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SUERF STUDIES 246INTRODUCTION
by David T Llewellyn, SUERF President
With  great  foresight,  SUERF  was  founded  in  1963  by  Professor  Pierre
Tabatoni (University of Paris) and Jacques Branger (Director General of the
Caisse  Nationale  des  Marchés  de  l’État  –  CNME).  It  was  founded  as
a Europe-wide forum with the aim of bringing together professionals from
banks  and  other  financial  institutions,  and  from  academia,  allowing
academics and practitioners the opportunity to exchange their views and to
interact on common areas of interest. In 1969, central bankers joined to form
a third “pillar”, being on the one hand a natural enlargement, and on the other
hand securing SUERF a sounder financial footing. From the outset it was
judged that, through the unique perspectives that the main constituents of
SUERF represent, it has the capacity to make significant contributions to
research, scholarship and understanding of key issues in public debate about
monetary and financial policy, and trends in banking and financial markets in
Europe. This was, and remains, the central mission of SUERF. The Mission
is to offer a forum for high-quality and informed analyses of key issues in
European money and finance.
To mark the 40
th anniversary, the Council of Management judged that it would
be appropriate and valuable to commission a special anniversary volume.
SUERF is a dynamic and evolving institution and has changed markedly over
the years, including its name which has recently been modified to SUERF:
The European Money and Finance Forum. However, the Council decided that
it did not want a self-indulgent history of SUERF itself but rather a reflective
view of evolving monetary and financial thought as seen through the choice
of topics in SUERF Colloquia and the papers presented and published in its
Colloquia volumes.
The Council was all too well aware that, given that there have been 24 Colloquia
and 22 Colloquia volumes containing 462 individual contributions by close
on  500  distinguished  authors  covering  over  8000  pages,  this  would  be
a formidable task. Without any hesitation, it was unanimously decided that
Jean-Paul Abraham  would  be  the  ideal  person  to  undertake  this  project.
Professor Abraham was, in many respects, eminently qualified to undertake
5the  venture  and  the  Council  was  very  pleased  that  he  willingly  agreed.
Jean-Paul  has  been  a constant  in  the  evolving  history  of  SUERF.  He  is
a distinguished  academic  and,  in  his  illustrious  career,  has  also  been
a distinguished European banker. He has therefore represented two of the
three main constituents of SUERF. His eminence to undertake the task is also
highlighted  by  the  fact  that  he  was  a founding  member  and  also
a distinguished past-President of SUERF in the period 1994-1997. Over and
above that, his dedication to, and support of, SUERF has been exemplary and
unsurpassed.
On behalf of the Council of Management, and all members of SUERF, Ishould
like to record deep gratitude to Jean-Paul for undertaking this Herculean task
for everyone who has an interest in SUERF and what it stands for. He has
produced a fascinating survey. In the process, he has made a formidable
contribution which I am confident will be of interest and value to financial
practitioners and academics who have an interest in the evolution of monetary
thought  and  practice,  and  the  development  of  financial  institutions  and
markets. It could not have been done better. We owe Jean-Paul a great deal for
what he has produced and the insights he offers in this volume.
The following pages relate solely to SUERF Colloquia and do not include
other  contributions  of  SUERF  through,  for  instance,  its  seminars,  annual
SUERF lectures, SUERF Studies and other publications. SUERF Colloquia
(which take place over a period of two and a half days) follow a common
format: a series of Keynote Lectures given by distinguished academics and
practitioners  (including  very  many  Governors  of  Central  Banks),  papers
presented in three parallel Commissions, and the Marjolin Lecture. In the
words of Professor Abraham below: “...the contribution of the Colloquia has
been to offer a forum for spreading the information and confronting the views
of high-level policy makers with the findings of the research done not only in
academia, but also in the research departments of various institutions”.
The  organisation  of  the  Colloquia  present  demanding  challenges  and,  on
behalf of the Council of Management, I would like to take this opportunity of
thanking all those who, over the years, have unstintingly contributed so much
behind the scenes to making SUERF Colloquia so very successful. I cannot
recall any other association in Europe that, over a period of 40 years, has
maintained  such  a high  and  continuous  standard  of  informed  analysis  of
European  monetary  and  financial  issues.  This  is  surely  testimony  to  the
enduring strength and value of SUERF. The constant and powerful support of
central banks, financial institutions, and academics demonstrates that SUERF
6 Introductionclearly “adds value”. That is what we strive to do. It is gratifying that the
support of the constituents demonstrates its enduring value. SUERF is, above
all, a “member organisation” which relies on the support and enthusiasm of
its members. This support has never failed.
The past forty years have witnessed substantial changes in all aspects of
European  and  international  finance  with  many  changes  in  both  the
international and domestic architecture and monetary regimes. The “business
of banking”, and the operation of financial institutions and markets, have also
changed out of all recognition. In reviewing these changes as seen through the
contributions  to  SUERF  Colloquia,  Jean-Paul  has  produced  a fascinating
study which highlights how monetary thought and practice have evolved over
almost  half  a century.  He  has  focussed  on  the  key  issues  discussed  at
Colloquia  and  on  how  thinking  and  practice  of  financial  markets  and
institutions have evolved over the period since the early 1960s. It is also clear
from his analysis that it has been the “force of events” rather than changing
theory that has shaped the programmes of Colloquia over the years. However,
and as Jean-Paul himself notes, “if academic thinking and theorising have
seldom played a dominant role in the choice of topics, they strongly continued
to highlight the basic issues at stake and to analysing them in a solid analytical
framework.” This is one of the major strengths of the association.
We must also be struck by the consistent high quality of the contributions at
Colloquia. Looking back, many of the papers have been very prescient and
authored  by  people  who  have  themselves  shaped  events. Above  all,  it  is
interesting to read the different perspectives of the three main constituents of
SUERF  each  of  which  has  always  been  powerfully  represented  at  each
Colloquium.
Over  the  past  forty  years  there  have  been  enormous  changes  in  the
international monetary systems, the role of private markets and institutions,
and in European monetary arrangements. Jean-Paul’s volume provides an
excellent set of insights into the nature, causes and implications of these
changes. The text also creates a strong impression about SUERF and the
contribution it has made through its choice of Colloquia topics and the quality
of the many papers presented at them. We look forward to this continuing
over the next forty years.
Loughborough, July, 2003
Introduction 7A Short Reader’s Manual
1. Part 1, the Survey: Section 1 is intentionally written in the first person
singular (I, me, my) because it presents the basic choices made by the
author in devising his essay. Section 2 and 3 are written in the first person
plural (we, us, our), suggesting a more general analysis, except where
a strictly personal opinion is expressed (in my opinion).
2. Part 1, Survey:  Being  written  on  the  same  documentary  base  as  the
quotations  of  Part  2,  Section  2  and  3  unavoidably  contain  some
duplications  and  repetitions.  Each  of  these  two  sections  can  be  read
separately. Readers primarily interested in catching ‘l’air du temps’o f
a specific period will probably prefer the synchronic approach per period
in Section 2. Those focusing on developments through time will be more
interested in the diachronic view of Section 3.
3. Part 2, Anthology (‘The SUERF Book of Quotations’): All the quotations
are presented in the language, the spelling and the syntax of the original
text,  except  those  referring  to  the  2003  Tallinn  Colloquium,  the
Colloquium Book for which had not been published at the time of writing.
In  this  instance,  the  quotations  have  been  drawn  from  unrevised
manuscripts, which sometimes needed some adjusting.
  Some quotations link excerpts from different paragraphs and sometimes
even different pages of the same article. Each excerpt is separated from the
next one by use of suspension points – “...”
  Titles and functions are those indicated in the relevant Colloquium Book.
Consequently, they refer to the title and the functions of the author at the
time of the Colloquium. So, for the first quotation from the first SUERF
Colloquium  (C1,  Tilburg  1969)  the  reference  to  the  author  should  be
understood as: Robert Russell (at the time of the Colloquium) Assistant
Professor of Political Science Wisconsin State University...
  The page number after each quotation obviously refers to the page number
in the Colloquium Book under review.
94. References:
  References to the quotations in the Anthology are indicated as Q under C1,
C2 etc.
  The other references are listed at the end of the Survey Part.
5. Some abbreviations:
abbr. indicates an abbreviation of the original text,
e.g. (exempli gratia), indicates an example given in the original text itself,
ibid. (ibidem) in the same place or text,
i.e. (id est) indicates an explanation added to the original text,
p.m. (pro memoria)
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EVIDENCE FROM FOUR DECADES OF SUERF
Part 1
A SURVEY OF SUERF COLLOQUIA
PUBLICATIONS 1969-2003
“... Non è vero che le idee sono sempre innocenti ...”
(Enzo Biagi, Addio a questi mondi, 2002)
In memory of my best friend ever, Prof. Fernand Nédée (1930-1980),
A driving force of the Paribas Group in Belgium in the late Sixties and in the Seventies, 
On the twenty-third anniversary of his untimely death...
Jean-Paul Abraham
President of SUERF 1994-1997
Professor (em.) Universities of Namur and Leuven
and College of Europe (Bruges), Former Executive




11Section 1: An Overall Presentation
“...SUERF is a rather unique institution. Every eighteen months it brings
together academics, practitioners and public officials to discuss financial and
monetary issues of interest to each of these groups. This is not an easy task.
On occasions the three groups can be like ships passing in the night,
acknowledging each others’ presence at a distance. So it is something of
a challenge to bridge their different perspectives on (a) topic in today’s
financial markets...” (Andrew D. Crockett, Keynote Speech, Colloquium
1995 in Thun, Switzerland)
Since its foundation in 1963 SUERF has organised 24 ‘General’Colloquia at
22 different locations in 16 countries. Although the number of more limited
regional conferences has increased in recent years, the ‘General’ Colloquia
have, for several reasons, remained the core activity of the organisation. First,
because  of  their  regularity: a Colloquium  has  been  held  about  every
18 months, alternatively in spring and autumn, the first one taking place in
Tilburg, The Netherlands, in 1969, and number 24 in Tallinn, Estonia, being
held in 2003. The regularity of the Colloquia is an impressive symbol of the
continuity of SUERF itself over four decades.
Secondly, because of their careful organisation: preparation starts about two
years in advance with the selection of the subject and the location; a call for
papers is sent out in due time; the conference itself combines plenary sessions
with  keynote  addresses  and  commission  work  in  three  (previously  four)
Commissions.  The  Colloquium  is  followed,  about  one  year  later,  by  the
publication of the Colloquium Book.
Thirdly and above all, the ‘General’Colloquia are a core business of SUERF
by their basicphilosophy, which reflects and justifies the working of SUERF
itself  as  “...an active network between financial economists, financial
practitioners, central bankers and academics for the analysis and mutual
understanding of monetary and financial issues...” (Excerpt from the SUERF
Mission Statement)
The present paper aims at analysing this Colloquium activity on the basis of
the publications connected with it, and from the specific point of view of the
monetary and financial thought expressed in them. Up to the spring of 2003,
13the  24  Colloquia  found  their  written  and  published  expression  in
21 Colloquium Books. No Colloquium Book was published after two of the
early Colloquia (Tarragona 1970, Strasbourg 1972). Some of the 1970 papers
and  all  of  the  1972  papers  found  their  way  in  brochures  published  in
1971-1972 in the so-called SUERF Series.
The  book  of  the  latest  Colloquium  under  review  (Tallinn  2003)  is
forthcoming and has provisionally been replaced by the mimeo version of the
main  papers  presented  at  this  event.  Below,  references  to  the  individual
colloquia are given by indication of their number as C1, C2 etc.
Thanks to the Archives of the SUERF Secretariat, to the personal library of
present and past Council Members and to the library of the National Bank of
Belgium, a complete set of these publications has been ‘reconstructed’ and
has been placed at my disposal. This help has been essential in starting the
project and is gratefully acknowledged here
1.
Choosing  ‘monetary  and  financial  thought’ as  the  specific  angle  of
investigation means that the objective of my analysis has not been to provide
l’histoire-bataille of the 24 Colloquia under review, which would probably
have resulted in a tedious ‘summary’ or even ‘a summary of the summaries’
already existing in the publications. On the other hand, this paper has not been
conceived as an academic monograph of economic thought, which would
have been a complete negation of the scope, context and contents of the
colloquia. As one of the contributors to the 1977 Colloquium in Wiesbaden
observed for the use of monetary targets in the New Monetary Policy of the
Seventies (Warren McClam, 1977, quoted in the Anthology Part) the choice
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1 I gratefully acknowledge the friendly and efficient help of:
– The SUERF Secretariat in Vienna – in particular of Executive Secretary Beatrix Krones; of
several members of the SUERF Council of Management and also of the National Bank of
Belgium for digging into their library and archives to assemble a complete set of SUERF
Colloquium Books and related publications,
– Morten  Balling  (Aarhus),  Erik  Buyst  (Leuven),  David  Llewellyn  (Loughborough),  Frank
Lierman  (Leuven-Brussels),  Ivo  Maes  (Brussels-Leuven)  and  Peter  Van  Dijcke  (Leuven-
Brussels)  for  making  comments,  suggestions  and  corrections  before,  during  and  after  the
drafting of the text,
– Emma Vorlat (Leuven), and Neil Foster (Vienna) for revising and correcting the rather rawish
English text of a non-native writer,
– Michael Bailey (Vienna) for editing the final version and monitoring the printing process.
All the remaining errors are mine.
JPAof the dominant themes and the title of a colloquium have been influenced
more by the “force of events” than by academic theories. The presentations
and discussions at the sessions are reactions to important events (e.g. the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system) or major shifts in policies and in
financial  activity  (e.g.  deregulation  or  globalisation).  These  reactions  are
partly  embedded  in  academic  thinking  but  also  in  the  analyses  of  bank
economists and in the field experience of the practitioners from both the
public  and  the  private  financial  sector,  from  central  and  the  commercial
bankers.
Therefore it is, in my opinion, essential to try to capture l’air du temps, the
general mood, the particular focus of a given colloquium by analysing the
written contributions, confronting them with the current thinking and practice
at that time. In this respect the keynote addresses, the General Reports (up to
the mid-1990s), the Marjolin Lectures afterwards, and also the introduction
and the conclusions of the individual papers are of particular interest, not only
for what – the content, but also for how – the way in which – something has
been said or written.
This explains why my analysis has been built on a documentary base of
quotations from the papers presented at the several colloquia. From these
quotations I have derived, in a synchronic approach, a characterisation of l’air
du temps and of the dominant issues in a given period. In the recapitulation at
the end I have taken a diachronic view, following the main developments
through time.
With the above considerations in mind, the reader will easily understand the
structure of the present contribution. The first part, the Survey, presents, after
this overall presentation, a characterization of the main issues in five distinct
periods, marked out by major events or major shifts:
  The demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system at the end of the Sixties
and the beginning of the Seventies,
  The first oil shock (October 1973) and the Bankhaus Herstatt Crash (June
1974),
  The shift to monetarism and deregulation in US policy and the constitution
of the European Monetary System at the end of the Seventies,
An Overall Presentation 15  The breakthrough of market-led globalisation and the road to European
Monetary Union starting in the early Nineties,
  The Millennium Turn in 2000-2003.
Under  the  title  “Constants  and  Change  Through  Four  Decades”,  a final
section recapitulates the main trends and evaluates them in the light of current
literature.
The second part of my contribution, the Anthology, constitutes the SUERF
‘Book of Quotations’ excerpted from the several Colloquium publications.
These quotations are expected to help the reader in feeling l’air du temps and
the developments through time.
I have made the selection and the ordering of the quotations based on three
criteria:
– The chronology of the colloquia, with one section per colloquium, starting
at C1, in 1969 and ending at C24 in 2003;
– The  specific focus of  my  analysis:  exploring  monetary  and  financial
thinking  about  basic  issues,  thereby  excluding  (outdated)  statistics,
methodological  problems,  techniques,  and  also  purely  descriptive
information;
– Rather strict space limitations: the more extended coverage for the recent
colloquia undoubtedly results from an implicit actualisation process (with
a rather high subjective actualisation coefficient!), favouring issues and
texts that are more than mere ‘historical monuments’ and remain relevant
for present discussions and policies. However, this extension also derives
from  the  increased density of  the  contributions  in  the  more  recent
Colloquium Books. Since the mid-Nineties these publications no longer
present all the written contributions of the colloquia but only a selection of
those, which are, rightly or wrongly, considered as the most significant
ones  by  an  ad hoc committee.  These  texts  frequently  incorporate  the
‘technical progress’ made in economic analysis through the four decades
under review. More space was needed to adjust to this improvement in
quality and technicality.
The two parts of the present contribution, Survey and Anthology, are linked
to  each  other  in  a closely  interactive  way.  As  already  mentioned,  the
16 An Overall Presentationquotations  of  the  Anthology  have  been  collected  to  constitute  the
documentary base for the Survey. But they have been selected and ordered,
having in mind some a priori impressions about characteristic periods and
issues to be analysed in the Survey.
Hopefully, the complete text, with its two parts, will provide a fair picture of
the way in which monetary and financial thinking has penetrated the core
activity of SUERF in the four decades since its constitution, and will be useful
as a source of inspiration for future times.
An Overall Presentation 17Section 2: Major Events, Dominant Themes and
Outstanding Contributions in Five Distinct
Periods
Period I: 1969- early 1974: The Demise of the Bretton Woods
International Monetary System
Four Colloquia:
C1: Tilburg, April 1969: The future of the International Monetary System
C2: Tarragona, October 1970: Monetary Policy and New Developments in
Banking
C3: Strasbourg, January 1972: Aspects of European Monetary Union
C4: Nottingham,  April  1973:  Multinational  Enterprises  –  Financial  and
Monetary Aspects
The opening address by Louis Camu, the highly esteemed President of the
Banque de Bruxelles (Quoted in the Anthology under C3, in short: QunderC3)
shows how much the events around the breakdown of the quarter-of-a century
old international monetary system impacted on thinking and reactions at that
time.  The  Strasbourg  Colloquium  was  held  six  months  after  the  Nixon
Declaration of inconvertibility (into gold) of the US dollar (15 August 1971)
and only a few weeks after the Smithsonian Conference (18 December 1971).
There the computers ‘produced’ a substantial devaluation of the dollar in
a completely new grid of exchange rate parities, which, however, did not resist
the pressures of the markets in the months thereafter. In his typical Latin style,
Louis Camu spoke of the death of the monetary structure of the world and,
using a phrasing by Sartre, urged the audience to look at this historical event
‘avecdesyeuxréinventés’. He announced (wrongly) that the persistent creation
of liquidity through the deficits of the US balance of payments financed by the
rest of the world had come to an end.
This gives a tragicomical connotation to most of the contributions to C1, the
Tilburg Colloquium in 1969, where the future of the international monetary
had completely been analysed as a reform within the existing system and not
as its breakdown. Reading the papers and the position statements of the stars
of that time (cf. the Q under C1 in the Anthology) one feels like listening to
the orchestra on the Titanic, stoically performing while the ship was sinking.
19What,  in  my  opinion,  should  be  remembered  of  that  future  which  never
materialized, is the brilliant paper by Robert W. Russell, a then, presumably
young, Assistant Professor at Wisconsin State University, who analysed the
pressures on the existing system and the proposals of reform considering five
variables:  freedom  of  international  economic  transactions,  alterability  of
exchange  rates,  internationally  accepted  monetary  reserves,  autonomous
mechanisms for adjustment and foreign holding of key national currencies
(especially US dollar and British Pound Sterling). He concluded that the most
fundamental  and  promising  changes  would  be  to  make  exchange  rates
somewhat (sic) more flexible and to activate the Special Drawing Rights IMF
arrangement for managed growth in world monetary reserves (Q under C1).
From  what  precedes,  we  can  safely  derive  that  macroeconomic issues in
international monetary relations dominated the SUERF Colloquia scene in
this period. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system spurred efforts to add
a specific monetary dimension to European integration. The debacle of the
Werner Plan (1971) was a major incentive at the Strasbourg Colloquium for
searching  for  new  ways  towards  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  By  its
timing,  by  the  quality  of  the  contributors  and  contributions  and  by  the
intensity  of  the  discussions,  this  meeting  may  be  considered  an  early
landmark in the history of the SUERF Colloquia.
From the point of view of economic thought, the paper presented at this
meeting  by  Prof. Fabrizio Onida,  from  the  University  of  Milano,  still
deserves  attention,  because  it  criticises  a mere  theoretical  architecture  of
EMU derived from the literature on the optimum currency area, and also
an over-emphasis on exchange rate stability in the sense of irreversible parity
pegging (Q under C3). His position on the latter issue is typical of Italian
thinking in the early Seventies.
The focus on international monetary relations in this period dwarfs, at least
for an ex post observer, the significance of the Tarragona (1970) and the
Nottingham Colloquia (Spring 1973). What is left of the former is a rather
academic survey of the various theories of monetary policy (Q under C2) and
a Swiss paper on the working and the pros and cons of the Eurocurrency
market (ibid). The latter meeting (Q under C4) focused on the working of
multinational enterprises, especially in their relations and frequent tensions
with national state policies, a theme which is now a current issue in the
analyses of emerging market economies and which has also been revived at
the 2003 Tallinn colloquium, as far as the impact of foreign banks in Central
and Baltic Europe is concerned.
20 Major Events, Dominant Themes and Outstanding ContributionsFinally, two particular points may be added to complete the picture of the
SUERF Colloquia in this period:
The problems about the entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC (1973): At
the  Strasbourg  meeting,  Continentals  expressed  suspicion  about  ‘the
historical ballast’linked with the reserve currency function of the sterling. On
the contrary, the British emphasised that the ‘marriage’ was not one between
a debt-ridden Britain and a reserve-rich Community and that ‘the bride, in
fact, brings a fine dowry’: the international relations of London as a top
financial centre (Q under C3).
The SUERF attention to the problems of the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, which were still integrated in the Comecon system under Soviet
dominance. This concern was expressed from the very first Colloquium in
Tilburg on, where two academics from Czechoslovakia presented a paper and
participated in an exchange of views on the future of the international system
(Q under  C1).  Afterwards,  the  association  of  academics  and  financial
professionals from that region became a tradition in the series of Colloquia
and even a major concern after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
Period II: Late 1974- early 1979: the Aftermath of Oil Shocks
and Bank Failures
Four colloquia:
C5:  Venice,  October  1974:  Floating  exchange  rates  –  The  lessons  from
experience
C6:  Brussels,  April  1976:  The  Development  of  Financial  Institutions
1956-1976
C7:  Wiesbaden, September 1977: New Approaches in Monetary Policy
C8:  Basle,  May  1979:  Europe  and  the  Dollar  in  the  World-Wide
Disequilibrium
The quinquennium after the first oil shock (October 1973) and the Herstatt
Bank  Crash  (June  1974)  was  a period  of  disarray and search for new
monetary anchors.
Major Events, Dominant Themes and Outstanding Contributions 21International monetary relations remained  at  the  forefront  of  several
colloquia, as shown by the inconclusive Venice discussion on the experience
of floating exchange rates and the colourful controversies in Basle about what
has  been  called  in  the  Anthology:  The stormy relations in growing
interdependence (between Europe and the United States).
From the quotations under C5 we can derive that the initial interest and trust
in  floating  exchange  rate  regimes  as  an  instrument  of  adjustment  of
international payments and as a tool for insulating domestic monetary policy
from external pressures had significantly weakened. In the opinion of several
authors, (i) no system of exchange rates – either floating or fixed – could
work well under the pressure of the enormous oil deficits (Francis Forte,
Q under C5), (ii) no new theoretical breakthrough had been achieved in the
fixed  versus  floating  debate  (Governor Carli,  ibid),  and  (iii)  empirical
conclusions were difficult to draw because recent experience was not about
a system of generalised ‘clean’ (i.e. pure) floating or not even of managed
floating, but about a variety of different, sometimes hybrid, systems (Francis
Forte and E. Merigo, ibid).
Meanwhile, the after-effects of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and
of the first oil shock had intensified what Irving S. Friedman has called The
World-Wide Inflation Disaster (Friedman 1974),  with  two-digit  inflation
rates in many countries. Therefore, the focus in the Colloquia shifted, at least
partly,  from  international  to  overall monetary policy,  domestic  and
international.  The  monetarist  paradigm  according  to  which  inflation  was
a monetary  phenomenon  that  should  be  counteracted  by  restrictive
quantitative control of the money supply, no longer remained a subject of
academic  debate.  It  penetrated  the  research  departments  of  financial
institutions  and  even  the  boardroom  of  some  central  banks,  especially,
although in a pragmatic way, that of the Bundesbank.
This  constituted  the  background  of  the  impressive  1977  Wiesbaden
Colloquium,  which  I consider  as  the  archetype  of  what  a good  SUERF
Colloquium should be:
  an  extensive  academic  input  by  Jacques Sijben on  the  theoretical
foundations of monetary policy from a monetarist point of view;
  a well-structured exposé by Helmut Schlesinger, at that time Member of
the  Directorate  of  the  Bundesbank,  on  the  philosophy  and  the
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and its control of the money creation process;
  an international survey of targets and techniques in Western Europe by
Warren McClam;
  contributions not only from individual officials of central banks, but also
from  research  departments  as  such  (including  those  of  the  Bank  of
England, the Banca d’Italia and the Banco de España);
  analyses  of  the  international  aspects  of  monetary  policy  and  their
coordination by Theo Peeters and Niels Thygesen (cf. Q under C7).
Evidently, the pressure of generalized inflation was also felt at the level of
markets and individual institutions.At the Brussels 1976 Colloquium, a sharp
divergence  of  views  arose  about  the  issue  of  indexation  of  financial
instruments, a process brilliantly advocated by Roland Vaubel. In retrospect,
the upshot of the discussion was that, if indexed financial tools may protect
individual  firms  and  persons  against  inflation,  they  also  help  to
institutionalise inflation and to weaken the incentive to suppress inflationary
pressures (Q under C6).
On the other hand, the Herstatt Bank crash and other bank failures and losses
contributed to attract the attention not only to the immediate effects of bank
‘accidents’but even more to the (in)adequacy of liquidity and solvency in the
financial sector, and to the need to improve national banking supervision and
international coordination of national supervision. In the formulation, at the
Colloquium, by G. Blunden, Executive Director of the Bank of England and
Chairman of the new Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory
Practices of the Group of Ten: “(The failures, etc.) served as a catalyst for
much rethinking of traditional attitudes both within individual banks and
within supervisory authorities...” (Q under C6)
Finally, by way of a transition to the next period, it should be mentioned that
the  1979  Basle  Colloquium  was  held  at  a moment  that  the  European
Monetary System (EMS) had already been launched (March 1979). At the
Colloquium,  one  of  the  Founding  Fathers  of  this  system,  Jacques van
Ypersele motivated and described EMS referring to the progress to be made
in overall European integration and growth, and in overall exchange rate
stabilisation (Q under C8).
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Europeans  recognised,  some  of  them  with  regret,  that  the  dollar  was
inescapable,  ‘incontournable’ in  international  monetary  relations,  but  that
some of its functions (e.g. those of international monetary reserve) should be
shared with European currencies in a context of multilateral interdependence
and cooperation (ibid).
Anglo-Saxon scepticism, especially on the EMS approach, was not absent
(Ralph C. Bryant, Brookings Institution: Exchange rate stability can result
from, but cannot by itself engender, an integrated Europe)  (ibid).  This
heralded many discussions in the Eighties and Nineties.
Period III: The Eighties: Disinflation, Exchange Rate Stabilisation,
‘Marketisation’ of Banking and Finance
Seven Colloquia:
C9:  Helsingør, October 1980: Bank Management in a Changing Domestic
and International Environment
C10: Vienna, April 1982: International Lending in a Fragile World Economy
C11: Madrid,  October  1983:  Government  Policies  and  the  Working  of
Financial Systems in Industrialized Countries
C12: Cambridge, March 1985: Shifting Frontiers in Financial Markets
C13: Luxembourg,  October  1986:  International  Monetary  and  Financial
Integration – The European Dimension
C14: Helsinki,  May  1988:  The  International  Adjustment  Process,  New
Perspectives,  Recent  Experience  and  Future  Challenges  for  the
Financial System
C15: Nice,  October  1989:  Financial  Institutions  in  Europe  Under  New
Competitive Conditions.
In many respects the experience of the Eighties, as reflected in the collection
of  the  seven  Colloquia  Books  of  the  decade,  can  be  divided  into  two
subperiods or phases, linked to one another by some common factors. In the
current literature, the dividing line is often traced to the middle of the decade
and  the  Plaza Accord  of  September  1985.  This  instigated  an  attempt  to
stabilise  exchange  rates  worldwide  through  multilateral,  mostly  tripolar,
policy  coordination.  As  this  effort  met  only  with  partial  and  temporary
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we prefer the distinction made by Michael Artis (Q under C13). In his paper
he opposed ‘the global post-1979 episode’ in which the theme of ‘putting
one’s own house in order’ had been dominant, and ‘the issue of the day’ (in
1986),  which  was,  rather  than  inflation,  ‘employment’.  However,  we  will
generalise ‘the issue of the day’ into a ‘search for new, market-led growth.
The  ‘global  post-1979  episode’ has  been  essentially  an  exercise  in
disinflation, led by the harsh but efficient US monetary policy à la Volcker.
Together with the after-effects of the second oil shock, this policy brought the
world economy to the brink of a generalised financial crisis. Nevertheless,
it finally succeeded in reducing inflationary pressures.
The  concern  for  a major  financial  crisis  was  apparent  at  the  Vienna
Colloquium of April 1982 (C10) and, eventually, materialized later that year
in  the  so-called  Mexican  crisis,  which  shocked  the  financial  system
worldwide. At that time volatility (of exchange and interest rates), fragility
and risk became keywords in many papers (Q under C10).
International bankers were accused of reckless profiteering from the recycling
of the oil surpluses and Eurocurrency markets were considered as mysterious
mechanisms with multiplier effects, which hampered the conduct of monetary
policy.
However, Rainer Gut, the President of Crédit Suisse, replied in a sharply
formulated paper (Q ibid) that the international banking system, by financing
the payments deficits after the oil shocks, filled, almost against its will (sic),
the gap created by government hesitations and cuts in development aid. On
his side, David Llewellyn blew up the ‘mystery’of the Eurodollar market by
pointing out that this market posed no threat to the conduct of monetary
policy if this policy did not rely on non-market and control mechanisms and
did not influence the competitive position of the domestic sector vis-à-vis the
Euro-sector (Q ibid).
This marks the Vienna Colloquium as a memorable event, with outstanding
papers by authors such as Alexander Swoboda, Luigi Spaventa and David
Llewellyn.
Pessimism about the prospects of banking and the future of bankers had
already  been  expressed,  in  terms  of  to be or not to be at  the  Helsingør
Colloquium (C9) on bank management (1980).
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the crowding out of the private sector as a result of the priority to be given to
the financing of huge government deficits.
Already at Helsingør, the Bocconi team (Franco Bruni, Mario Monti and
Angelo Porta) had concluded that when deficits are no longer financed by the
creation  of  monetary  base  (which  was  one  of  the  main  objectives  of
monetarist anti-inflation policy) and banks are compelled to pursue lending to
the public sector by direct or indirect portfolio constraints, these constraints
must be regarded as disguised taxes levied on banks. They may be partly or
completely  shifted  by  them  to  other  agents  in  a kind  of  transmission
mechanism of fiscal policy (Q under C9).
Crowding out became the ‘star’ at C11 in Madrid in 1983, which focused on
the explosion of budget deficits in a period of stagflation. The general tune of
the Colloquium was set by an acting President and a former President of an
important  central  bank: Alvarez Rendueles of  the  Banco  de  España  and
Ottmar Emminger of  the  Bundesbank,  the  latter  proposing  a ‘law of
government retrenchment’ instead  of  the  Wagner  law  of  increasing
government  expenditures.  Meanwhile,  inflation  rates  had  diminished  and
several speakers were wondering and tried to explain why real interest rates
remained so high (Q under C11).
On the whole, the Colloquia during the ‘post-1979 episode’ reflected all the
difficulties  of  a period  of  ‘remise en ordre’, which,  at  critical  moments,
required harsh crisis management and raised the well-known question: why
are these hardships necessary? Only later, at the Helsinki Colloquium in
1988, was the resulting success of this crisis management fully recognised
(Q under C14).
In the second half of the Eighties, the general mood at the Colloquia became
more cheerful and forward-looking. This appears from a series of positive
indications collected from the Colloquia Books of that period:
– The experience of the first years of EMS got a positive evaluation as far as
the intra-EMS exchange rate stabilisation was concerned (Jean-Jacques
Rey and Jan Michielsen). This experience was considered as a regional
counterpart to the international disinflation effort, combining the function
of a counter-inflation framework with that of stabilizing intra-EMS real
exchange rates (Michael Artis, Q under C13, 1986).
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EMS and as part of the Europe 1992 project aiming at the Single Market
of goods and services. Rey and Michielsen suggested a ‘Werner Plan
revisited’ (ibid).
– The success of the disinflation effort and of intra-EMS exchange rate
stabilisation  improved  the  prospects  of  tripolar  policy  cooperation
between the US, Japan and the EEC and even, on a larger scale at the 1988
Helsinki Colloquium (C14), those for an international global adjustment
process.  This  worldwide  adjustment  would  involve  tackling  the  US
payments  imbalances  and  financing  developing  countries,  which  had
suffered  an  ‘involuntary’ adjustment  after  the  Mexican  crisis  (with
remarkable  papers  by  Christian de Boissieu (Q under  C13),  Sergio
Siglienti and Robert Pringle (Q under C14)). However, the optimism for
global adjustment through policy cooperation weakened after the failure of
the Louvre Accord in 1987 and had practically disappeared by the end of
the  decade.  This  evolution  rendered  obsolete  a significant  part  of  the
literature on policy cooperation, which had been developed at that time,
for example, concerning the concept and the technicalities of target zones
for exchange rates.
What finally seems to be the most important development in the Eighties
from the point of view of economic thought is implied in the title of the 1985
Cambridge  Colloquium:  Shifting Frontiers in Financial Markets. At  that
meeting,  the  late  Tadeusz Rybczynski (Q under  C12)  distinguished  two
dimensions in these shifts: the extension of external frontiers of financial
activity (i.e. ‘globalisation’) and the removal of internal frontiers between
financial  activities  and  between  various  types  of  institutions  (i.e.
‘desegmentation’ or ‘despecialisation’), resulting from a greater reliance on
market forces, which in turn pointed to deregulation (Governor Robin Leigh
Pemberton, ibid).
The transition from a government-led system of markets and institutions to
a market-led one, the ‘marketisation of banking and finance’ (Jan Koning,
ibid) did not take place at once, but spanned the whole decade, linking the two
subperiods and most of the colloquia of the decade.
Neither  did  the  process  occur  at  the  same  pace  everywhere.  In  the
mid-Eighties it still differentiated the US and the UK from most countries of
Continental  Europe.  But  in  the  second  half  of  the  decade  the  process
accelerated and generalised, so that at the last colloquium of the Eighties
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the question: “Why does it all happen now? ... What happens now is both
a quantitative and a qualitative jump with deregulation proceeding in many
countries at a sharp accelerated pace, capital controls being reduced in many
parts of the globe, innovation becoming a driving force and finance rapidly
internationalising. It is the simultaneous occurrence of these factors in many
parts of the globe, at a rapid pace, which is the new phenomenon. I think there
are two major forces at work, reinforcing each other. One is the increasing
internationalization of the non-financial sector. The other is that existing
regulations were largely set up for needs of the past and therefore not well
suited for present needs...”  Rainer S. Masera spoke  in  the  same  sense,
mentioning  the  ‘ossification’ of  regulatory  frameworks  over  an  almost
fifty-year span (Q under C15).
All this explains why I consider the second half of the Eighties as a period of
search for a new market-led growth. Some authors, such as David Llewellyn
at C 13, that is before the Europe 1992 project and the full EMU move of the
Nineties, estimated that, in this search, the European dimension was swamped
by factors operating at the global level and was ‘irrelevant or at least of
second-order for international financial integration’.  The  subsequent
developments,  especially  in  the  Nineties,  will  show  that  the  interaction
between the global and the European dimension still remains a significant
feature of financial life in Europe (Q under C13).
Period IV: The Nineties: The Dominance of (unstable) Markets.
The New Europe after Berlin and Maastricht.
The strenuous but successful Road to EMU.
Six Colloquia:
C16: Lisbon, May 1991: Fiscal Policy, Taxation and the Financial System in
an Increasingly Integrated Europe
C17: Berlin,  October  1992:  The  New  Europe:  Evolving  Economic  and
Financial Systems in East and West
C18: Dublin, May 1994: The Competitiveness of Financial Institutions and
Centres in Europe
C19: Thun, October 1995: Risk Management in Volatile Financial Markets
28 Major Events, Dominant Themes and Outstanding ContributionsC20: Budapest, May 1997: Corporate Governance, Financial Markets and
Global Convergence
C21: Frankfurt, October 1998: The euro: A Challenge and Opportunity for
Financial Markets
The list of topics and even the length of the titles of the colloquia in the
Nineties  point  to  an  increasing  variety,  from  the  macro  level,  over  the
markets, down to the management and governance of individual financial
firms, and vice versa. Besides the impact of changes in the organisation (more
joint initiatives with other institutions, extension of the list of authors and
contributions as a result of regular calls for papers, attracting young talent,
new  topics  and  new  ideas),  this  diversity  reflects  the  way  in  which  the
financial  system  works  at  present,  and  is  also  progressively  extended  to
Central, Baltic and Eastern Europe: a mix of evolving government policy,
regulation and supervision, intense and globalised market activity in unstable
conditions, and the competitive struggle of financial institutions.
Three main determinants may be mentioned:
– The ‘force of major events’, particularly the Fall of the Berlin Wall (1989)
and the signature of the Maastricht Treaty (1991-1992), which created
a ‘New Europe’ involved, at the same time, in two transitions:
in the East, towards a privatised market economy, a two-tier bank system
and a progressive and as yet uncompleted integration into an enlarged
European Union;
in the West, towards full EMU and a single currency through a process in
three stages.
– The dominance of markets, characterised  by  globalisation,  intense
competition  and  widespread  financial  risk,  which,  all  three,  exerted
increasing pressure on the management and the governance of individual
financial firms.
– The launching of the euro, as the rather exuberant end of the journey on
the road to EMU, creating a framework with new challenges and new
expectations.
  The Dominance of Markets
This aspect closely links up with the experience of ‘marketisation’of banking
and finance in the 1980s. However, as reflected in the colloquia of the decade,
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is not a mere ‘continuation’but a ‘continuing acceleration’with an emphasis
on specific points, old and new:
– Shift to Capital Markets:  Much  attention  was  given  to  the  shift  from
traditional  intermediation  by  banks  towards  finance  through  capital
markets, which also involved the intervention of non-bank intermediaries,
such as securities houses. David Llewellyn held that, as a consequence of
this  shift,  banking  may  exhibit  some  characteristics  of  a ‘declining
industry’, whose comparative advantages in its traditional business and its
protection by regulation had been eroded (Q under C17). On the contrary,
Rainer Masera considered the phenomenon as a diversification of the
forms  of  intermediation,  in  which  banks  were  able  to  maintain
a significant role, if they achieved economies of scale and scope in the
production  of  financial  services  through  appropriate  operational  and
organisational strategies (Q under C18).
– Competitive Environment: A review in Dublin of the reactions of banks
and financial centres to the new environment after deregulation pointed to
varying national  banking  strategies  but  often  analogous pressures  of
competition for more efficiency, more profitability and a reduction of risks
through diversification in large commercial banks (ibid).
From the academic side, Jacques Sijben introduced, in an impressive
paper,  asymmetric  information,  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  as
determinants of market imperfections. In a downturn of the cycle these
imperfections may contribute to financial crises. He stressed the need for
stable  government  policies  and  an  institutional  environment  that
encourages diversification of risks (ibid).
– Risk, Risk Management and Financial Fragility: these were the keywords
at  the  1995  Thun  meeting.  In  an  in-depth  analysis  of  risk,  Andrew
Crockett distinguished  diversifiable  risk,  which  can  be  hedged  or
diversified away, and non-diversifiable risk, which requires a prudential
capital cushion on the part of individual institutions in a framework of
capital adequacy requirements of the Basle type. Official support should
be available in the event of truly unforeseen shocks of major proportions
(Q under C19).
Martin Hellwig linked  up  with  some  of  the  considerations  expressed
above,  by  explaining  the  impact  on  financial  fragility  of  interest  and
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erosion of margins in traditional banking and to the reduced ability of
banks to rely on oligopoly rents to withstand shocks (ibid).
– Volatility, Bubbles, Crises. Charles Goodhart argued that the perception
of  worsening  risk,  though  fashionable,  had  been  much  exaggerated,
“... It would not surprise me if, by the year 2010, we looked back at the
decades of the 1980s and 1990s as being (periods) of general stability and
relatively little structural change...” (Q under C19). In his paper, Crockett
(implicitly) replied that, although average volatility may not have risen,
the risk of large short-term but potentially disruptive price movements
may indeed have increased (ibidem).
It  appeared,  anyway,  that  the  frequency  of  such  recent  disruptions  on
various financial markets had induced several economists in international
organisations to explore the determinants and the specific aspects of these
crises. In their findings, Claudio Borio and Robert McAuley at the BIS
and Philip Davis at the European Central Bank attributed the outburst of
the crises to the own dynamics of the market(s) involved, more than to
fundamental  economic  and  financial  factors  (ibid).  The  (implicit)
conclusion from these studies was, in my opinion, that such crises could
not be handled merely with the traditional instruments of monetary policy
and that a new dimension had to be added to the objectives of public
policy:  financial stability,  besides  and  as  a complement  to  monetary
stability.
From the point of view of economic thought these ideas were, at that time,
discussed in many academic and policymaking circles. In this sense they
were not new. However, as usual, the contribution of the Colloquia has
been to offer a forum for spreading the information and confronting the
views of high-level policy makers with the findings of the research done
not only in academia, but also in the research departments of various
institutions.
  Transition Economics: The East: Stabilisation, Institution Building,
Convergence still far away.
By the ‘force of events’, the Colloquia got involved in Transition Economics.
This involvement was new, certainly as far as Central and Eastern Europe
were  concerned.  By  definition,  the  subject  implies  ‘transitional’ elements
such as interim reports on various experiments, many of which will not have
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reflect l’air du temps. They will be omitted in the present survey, which
focuses  on  the  more  lasting  elements  in  the  development  of  economic
thought.
That Transition Economics will penetrate the issues and problems inherited
from previous periods was already apparent at the first Colloquium of the
decade: C16 at Lisbon, in May 1991, where the dominant theme referred to
the saving-investment relation. As underlined by Mervyn King (Q under
C16) the fall in the aggregate saving rate was marked and general in the
1980s: roughly 6 percentage points in all the major countries. Hence the
concern  that  savings  would  be  insufficient  to  cover  the  investment  and
financing needs of the Nineties. Several participants were sceptical about the
effectiveness of tax incentives to increase aggregate savings and insisted on
further  reduction  of  public  budget  deficits,  i.e.  government  dissaving.
However, from the German side, no doubt was left about increased public
transfers  and  expenditures  induced  by  German  economic  and  monetary
unification.  Hans-Peter Fröhlich astutely  added  that  this  situation  was
exactly what had been internationally expected from and asked of Germany
in the Eighties (Q ibid).
At that Colloquium the transition from 1989 to the start of “self-sustained
growth on market principles” in the East, was optimistically estimated at
6-7 years by Conrad Reuss (ibid). This optimism did not stand the test of
hard  experience,  which  was  reflected  in  the  subsequent  meetings.  An
overview of the basic statements made from the 1992 Berlin Colloquium
(C17) on, provides the following picture:
– In Berlin, both policymakers and professional economists emphasised the
complexity and the difficulties of economic reform in the East. Governor
Hans Tietmeyer stated that there was no unique blueprint or ‘royal road’
to successful reform. And Associate IMF Director Manuel Guitián added
that the challenge was “to extract from an increasingly obsolete body of
expertise and from the still-to-be applicable body of knowledge insights
that can help the reform along in an orderly fashion ...” (Q under C17).
– In Berlin, as well as in Lisbon, opinions and statement generally stuck to
‘the middle of the road’ between what was called the Anglo-American
model of going ‘cold turkey’into a free market system (RoyC. Smith and
Ingo Walter) and gradualism without time path or limit. Much emphasis
was put on the imperative of ‘institution building’ (Helen Junz) or ‘the
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accompany stabilisation. In this context participants in Berlin discussed
the pros and cons for the East, of different systems of corporate ownership,
on the basis of a paper by Colin Mayer distinguishing the insider systems
of corporate ownership, as in most Continental European Countries and in
Japan and the outsider systems, as in the US and the UK (Q ibid).
– Convergence between  East  and  West  was  the  leitmotiv  of  the  1997
Budapest Colloquium (C20), which focused on corporate governance. In
his introductory presentation, Morten Balling stated that in all parts of
Europe  –  East  and  West  –  one  can  find  countries  which  are  moving
towards governance systems in which financial markets can be expected
to play a stronger disciplining role on corporate managers and where one
can  also  find  cases  of  privatisation,  allowing  tougher  monitoring  of
managers  (Q under  C20).  In  fact,  most  papers  dealt  with  corporate
governance problems in the West (e.g. the respective role of the large
shareholder(s), of the banks and, most of all, of institutional investors as
stakeholders in corporations) quoting aspects which were not immediately
applicable to the East, at least at that time. This clearly appeared from the
comparison of these papers with the case study on the Czech Republic and
Poland, presented by Tito Boeri and Giancarlo Perasso (Q under C20).
Afterwards, the convergence issue gained momentum, when a significant
number of Central and Baltic Europe countries applied for entry into the
enlarged European Union. One had to wait for the 2003 Colloquium in
Tallinn  (C24)  to  assess  the  progress  made  in  the  six  years  after  the
Budapest event (cf. the next period).
  Transition Economics: The West: The Bumpy Road to EMU.
The first years of the Nineties corresponded, in the EEC, to the last phase of
the Single Market Project and the start of the journey in three stages towards
full  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  It  was  a period  of  turbulences  and
uncertainty, marked by the EMS exchange rate crisis of 1992-1993 and by the
political difficulties to get the Treaty of Maastricht ratified in some countries,
events which were all echoed in the SUERF Colloquia.
Speaking at the 1991 Lisbon colloquium, Jean-Jacques Rey compared these
years to a mountain hike where ‘climbing starts only when one has walked
alongtimealready’(Qunder C16). The climbing was towards further progress
in convergence, which meant catching up for some countries, consolidation for
others. There was a need to manage currencies within the EMS, to eliminate
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to EMU, and to remedy a number of difficult-to-identify rigidities, which ran
the risk of putting the country concerned at a competitive disadvantage when
EMU was implemented (ibid).
In  the  background  stood  the  fact  –  highlighted  by  Axel  Weber in  his
Marjolin-Prize  winning  paper  and  exemplified  by  the  sterilisation  of
interventions within the EMS – that “neither the Bundesbank nor the central
banks in the remaining EMS were prepared to give up some monetary
autonomy for the sake of exchange stability” (Q under C19).
The problem boils down to what Robert Raymond said at the end of his
Marjolin  Lecture  at  the  Thun  Colloquium:  “...If the target can easily be
determined, difficulties are in the transition... The challenge is to find the
optimal path between some flexibility which would be compatible with the
variety of individual situations and a smoothly organised transition...”
(Q ibid).
However, three years before, at the Berlin Colloquium, Governor Tietmeyer
had defended the EMS, as an important stopover and also a test on the road
to EMU (Q under C 17).
But,  from  the  point  of  view  of  economic  thought,  the  most  remarkable
development was what Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa wrote in his 1994 book
‘The Road to Monetary Union in Europe’and what Niels Thygesen recalled
in  his  masterly  survey  of  ‘Twenty Five Years of European Monetary
Unification’ at the Frankfurt Colloquium in 1998 (C 21): “that the utopian
perspective of full currency union was confirmed as a realistic option by the
1992-1993 crises in the EMS. With the degree of capital mobility achieved
at the end of the 1880s, fixed -but-adjustable exchanges rates might have
become impossible to maintain...” (Q under C21). Despite the hesitations
of some central bankers and the staunch opposition of many academics,
which was also felt at the SUERF Colloquia, this would, in the second half
of the decade, become the safer way to full EMU, including the Single
Currency.
On this road, the policymakers got the support of top practitioners in the
financial world. At the SUERF Colloquia, Graham Bishop promoted the
idea and sketched, in several papers, the prospects of a large European market
for savings, for bonds, for pension funds, in an integrated area with a single
currency (Q under C17 and C21).
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Symbolically, the 21
st Colloquium was held in Frankfurt, the city chosen as
the seat of the European Central Bank. It was held about six months after the
final decision to introduce the single currency and less than three months
before the effective launching of the euro. Europe was resisting the East Asian
crisis, which induced Governor Tietmeyer to say, in his opening address,
that the euro had passed its first acid test, since it proved that the markets had
accepted the transition to monetary union as ‘irreversible’ and regarded the
euro as a safe haven (Q under C21). Dresdner Bank Director Ernst-Moritz
Lipp joined this statement in a more cautious way: “...The euro has passed its
first critical test before it comes into existence but the experiences of the
Asian tiger states have shown that every trust must be earned ex post ...”
(Q ibid).
These statements explain why most papers and the discussions reflected some
exuberance on the prospective structural effects of the introduction of the euro
and  of  the  single  monetary  policy  connected  with  it.  Olivier De Bandt
phrased a rather general expectation that the final impact of EMU would be
to increase the competitiveness of banks in the Single Currency area and to
favour the emergence of some large Europe-based global banking groups,
while, at the same time, smaller institutions may develop profitable niches
(Q ibid). Rudi Vander Vennet estimated that the continued expansion of
financial conglomerates and universal banks in Europe, partly as a response
to EMU, would lead to a more efficient financial system (Q ibid).
In the field of portfolio management and corporate finance, government bond
markets  would  be  more  integrated  and  yields  closely  correlated.  Non-
government borrowers would increasingly borrow directly from investors by
issuing debt securities rather than borrowing from banks, leading to a US-
style corporate bond market. The national bias in equity and fixed income
investments  would  diminish  and  funds  would  be  increasingly  managed
against  Euro-wide  benchmarks,  possibly  involving  some  reallocation  of
existing investments. Equity markets would grow, as more companies go
public and more investors seek to invest funds in equity markets. In addition
to these general trends, Goldman Sachs banker Martin Brooks estimated that
cross-border  flows  resulting  from  the  re-balancing  of  portfolios  may  be
skewed towards large-cap stocks (Q ibid).
The launching of the euro was an opportunity to discuss a possible lender-of-
last resort function for the European Central Bank (Allessandro Prati and
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in the euro area and the disposal of their excess foreign reserves (Daniel Gros
and Franziska Schobert) (all Q ibid).
However, the optimism was not unlimited. Michael Artis had conducted
a clustering exercise on 18 countries, the result of which was, as expected,
that in Europe three groups could be distinguished: a cluster around Germany,
a ‘Northern periphery’ and a ‘Southern periphery’. A single monetary policy
could  probably  not  always  fit  all  ...  Policies  to  substitute  for  the  loss  of
independent monetary policies in some countries should be considered.
The most qualifying opinions related to the external role of the euro. Robert
McCauley did  not  see  an  immediate  prospect  for  the  euro’s use  outside
Central Europe and the Mediterranean. John Arrowsmith, RayBarrell and
Christopher Taylor pointed to the worry of many economists that, if and
when the euro develops into a global currency, it will prove to be at least as
unstable as the dollar and the yen had been. Returning to the views of the
latter half of the Eighties they suggested ‘despite the fairly discouraging
omens’, a revival of global co-operation, to minimise fluctuations between the
key currencies in a tripolar, or more probably bipolar, post-EMU world.
The most impressive and most balanced contribution of the Colloquium was
undoubtedly the already mentioned survey of twenty-five years of European
unification in the Marjolin Lecture by Niels Thygesen. Using his previous
work on the subject and updating it, he analysed the current state of monetary
union in the light of five evolving ambitions, constituting a logical sequence:
– reducing, then eliminating nominal exchange rate fluctuations,
– reducing, then eliminating inflation,
– developing rules for non-monetary policies, then scope for coordinating
them without undermining the rules,
– developing  a potential  role  in  the  international  monetary  system,  then
adjusting it to the realities of the day,
– developing a European profile in financial regulation.
His assessment was that only the first three, or rather two and a half, of these
ambitions had been fulfilled at the start of full EMU and the launching of the
euro.
This  brilliant  survey  confirms  my  personal  opinion  that  the  whole
professional work of Niels Thygesen, including this paper, has been and still
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Europe.
Many  readers  will  consider  most  other  contributions  as  examples  of
daydreaming  or  wishful  thinking.  At  least,  they  should  view  them  as
expressing  the  expectations  created  by  the  successful  end  of  the  difficult
journey towards EMU, and as a reference for future developments.
Period V: 2000-2003: Adjusting West, Converging East?
Three Colloquia:
C22: Vienna, April 2000: Adapting to Financial Globalisation
C23: Brussels,  October  2001:  Technology  and  Finance,  Challenges  for
Financial Markets, Business Strategies and Policy Makers
C24: Tallinn, June 2003: Stability and Efficiency of Financial Markets in
Central and Eastern Europe
This is too short a period to be analysed in the same way as the previous ones.
Yet, in these three years from the Vienna to the Tallinn Colloquium major
events occurred, two of which are particularly relevant for our subject. Firstly,
the reversal of the world’s financial markets ‘from bull to bear’from Q2 2000
on. The effect of this downturn was exacerbated by the events of September
11th (2001) and by the implications of the Iraq war in early 2003. The threat
of general deflation also became manifest in 2003. Secondly, the agreement
reached on 11-12 December 2002 in Copenhagen on the enlargement of the
European Union (EU), by which 10 countries, 8 of them from Central and
Baltic Europe, were invited to join the EU by May 2004. The latter event
directly  inspired  the  dominant  themes  chosen  for  the  2003  Tallinn
Colloquium; the former reduced the exuberance, which characterized the late
Nineties and was apparent at the Frankfurt Colloquium of 1998.
One may imagine analysing the developments in both West and East under
two common labels: efficiency in a competitive environment at the level of
markets and institutions, stability at the macro-level of systems and public
policies. However, such a procedure would soon appear artificial because
each label relates to, at least partly, different contents in each region:
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micro- and meso-level; at the macro-level, facing financial instability and
systemic risk.
– In the East: searching for bank efficiency in different countries and/of
different types of banks; discussing the role of foreign banks (friends or
foes?)  on  the  one  side,  macro-implications  of  accession  to  the
EU-integration and convergence towards EU stability-oriented policies,
on the other.
– It  is  nevertheless  striking  that  the  three  Colloquia  under  review  were
opened  or  concluded  by  top  central  bankers  who,  in  their  addresses,
focused on the same topic:
Financial stability and the role of central banks in this respect:
– Governor Liebscher in  Vienna:  “One outgrowth for us central
bankers, is that in addition to our concern with price stability, our
acknowledged home turf, we must increasingly also be concerned with
the stability of the financial system both regionally and globally...”
(Q under C22)
– Governor Quaden in Brussels: “The monitoring of financial stability
may certainly not be considered as a by-product or a mere extension of
the traditional monetary stability objective of central banks. The two
functions are closely related but distinct. In other words, the monetary
stability and financial stability wings belong to the same
bird.”(Q under C23)
– Governor Vahur Kraft in Tallinn: “Directly or indirectly, the primary
goal of most central banks is price stability...(But) monetary
transmission cannot be efficient if a weak financial system distorts
interest signals by increasing margins, or if financial markets have
ceased to function for the reason that some of the participants do not
trust other players...” (Q under C24)
Most penetrating was the analysis of Andrew Crockett in Vienna: “... (The)
large asset price swings are ... a palpable manifestation of the increased
financial instability experienced around the world since at least the 1980s ...
Just as policy makers appeared to be emerging victorious from one
exhausting battle, that against inflation, another equally challenging front
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peace dividend of a more stable environment ... Financial globalisation has
transformed geography with significant implications for the character of
instability. Globalisation has heightened the significance of ‘common factors’
in the genesis and unfolding financial distress. It has done so by extending
and tightening financial linkages across institutions, markets and countries ...
In addition, globalisation has heightened the significance of size
asymmetries, between the main industrial countries, on the one hand, and
emerging market economies, on the other, that is, between core and periphery
... The search for a solution ... can be seen as a search for adequate anchors
in the monetary and financial spheres...” (Q under C22)
In this context, Philip Davis, continuing his studies of financial crises, drew
the  lessons  from  US  financial  history  for  the  European  euro-area.  He
concluded that US history shows that in a large and diverse monetary area
with  segmented  local  banking  markets,  regional  crises  can  pose  a major
challenge  to  policymakers,  while  the  existence  of  a large  monetary  area
means  that  there  will  inevitably  be  international  transmission  of  shocks
generated within it. He suggested that, while European financial instability
has traditionally been of a pattern of bank failures following loan and trading
losses, the likely securitisation of euro-area markets may lead to crises of
a type more characteristic of the US, i.e. associated with price volatility in
asset markets following shifts in expectations or with the collapse of market
liquidity and issuance. Too-big-to fail problems can arise in a large monetary
zone in the same way as in a small state with a concentrated banking sector.
Finally, real estate lending booms and rising corporate leverage are warning
signs of financial instability (Q under C22).
How to cope with financial fragility? As usual, capital adequacy stood first on
the  list.  Reflecting  upon  the  issues  behind  the  proposals  of  the  Basle
Committee,  Swedish  financial  supervisor  Claes Norgren sketched  the
requirements of a new capital adequacy framework, better adapted to current
conditions and taking into account a bank’s ability to identify its various risks
and to cope with them in its internal policy. His slogan was: 8% is not the full
answer! (Q ibid)
Kenneth Kuttner and Adam Posen, from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York and the Institute for International Economics respectively, defended the
case  for  reducing  the  exchange  rate  volatility  between  the  three  key
currencies  by  rendering  monetary  policies  more  transparent. They  shared
Rogoff’s view that the problem of the ‘G3 exchange rate volatility’would and
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But they guessed that 20-30 % of that volatility could be removed by more
transparency in the monetary policies. This would be significant for emerging
markets and international businesses and improve, without economic cost, the
political legitimacy of these policies. (Q ibidem)
For the emerging markets, Enrique Aberola-Ila and Luis Molina Sanches
stated that the worldwide upsurge of financial flows had eased the reform
process in several emerging economies, by providing the much needed inflow
of capital but had increased their vulnerability at the same time. Countries that
had  been  perceived  to  have  weak  economic  and  financial  fundamentals
suffered from swift reversals in the inflows of capital, which put the process
of reform at stake.
They observed that fixed exchange regimes, against theoretical expectations,
had only attained limited macroeconomic stability in emerging markets, as
compared  to  countries  with  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes.  In  contrast,
a special  type  of  exchange  rate  arrangement  with  stronger  legal  and
institutional constraints, the currency board, had shown more strength in the
financial turmoil and was recommended by the authors, because, if it can gain
the support of economic and social forces (an important qualification, in my
opinion)  it  can  be  identified  ‘with a deep institutional change, which
transforms the way economic policy operates’ (Q ibid). This discussion was
continued at the 2003 Tallinn Colloquium.
How interesting these analyses of financial instability problems and of the
ways  to  cope  with  them,  may  be  from  the  viewpoint  of  economic  and
financial thought, they should not convey the impression that the Vienna and
Brussels meetings were primarily exercises in doom and gloom, a traditional
pastime of many macroeconomists and public regulators.
In Brussels (C23) Charles Goodhart warned, in a very appropriate Marjolin
Lecture, against determining regulation based on the current deviation of the
economy from ‘fundamental disequilibrium “... sinceweonlygettoknowwhat
that actually was after the event, and usually many years after the event ...”
Neither can we hope to predict the really big adverse shocks, since these are
almost by definition unpredictable, “all we can do is model the aftershocks”
(Q under C23).
This leads to adilemma illustrating the ‘inevitable’conflict between the micro-
and the macro-level concerns in the operation of financial regulation: “In the
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fragile, but in aggregate you want them to be more expansionary. By the same
token during an expansionary boom, individual banks are stronger, but in
aggregate you would wish them to be more cautious ...” In short, he urged the
regulators  “to make strenuous efforts to lengthen the horizon over which
regulating metrics and decisions are made.” (extensive Q under C23)
Eventually, the contributions focusing on markets and institutions displayed
rather positive reactions to the challenges of globalisation and technology.
In Vienna, this was apparent in the following three topics for example (several
quotations under C22):
– The emergent Euroland banking system: Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
assessed that one and a half years after the launch of the euro, signs that
a single Euroland banking system was emerging, were rather strong in
wholesale  and  capital  market  activities.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were
lacking in localised retail banking and in cross-border M&A, just as in
other mature financial systems, such as the US one. On the contrary, the
obstacles in the fields of technology and infrastructure were less justified
and asked for policy action.
– Financial consolidation: Jacques de Larosière and  Eric Barthalon
summarised the rationale for cross-border M&Ain one paradox: too many
large national banks, no big European bank! The  discussion  on
cross-border  financial  consolidation  was  very  lively.  There  was
widespread agreement on the need for a strong domestic stronghold for
entering the Pan-European market.
– Efficiency: As  a bank  economist,  Peter Van Dijcke stated,  in  his
Marjolin-Prize winning contribution, that increased competition, ongoing
consolidation,  continuing  pressure  for  the  reduction  of  existing  excess
capacity and shrinking profitability in the European banking industry had
put efficiency high on the agenda of most banks. His findings on the
cost-to-income ratio, considered as a proxy for bank (in)efficiency, seem
to confirm that changing scale and scope only have a limited impact on
this ratio. He derives that banks can improve their overall cost efficiency
to a greater extent, if they emulate the banking industry’s best practice,
thereby  increasing  their  managerial  and  technical  efficiency  (reducing
so-called  X-inefficiency)  rather  than  by  size  (scale  economies)  or
diversification (scope economies).
Major Events, Dominant Themes and Outstanding Contributions 41The Brussels Colloquium 2001
The impressive list of papers collected for the 2001 Brussels Colloquium
(C23) – many of them entering into great detail and technicality – shows at
length the widespread and, for many experts, even the overriding impact of
technology in the financial world: in banks and other financial intermediaries,
in  financial  markets,  at  stock  exchanges  and  other  trading  systems,  in
payment networks, etc. This raises the issue of whether, in this and other
ways, technology creates a ‘new economy’in society. In the Anthology part of
the present paper, an extensive number of quotations try to give some idea of
this impact, as reflected in the Colloquium Book, which, however, comprises
only a selection of the best and most representative contributions.
It is not possible to go, in this Survey, into all the aspects suggested by those
quotations. I prefer to agglomerate some of them around two general issues.
Using the formulation of two contributors, I will successively deal with the
Shift of paradigm issue raised by David Llewellyn for banking, which can
also be extended to other institutions and markets, and the New economy:
reality or mirage issue raised by Antje Stobbe, which can also be extended
to other particular aspects.
David Llewellyn’s thesis is presented in the framework of the so-called ‘New
Economics of Banking’. Technology is a dominant driver in the combination
of  pressures,  which  change  all  aspects  of  banking  in  a fundamental,  not
incremental way. In this shift, some banking markets (rather than necessarily
the banking industry) have become more contestable, in that entry and exit
barriers have been reducing in significance. Scale has become less of an entry
barrier to the extent that, while technology has increased the economies of
scale in processing, many processes can be subcontracted. Scale economies
tend to be in bank processes rather than in banks per se, which means that, if
processes can be subcontracted, economies of scale can be secured by firms
of varying size. If the external (sub)contracts are managed efficiently, the
existence of economies of scale does not mean that only large banks can be
competitive and survive (and, in my opinion, that the banking sector is no
longer a ‘declining industry’which was an important issue in the Nineties (cf.
period IV)).
Papers by other contributors indicate that technology penetrates in other ways
and at a different speed in different countries and, as exemplified by Spanish
banking, in different types of banks of the same country. The same applies to
markets. Helen Allen, John Hawkins and Setsuya Sato, of the Bank of
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winning paper on Alternative Trading Systems, pointed to the contrasting
development patterns of equity markets in the US and in Europe. Whereas the
US equity market has been characterised by a proliferation of alternative
electronic trading systems (e.g. ECNs) alongside relatively few traditional
exchanges, Europe has been notable for the absence of separate systems, with
electronic trading incorporated within its many traditional exchanges.
This turns Llewellyn’s thesis into a shift with many faces, speeds and limits.
In my opinion, this qualifies, but does not necessarily invalidate his view.
The  ‘New Economy’ issue  raised  more  objections  against  attributing  to
technology an overriding impact on the economy and society as a whole. In
her paper Antje Stobbe was outspoken. So far, the new economy is more
mirage than reality. Even in the US there seem to be no clear signs of spillover
effects  from  increased  ICT (Information  and  Telecommunication
Technology) investment on the efficiency of the economic process In Europe,
most  studies  show  capital  deepening  with  respect  to  ICT,  with  increased
demand for high-skilled labour and reduction of demand for unskilled labour,
but evidence on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth was, in her opinion,
rather disappointing. Johan Van Gompel suggested that the rapid growth of
productivity in the US after 1995 might have been a cyclical phenomenon,
and not a shift of a more lasting nature.
For most of the non-believers, technology is just one of the numerous factors,
albeit an important one, that influences financial and global activity. This
explains the answers to two, implicitly or explicitly formulated questions:
Does geography not matter any more according  to  O’Brien’s work  on
networks? It still does, was the answer of most participants and authors. “We
find no evidence for the thesis that technology has eliminated the importance
of geography, as predicted by the ‘Geography doesn’t Matter’ hypothesis.”
(Iman Van Lelyveld and Marieke Donker, both from the Nederlandsche
Bank)  “Spatial proximity has not been completely substituted by virtual
proximity on the net. It does not make traders footloose” (Vivien Lo and
Michael Grote).  “It does not destroy the value of home equity markets,
especially for small and mid-caps” (Olivier Lefebvre).
Does history not matter any more? It still does, said Gottfried Leibbrandt
from  McKinsey,  for  payments  systems.  The  network  nature  of  many
payments (especially the prime-mover advantage emphasised in Allen et al.)
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rather than to disappear.
But  non-believers  can  become  moderate  believers  when  technology  is
considered in conjunction with other factors within an appropriate framework
and when it is promoted by public policies. For Siegfried Utzig, from the
Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, the new economy has its own laws and
requires  more  flexibility  from  market  participants.  This  highlights  the
responsibility of economic policymakers to create a framework within which
market forces can freely interact and develop. Also Van Gompel urged that
institutional  and  legislative  obstacles  be  eliminated.  In  addition,  the
governments  in  the  EMU  should  make  extra  efforts  in  support  of
commercially oriented R&D and, because ICT applications are ‘knowledge
products par excellence’, in strengthening ICT knowledge and skill among
the population.
The Tallinn Colloquium 2003
The Tallinn 2003 Colloquium may duly be characterised as ‘the event with the
right topicat the right time and at the right plac e’ . The development of the
financial sector in Central and Eastern Europe and its integration into the EU
and later on into the EMU (in short CEE), has become a high priority in many
countries in that region (cf. Governor Vahur Kraft, Q under C24). It will be
a major issue in the post-accession years for unlocking the benefits of the
Single Financial Market (cf. Luigi Passamonti, ibidem).
It was the right time to assess what has already been realised in the various
transition economics and, even more what has still to be realised on the road
to full integration in the coming years, in accordance with the sequence:
Transition   convergence   accession   full EU membership   full
EMU membership.
And Tallinn was the right place because Estonia, in the East, has been among
the frontrunners in understanding the opportunities and the risks of the
internationalisation process in  the  financial  sector  (Mart Sörg et al.,
ibidem). This small country may be considered a successful country on the
road map we have just drawn.
No  wonder,  that  under  these  circumstances  a very  large  number  of
contributions  had  been  collected.  Fourteen  papers  were  presented  on  the
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empirical cases discussed were not monographs on one single country but
included comparative research on several ones. Remarkably, a number of the
high quality papers also did not originate from the West or from international
organisations, but from researchers working in CEE countries themselves.
Compared to the presentations at the 1997 Budapest Colloquium, progress in
techniques and analysis was impressive and points to a large convergence in
economic and financial research between East and West. Estonia was also
a frontrunner  in  this  respect,  in  the  context  of  the  cooperation  between
SUERF and the (central) Bank of Estonia.
In the framework of this survey three aspects should be highlighted on the
basis of the papers that have been selected for the Colloquium Book:
– the integration process, the present and prospective positions on the road
map transition   convergence   accession   full EU membership   full
EMU membership,
– the role and the performance of  the  financial  sector  in  transition  and
accession economies,
– the quest for financial stability in these countries.
As  far  as  the  first  aspect  is  concerned,  the  obvious  assessment  may  be
summarised in one sentence, namely: Much has been done in the last ten
years,  but  even  more  has  still  to  be  done  in  the  coming  years.  Luigi
Passamonti was most explicit on the accomplishments of the past, Maxwell
Watson on the gap that still remains and the challenges to be faced in the
period ahead (for both, Q under C24). In Watson’s terms: “Little more than
a decade after transition began, the progress that has been made in
strengthening the efficiency of the financial sector is impressive – but it gives
no grounds for complacency in terms of the path ahead...
By EU standards, financial depth typically remains fairly modest – leaving
a considerable way to go to ensure that the financial sector functions
efficiently and is competitive in the settings of the EU market in financial
services...” (ibidem) However, Passamonti estimates that if the benefits of
the Single Financial Market can be unlocked, ‘it is quite possible that the new
member states may become the main beneficiaries of the EU Financial Sector
Plan’ (ibidem).
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map, not only by the Estonian authors (Lelo Liive, Mart Sörg et al., Q under
C24), who were rightfully proud of the performance of their home country but
also by authors with a rather critical approach, as e.g. Maxwell Watson:
‘...Estonia...by the late 1990s (had) achieved success through a strictly
rule-based framework (currency board, balanced budget), a major banking
clean-up in the late 1990s – triggered by the Asian and Russian crisis, and
absolute openness to foreign capital’ (ibidem).
With  regard  to  the  second  aspect,  the role and the performance of the
financial sector in the transition and accession economies, the  growth
potential of the sector was, in general, evaluated in rather optimistic terms. In
his keynote address Herman Agneessens stated that the CEE financial sector
would profit, on the one hand, from general economic growth in the transition
economies which would be higher than in the existing EU-15 and, on the
other hand, from a specific financial catch-up effect, due to the initial lower
level of development of the sector and supported by a high degree of foreign
involvement. However, as Fink et al. pointed out, initial evidence indicated
that the growth-enhancing potential did not so much lie in financial sector size
but rather in financial sector efficiency (Q under C24).
In several papers attempts were made to measure bank efficiency in countries
of Central and Baltic Europe. Results did not allow definite conclusions to be
drawn, because of differences in countries and periods considered, and also in
sampling  and  estimation  techniques.  This  is  not  surprising  when  one
remembers that even the extensive (Western) literature on measurement of
economies of scale and scope has remained quite inconclusive.
Some studies (e.g Tuuli Koivu, Q under C24) point to the reduction of the
margin  between  deposit  and  lending  rates  as  an  indicator  of  increasing
efficiency of banks, accelerating economic growth. The impression conveyed
by several papers (e.g. Mariana Tomova et al.) is that efficiency is (slowly)
increasing with reduced dispersion among countries and that it is convergent
towards  EU  standards.  Nevertheless,  the  gap  between  efficiency  levels
remains large and the overall picture is still unclear.
Much more consensus resulted from the extensive discussion of papers and
views about the role and performance of foreign banks in Central and Baltic
Europe. As an innovation at SUERF Colloquia, a banker’s panel of high
representatives  from  5  banks  ‘from  the  West’,  but  with  substantial
involvement ‘in the East’, concluded the exchange of views. The consensus
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capital has had a positive impact on the financial sector, increasing
competition and making it possible to import management culture and
professional skills. It is noticeable that no proof of significant negative effects
related to the foreign banks entry has been found. It seems that the foreign
banks’ credit policies have been less sensitive in local economic downturns
and the entrance of foreign banks has not imported instability in any form...”
This consensus is supported by the conclusion of several contributions on
various CEE economies, in particular by the orally presented evidence on the
dynamics  of  foreign  ownership  in  Hungary,  one  of  the  countries  where
foreign  banks  penetrated  early  (Giovanni Majnoni et al.):  higher
profitability of foreign banks resulted not from lending policies different from
those of domestic banks, not from higher intermediation margins, which were
in  fact  decreasing  over  time,  but  from  product  innovation  and  a better
screening and monitoring procedure of the loan applicants.
However,  a sharply  dissenting  view  was  expressed  in  the  paper  by
Christopher Green et al. based  upon  an  extensive  investigation  of  the
economies of scale and scope in 273 foreign and domestic banks located in
nine different countries for the period 1995-1999. The paper contested the
widespread belief that foreign banks were more efficient than their domestic
counterparts. In each of the nine countries under review foreign banks were
not more efficient than the average bank. “...The results suggest that foreign
bank ownership (rather than domestic ownership) is not a significant factor
in reducing the banks’ total costs...” (Q under C24)
Anyway, as will be argued in Section Three of the Survey, the evidence about
foreign banks in Central and Baltic Europe adds a distinct dimension to the
current worldwide debate on the impact of international capital flows on
economic and financial growth.
The  quest for financial stability in  CEE  countries,  as  expressed  in  the
contributions to the Tallinn Colloquium, has clearly been inspired by the
multiple financial crises which have occurred in Central and Baltic Europe
since the beginning of the Nineties (cf. infra, the statement by Governor
Kraft). The focus has been put on the prevention of currency and banking
crises and on the combination of both. The frequency, the sudden occurrence
and the intensity of these crises explain the emphasis laid on the need for
adequate information and early warning mechanisms for the policy-makers,
as well as for many other market participants. It is also characteristic, that in
this  concern  about  prevention  much  attention  is  devoted  to  factors  of  an
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concern  for  prevention  is  no  longer  limited  to  general  statements  but  is
increasingly being adapted to local conditions and expressed in technical
models, two of which were presented at the Colloquium (cf. Franz Schardax
and Dirk Effenberger, Q under C24).
In  their  Marjolin  Prize-winning  contribution,  Alicia García-Herrero and
Pedro del Rio, from the Banco de España, concentrated on the banking crises
over  the  years  1970-1999  for  79  countries,  of  which  20  were  transition
economies. They tried to relate, at least statistically, the likelihood of such
crises to the central bank objectives, to the monetary strategy followed and
also, but to a lesser extent to other factors of regulatory and supervisory
nature.
The general outcome is that the likelihood of banking crises is, other things
given,  reduced  in  countries  and  conditions  where  central  bank  objectives
focus on price stability. However, this conclusion does not seem to hold for
transition  economies,  where  monetary  policy  strategy  with  exchange  rate
targeting appears to be the preferred option in terms of financial stability.
Partly in contradiction with other investigations, this finding would support
the choice of relatively fixed exchange regimes. Finally, locating regulatory
and supervisory responsibilities at the central bank appears to be the solution
to be preferred in all cases where factors of this kind are introduced into the
analysis.
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  early  warning  models  presented  for  signalling
currency crises, Dirk Effenberger claimed that adding institutional factors
to mere economic indicators improves the forecasting quality of the model.
One  interesting  result  of  his  investigation  qualifies  the  preference  of
García-Herrero and del Rio for fixed exchange regimes and links up with the
observations of Aberola-Ila and Molina Sanches at the Vienna meeting. For
transition economies, ‘hard’fixed exchange rate regimes such as the currency
board,  but  not  conventional  adjustable  pegs  or  crawling  pegs  reduce  the
vulnerability of transition economies for currency crises. (Compare relevant
Q under C22 and C24). Obviously, this relates to the problem of credibility in
so-called fixed exchange rate systems, as described in De Grauwe (2000):
“The fragility of a fixed exchange rate system has everything to do with
credibility...When the authorities of a country announce that they will fix the
exchange rate they are making a promise: they pledge to keep the exchange
rate fixed today and in the future. The problem with any promise, however,
is that doubts may arise as to whether it will be kept. In other words, all
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exchange rates seem to be only credible in the hard framework of a currency
board and not in other fixed exchange rate systems.
All in all, the SUERF Colloquia of Vienna and Brussels showed that the
Millennium Turn had reduced the rather exuberant euro and ‘new economy’
expectations of the late Nineties. However, they did not replace the hype of
that period by an equal wave of euro and ICT pessimism. In other words, in
the  West,  l’air  du  temps  was  ‘less  exuberant,  but  reasonable  and  not
negative’.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Tallinn  Colloquium,  by  stressing  the
potential of the financial sector in Central and Baltic Europe, added a new
dimension to the analysis of growth and integration in Europe, which forces
us to face new challenges, but also opens new prospects.
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In this final section we no longer discuss developments period per period.
Taking a diachronic view instead of a synchronic one, we recapitulate our
findings and conclusions by trying to describe the main trends in the whole
period under review, distinguishing three constant aspects on the one hand,
and on the other, change (i.e. developments through time) in three main areas
of interest for SUERF.
This leads to the following structure:
Constants:  - the ‘force of events’
- mainstream thinking
- interaction between macro- and micro-factors
Change: - monetary and financial policy
- European monetary integration
- markets and institutions
Constants
When considering the ‘force of events’ as a permanent feature of the SUERF
Colloquia, we link up with the overall presentation in section 1. Events and
major shifts, not theories, have constantly determined the main topic and the
dominant themes of the meetings. Some of them, such as the oil shocks and
the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall  were  primarily  political,  but  had  far-reaching
monetary  and  financial  implications;  others,  such  as  deregulation,
globalisation, EMU, originated in the sphere of economics and economic
policy, but occurred in a well-defined political context. Although the intensity
of the impact may have been different from case to case, no major issues seem
to have been neglected, at least as far as they were considered relevant for the
financial community in Europe. This qualification is important. It shows why
events in the developing world and in the emerging markets have attracted
much attention only when they had a significant impact on the European
financial sector, particularly when they threatened to lead to an international
financial crisis (cf. the credit crisis in the early Eighties and the East Asian
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relevance  explains  the  continuing  emphasis  on  progress  in  European
monetary integration, which is so characteristic of the history of the colloquia
in the four decades under review.
However, if academic thinking and theorising have seldom played a dominant
role in the choice of topics, they strongly contributed to highlighting the basic
issues at stake and to analysing them in a solid analytical framework.
As already mentioned, the contributions of Jacques Sijben on monetarist
economic policy and on market imperfections (Q under C7 and C18), those
of Niels Thygesen and Michael Artis on European monetary integration
(Q under C13 and C21), those of David Llewellyn on the New Economics of
Banking (Q under C17 and C23), those of Charles Goodhart on risk and risk
management (Q under C23) are examples of in-depth analysis, which shaped
the intellectual profile of several colloquia. Would it not be advisable to have
at each Colloquium, a keynote paper or a Marjolin lecture systematically
analysing the main themes of the meeting from the point of view of current
academic thinking and literature? Such a contribution would be an excellent
counterpart  to  the  keynote  speech  of  outstanding  policymakers,  such  as
Andrew Crockett at  C19  in  1995  and  at  C22  in  2000,  and  outstanding
practioners, such as Herman Agneessens at C24 in 2003.
Mainstream thinking is a second rather permanent feature of the Colloquia.
Obviously,  it  derives  from  the  composition  of  the  SUERF  constituency:
central bankers, commercial bankers, academics in banking and finance. It
appears in several aspects. First, the opinions expressed in the papers and the
discussions generally refrain from extremes and out-of-line novelties. They
often express a kind of consensual wisdom. At the Wiesbaden Colloquium in
1977  the  proposal,  in  the  so-called  academic  ‘All Saints Manifesto’,  of
a parallel European currency and a European central bank as independent as
the judicial system and separated from the national treasuries, with monetary
authorities ‘appointed or elected for long periods of time, if not for life...’was
flatly rejected and even ridiculed (Q under C7). In Lisbon in 1991, and in
Berlin in 1992, the views about the transition to a market economy in Central
and Eastern Europe held, as already mentioned in section 2, the middle of the
road  between  going  ‘cold  turkey’ into  the  free  market  system  and
a gradualism without time path and limit (Q under C16 and C17). Another
aspect of SUERF thinking is that the Colloquia grosso modo followed the
general  mainstream  change  from  Keynesian  active  demand  management
policies based on fine tuning through a combination of fiscal and monetary
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approach, allowing for a greater impact of market forces (as analysed by Ivo
Maes, 2002). In this context the Wiesbaden 1977 meeting was a landmark for
monetary policy and the Cambridge 1985 Colloquium one for market forces,
shifting  existing  frontiers.  However,  the  general  trend  did  not  exclude
differences of speed and national peculiarities. In this respect, the differences
between the mainstream Anglo-Saxon and mainstream Continental approach
remained significant, particularly for France.
On the whole, systematic dissenters from mainstream thinking have not been
numerous. Within the existing framework, Charles Goodhart, who likes to
call himself a contrarian, contested the higher volatility of financial markets
and  also  criticised  regulatory  decisions  based  on  current  deviations  from
a fundamental disequilibrium, about which we do not know very much at the
moment of the decision (Q in C19 and C23). At the 2003 Tallinn Colloquium,
Christopher J. Green, Victor Murinde and Ivaylo Nikolov contested the
widespread belief that foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe were
more efficient than their domestic counterparts.
In a more radical way, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, at that time Professor at
the Paris I University and later a very able Minister of Finance in France,
opposed, at the 1983 Madrid Colloquium, the current drive to reduce and
even suppress public deficits because, in his opinion, it hampered the state in
two of its initial missions: stabilisation of the business cycle and the macro-
economic allocation of resources (Q under C11).
In  general,  such  reactions  against  mainstream  thinking  and  ‘consensual’
wisdom were rather rare. Anyway, it is typical, that what has been defined and
contested by Stiglitz (2002) and other ‘global’ dissenters, as the three pillars
of the so-called Washington Consensus – fiscal austerity, privatisation and
market liberalisation – have been topics approached in a positive way at the
SUERF Colloquia. Maybe, more dissenting voices may prevent the SUERF
consensual wisdom from turning into a conventional one.
From the very beginning, the third constant feature – the interaction between
macro- and micro factors – has been built in the Colloquia by alternating
meetings  on  macro-economic  topics  with  others  that  were  more  closely
related to developments in the financial markets and in the management of
banks and other financial institutions. As l’air du temps does not generally
change  overnight,  osmosis  of  ideas  and  percolation  of  opinions  have
frequently occurred.
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regulatory orientations have not been eschewed. Already in Brussels in 1976,
Jack Revell stated  that  “there must always be some conflict between
competition and regulation ...” (Q under C6). In Vienna in 1982, when an
international financial crisis was threatening, W.P. Cooke, who afterwards
became famous through the ‘Cooke’s coefficients’of capital adequacy, stated
the  supervisor’s dilemma  as  follows,  “On the one hand, the supervisory
authorities have the responsibility for restraining banks from overreaching
themselves and exceeding the prudent limits of lending, but on the other it is
clear that to restrict the recycling capacity of the banking system...might
precipitate the very crisis which the prudential regime is designed to avoid...”
(Q under C10) This raises the issue tackled by Michel Tison at the Tallinn
Colloquium whether the prudential supervisor should be regulatorily immune
against claims from private parties contesting decisions taken in the context
of regulation and supervision (Q under C24).
However, emphasizing the interaction between macro- and micro- does not
mean that this interaction has remained unchanged in the whole period under
review. As will be shown infra, when considering changes at the level of
markets and institutions, macro-economic aspects and factors predominated
until about the mid-Eighties. Afterwards, problems were often related to the
dynamics proper of the financial sector itself. They sometimes even induced
macro-developments and decisions, while, before that time, causation usually
went the reverse way.
Change
Monetary and financial policy
Linking up the quotations in the Anthology and the period analysis of section
2 of the present Survey invites the reader to an impressive journey into the
world of monetary and financial policy, covering four decades and 24 SUERF
Colloquia.
As already mentioned several times, the beginning of the period under review,
exemplified  by  the  1969 Tilburg  and  the  1972  Strasbourg  meetings,  was
dominated by international monetary problems, associated with the demise
and final breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. From this debacle two
main issues and strands of thought emerged:
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system of Bretton Woods by a less rigid, more flexible one?
  The  anchorage  issue,  after  the  US  dollar  had,  also  formally,  become
inconvertible into gold. How to replace or redefine the role of the US
currency as the anchor of the system and as the major reserve currency?
The exchange rate issue was the main topic of the 1974 Venice Colloquium
(C5) and was also discussed on the sidelines of the 1977 Wiesbaden meeting
(C7). The anchorage issue was dealt with, in a first immediate reaction at the
1972 Strasbourg meeting (C3) and then, after much trial and error during the
whole decade of the Seventies, at the 1979 Basle meeting (C8).
In the field of exchange rates, the fixed-float debate entered on a large scale in
practical policy-making. Would floating or at least managed floating become
a (semi-) automatic instrument of adjusting external disequilibria and even
a way to insulate the domestic economy and national policy from external
shocks? At the beginning of the Seventies, these ideas were quite attractive not
only among academics but also among policy advisers and policy makers,
especially  in  countries,  such  as  Italy,  where  external  disequilibria  were
associated with structural differences in the propensity to inflate (Magnifico,
1972). These expectations soon proved to be illusions, as testified by the
discussions in Venice. Floating rates were not a panacea, particularly in the
economic disarray after the first oil shock. The real world had become a rather
chaotic conglomerate of adjustable pegs, managed floating and more or less
‘clean’floating. In Wiesbaden (Q under C7) Theo Peeters emphasized that an
open economy (especially in Europe) is open, no matter what his exchange
rate regime is. Governments can use exchange rates as policy instruments,
even, as in the Thirties, for practising beggar-thy-neighbour policies through
competitive devaluations. Hence, the need for policy coordination.
As such coordination did not occur because of benign neglect or, at least, did
not prevent large swings in the exchange rates of the major currencies; the
need for exchange rate stabilisation was increasingly felt in Europe. This led
to the creation of the European Monetary System, which was presented at the
Basle Colloquium by one of its Founding Fathers (Q under C8).
The anchorage issue and the changing role of the dollar after the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods system was an aspect that struck the European policymakers
and market operators of that time even more than the exchange rate issue.
Impressed by the Nixon Declaration of inconvertibility of the dollar, Louis
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creation of liquidity through the deficits of the US and financed by the rest of
the world had come to an end. He was proved wrong, the mechanism survived.
The dollar remained the (unstable) anchor of the de facto system, which
emerged from the ruins of Bretton Woods. This led, during the whole decade,
to stormy relations between the dollar and the key European currencies.
In this context, the papers and discussions at the Basle meeting, held under
the suggestive title: Europe and the Dollar in the World-Wide Disequilibrium
offer a very representative picture of the situation at the end of the Seventies.
Three points may be mentioned:
– Interdependence  had  increased.  Developments  in  the  Seventies  had
limited  the  ability  of  the  US  to  determine  its  own  economic  fate
independently. Even high-ranking officials recognised at the colloquium
that the US could no longer afford to ignore feedback effects from the rest
of the world. (Daniel H. Brill and Edwin M. Truman (Q under C8)).
– The ‘worldwide disequilibrium’was considered, in Keynesian terms, to be
rooted  in  the  deficiency  of  savings  in  the  US,  which  had  maintained
relatively high levels of growth and investment, the opposite being the
case for Germany and Japan. This deficiency was mainly financed through
official capital flows which inflated the reserves of the surplus countries
(Jacques Artus,  ibid).  Autonomous  private  capital  flows  were  not
forthcoming on a stable and continuous basis from the surplus countries
because the inward-looking capital markets of Germany and Japan did not
generate sufficient long-term capital outflows. This was considered to lead
to the absurd situation that countries in deficit had been borrowing in the
well-developed capital market of the country with the largest deficit of all:
the United States (Tom de Vries, ibid). However, reserve diversification
and exchange rate flexibility would feed on each other to reduce the gap
between actual and desired dollar holdings (Sergio Siglienti, ibid). No
mention was made of the entrepot function of the London financial centre.
– In  this  context  the  US  dollar  was  still  considered  inescapable,
‘incontournable’ as  transaction  and  intervention  currency,  but  was
expected to gradually lose its other reserve functions.
The  reader  will  observe  that  some  considerations  mentioned  above,  for
example, concerning the insufficiency of US net savings, remain of relevance
for present times.
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of worldwide inflation. Post-war macro-economic stabilisation policy based
on Keynesian analysis had not been successful in curbing the inflationary
process (Jacques Sijben, Q under C7). After more than a decade of mere
academic debate, monetarism penetrated the boardrooms of policymaking
organisations.  In  the  Seventies,  monetarism  was  discussed  at  the  1970
Colloquium in Tarragona (C2) and, most of all, at the already often quoted
1977 meeting in Wiesbaden (C7).
In Tarragona, it was only analysed in the framework of a rather academic
survey of various theories of monetary policy and with the prudent caveat:
‘recognizing the importance of the monetary supply is not equivalent to
centring stabilisation policy exclusively on the management of the quantity of
money ... Fiscal and monetary policies should be used in coordination and
much discretion was preferred to ‘any rigid rule though it will not be free from
errors’( L.A. Rojo, Q under C2).
The  Radcliffe  Report  was  clearly  not  forgotten  and  the  coordination
recommendations reminded us of the Fleming-Mundell model.
Seven years later in Wiesbaden, the – not unanimous – message was that the
inflationary process was essentially a monetary phenomenon that cannot come
into effect unless the monetary authorities provide the required ‘monetary fuel’
(Jacques Sijben, Q under C7). In this way control of the money supply, based
on the hypothesis of a stable demand for money and a strong and systematic
correlation between money supply and economic activity, became the new
paradigm. The strategy of the Bundesbank, which, in apragmatic way, followed
this quantitative approach, became a reference for friends and foes alike.
As a logical consequence, policy coordination and exchange rate stabilisation
should in the first place be a matter of coordination of money supply policies
and not of exchange rate surveillance and intervention rules (Theo Peeters,
ibid). However, not everybody was prepared to push that far the Copernican
change, the causation going from money supply to exchange rates, instead of
the other way round. Niels Thygesen stated that, without the focus on some
declared objectives for exchange rates, clear guidelines for monetary policy
coordination were not feasible (ibid). Obviously the idea of the European
Monetary System was in the air.
Monetarism found its most extreme application in the new US monetary
policy, initiated at the end of the Seventies under the leadership of Federal
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this had two consequences, which were analysed at two different Colloquia:
in Vienna in 1982 (C10) and in Madrid in 1983 (C11):
– In the industrialised countries, particularly in Europe, it reinforced the
effect of stagflation, inducing large government budget deficits, whose
financing  put  heavy  pressure  on  central  banks  to  allow  monetary
expansion,  in  contradiction  with  monetarist  rules.  In  Madrid,  former
Bundesbank President Emminger strongly opposed the idea that high
public deficits would inevitably lead to an over-expansive monetary policy
and advocated a law of government retrenchment.
– Worldwide,  it  fuelled  the  threat  of  an  international  financial  crisis,
followed by a collapse of the real economy which went ‘beyond the usual
gloom associated with every recessionary or stabilisation phase.’
(Alexander Swoboda in Vienna (Q under C10)).
In the meantime, deregulation was progressing, leading to the ‘marketisation’
of  banking  and  finance.  Financial  innovations  generated  shocks,  which
tended to destabilise the money demand function and seriously complicated
the use of monetary targets (Jan Koning and Niels Thygesen at the 1985
Cambridge Colloquium, Q under C12). In some countries inflation targeting
replaced mere control of the money supply. Exchange rates and interest rates
came again to the forefront.
When in the second half of the Eighties, inflation rates had been reduced and
intra-EMS exchange rate stabilisation had scored its first results, time seemed
to have come for renewed efforts of international cooperation and even for
initiating a global adjustment process (cf. the 1988 Helsinki Colloquium,
Q under C14). As mentioned in section 2, these efforts did not survive the
failure of the Louvre Accord in 1987, while the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
signature of the Maastricht Treaty directed the attention to new perspectives.
Most of all, the increasing dominance of globalised market developments
forced both theorists and policymakers to re-examine the scope and methods
of monetary and financial policy in a context of despecialised banking and
free capital movements. How to cope with increased competition, volatility,
risk and financial fragility?
Empirical  studies  (Q under  C18  and  C19),  both  in  public  and  private
institutions, had brought out that an increasing number of tensions and crises
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to the dynamics of markets themselves.
As a consequence financial stability had to be promoted and secured in its
own  way,  besides  monetary  stability:  by  market  discipline,  by  private
management or public intervention?
The response to this new challenge is still not clear-cut, as testified by the
important addresses of Andrew Crockett at the 1995 Thun (C19) and the
2000 Vienna (C22) meetings. Additionally, a new accent in the discussion
came, at the 2003 Tallinn Colloquium, from the sensitivity for crises in the
transition and accession countries, which had experienced frequent, sudden
and intense currency and banking crises since the beginning of the Nineties.
There are limits to market discipline, but which? “From the experience of the
last three years I would argue that a number of institutions seriously
overestimated the ability to hedge and diversify market and credit risk.”
(Andrew Crockett, Q under C19).
How to define capital adequacy requirements in a more refined way than
by the blunt 8% rule of the original Basle Accord? (Claes Norgren, Q under
C22).
How to organise official support in the event of truly unforeseen shocks of
major  proportions  without  creating  moral  hazard  problems?  (Andrew
Crockett, Q under C19).
It appears that in a market-led economic and financial world, public policy in
general and central banking in particular becomes more complex and less
obvious in their objectives and methods, especially as far as financial stability
is concerned. At the 2001 Brussels Colloquium Governor Quaden spoke of
present central banking as a bird with two wings: monetary and financial
stability (Q under C23). At present, the monetary wing seems to be much
stronger than the financial one, which often covers only defensive capital
requirements and more or less pathetic appeals for more transparency and
disclosure. Is it not difficult to fly with two uneven wings?
European Monetary Integration
From  the  beginning,  European  monetary  integration  has  been  an  area  of
special  interest  for  SUERF.  Few  private  associations  can  display  such
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and Monetary Union (EMU) has provided the subject matter and the title of
three  colloquia:  Strasbourg  1972  (C3),  Luxembourg  1986  (C13)  and
Frankfurt 1998 (C21). It was a major theme at several other meetings: Basle
1979 (C8), Nice 1989 (C15), Lisbon 1991 (C16), Berlin 1992 (C17) and
Tallinn 2003 (C24) and it received secondary attention at several other ones.
If one neglects hesitations and temporary setbacks, the development through
time of this topic in the period under review can be summarised in a very
straightforward way:
– from the failure of the Werner Plan, towards exchange stabilisation in the
European Monetary System (EMS) from the late Seventies on.
– to reach full EMU with a single currency in three stages during the
Nineties.
– to be enlarged, with some delay, to countries of Central and Baltic Europe,
after their accession to the European Union, from 2004 on.
In this process, the pressure of external factors, from both policy (cf. supra)
and  private  origin  (cf.  infra)  has  been  important. The  failure  of  the  first
comprehensive programme of EMU, the Werner Plan, was determined in
a significant way by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, on which
it implicitly relied (Gros and Thygesen, 1992). It was discussed in these
terms at the Strasbourg meeting.
The setting up of the EMS, presented at the Basle meeting, aimed at exchange
rate  stabilisation  after  the  large  swings  and  the  stormy  relations  between
Europe  and  the  dollar  in  the  second  half  of  the  Seventies.  We  should
remember the rather military approach used by Lord Jenkins, President of the
European  Commission,  when  he  spoke  in  April  1978  in  the  European
Parliament  of  “a fundamental asymmetry about the United States having
withdrawn from the responsibilities of Bretton Woods, while dollars, like
legions without a central command (sic), continued to dominate the currency
transactions of the world.” (quoted in Abraham and Lemineur-Toumson,
1981).
Most importantly, the final decision to go beyond the adjustable peg solution
of  the  EMS  towards  full  EMU  with  a single  currency  was  significantly
determined by the assessment, after the 1992-1993 EMS crisis, that in a world
of deregulated markets and free capital movements mere internal exchange
rate stability was no longer sustainable (Niels Thygesen, Q under C21).
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although at certain moments it was questioned in the wake of increasing
globalisation  and  intensifying  technological  progress.  (David Llewellyn,
Q under C13 and C15) Ultimately, these pressures stimulated new thinking
and new initiatives.
Also in the SUERF Colloquia, the EMU topic developed its own profile in
several ways:
– As an important component of overall economic integration in its political
context. At the Basle Colloquium, the creation of the EMS was motivated on
the basis that unstable exchange rate conditions had adverse effects on
economic integration in Europe and had replaced old customs barriers in
their negative effects on growth (Jacques van Ypersele, Q under C8). In
Nice, monetary union was presented as the logical extension of the single
market of goods and services (PhilippeLagayette, Qunder C15). In Tallinn,
the  potential  benefits  of  the  single  European  financial  market  for  the
accession countries from the East were strongly underlined (Passamonti,
Q under C24) but, at the same time, due attention went to the imperative of
putting the ‘old’EU back on a path of sustainable and no longer decreasing
economic growth (André Sapir in his oral presentation at C24).
– With its solid institutional arrangements:  single  monetary  policy  and
independent central bank (Hans Tietmeyer, Q under C21).
– With its logicof a gradual deepening of the integration process (Reyand
Michielsen, Q under C13).
– With its basicissues and tensions (cf. Ivo Maes, 2002):
– The permanent tension between the logic of integration, which requires
deepening, and the fear of losing much national sovereignty: “Une des
difficultés de l’actuelle négociation (of the Maastricht Treaty and its
implementation) est qu’elle prend souvent l’allure d’une défense
excessive des symboles nationaux. Chaque pays a ses valeurs et ses
préférences en matière économique et monétaire. Lorsqu’elles sont
brandies comme des drapeaux sur un champ de bataille, elles en
deviennent des symboles.” (Giovanni Ravasio, Q under C16).
– The tension between the ‘monetarists’ (in the ‘European’, not in the
‘theorist’ jargon), who want to use the monetary issue as a catalyst for
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of successful coordination of economic policy of the member states:
“...Exchange rate stability must be viewed as the outcome of a process
of policy coordination and convergence in Europe and not vice
versa...” (Axel Weber, Q under C19).
– The tension between centralisation and decentralisation of economic
policy, the implementation of the subsidiarity principle, the ‘one size
fits all’ problem in the single monetary policy (Michael Artis, Q under
C21).
– With its doubts and temporary setbacks: the disarray of the Seventies, the
gloom of the early Eighties, the impact of market-induced turbulence in
the early Nineties and again after the Millennium Turn...
– With its protagonists and its euro-sceptics, who often did not line up along
the  classical  dividing  line:  Continental  versus  Anglo-Saxon  (cf.  the
brilliant  protagonists  Michael Artis and  Graham Bishop in  the  UK,
versus the rather sceptical German academics).
At  the  1998  Frankfurt  colloquium,  the  already  decided  and  soon  to  be
launched  euro  made  for  some  exuberance,  which  is  not  characteristic  of
SUERF Colloquia. However, the enthusiastic idea that a new era had already
been  initiated,  was  somewhat  tempered  by  the  final  assessment  of  Niels
Thygesen (Q under  C21),  that  only  two-and  a-half  of  the  five  initial
ambitions for EMU had already been fulfilled. As far as the external impact
of the eurozone on the international monetary system and the development of
a European profile in financial regulation are concerned, deepening is still
lacking.  Together  with  the  enlargement  problem  towards  the  United
Kingdom, Scandinavia and the accession countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, this makes for a tremendous assignment... and a subject matter for
future SUERF Colloquia.
Markets and Institutions
As  already  suggested  in  section  2,  the  developments  through  time  at  the
meso- and the micro-level can be summarised by breaking down the four
decades  under  review  in  two  periods,  the  dividing  line  being  placed
somewhere at the mid-Eighties, at about the time when SUERF discussed
‘Shifting Frontiers’in Cambridge (C12 in 1985). In the first period, the focus
had been put on the impact of macro-evolutions and of government policy on
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financial institutions. In this macro – and government – led time the main
issues for markets and banks was to meet the challenges induced by these
external factors.
In the second period, the specific dynamics of the financial sector itself came
to  the  forefront  as  a consequence  of  deregulation.  Sometimes  it  became
dominant, having macro-economic implications of volatility and financial
risk. The attention went – though not exclusively – towards internal issues of
the financial sector or to internalising external developments by adequate
management.
In both periods specific features and topics appeared in various ways.
Among the most significant ones in the macro – or government – led period,
may be mentioned:
– At the 1974 Nottingham Colloquium (C4), the effects of internationalisation
on  the  business  sector  and,  more  specifically,  the  functioning  of
multinational enterprises in their relations and conflicts with domestic firms
and government policies;
– At the 1976 meeting in Brussels (C6), meeting the challenge of worldwide
inflation, among others by indexation of financial instruments;
– At the same meeting, deriving the lessons for liquidity and solvency of
financial  institutions  from  the  failure  of  Herstatt  Bankhaus,  which
occurred in the period of super-inflation and volatile exchange rates after
the first oil shock;
– At the 1980 Helsingør Colloquium (C9), focusing on bank management in
difficult times, illustrated by these quite typical quotations: “The time had
come for a topic of more direct concern to individual bank managements,
(facing) major new challenges: the rise in energy prices, high rates of
inflation, balance of payments disequilibria, fast-growing indebtedness of
lesser developed countries, rapid structural change in industrial
economies and growing intervention by governments.”  (Preface  to  the
Colloquium Book). “Nous sommes ici au pays de Hamlet et la question
fondamentale (du colloque) ne devrait-elle pas se formuler: Pourra-t-on
continuer à être banquier dans les année 1980?” (Pierre Ledoux, Q under
C9).
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policies and huge public deficits, whose financing crowded out private credit
activity to business and individuals.
– The crowding-out theme towered in the 1983 Madrid meeting (C11) where
it was called ‘the star’ of the colloquium. But, as mentioned in section 2,
resistance of top bankers was also noticed at the 1982 Vienna meeting
(C10), when the role of international banks in the recycling of the oil-
surpluses was explicitly questioned and criticized.
When,  under  the  impact  of  deregulation  and  liberalisation  of  capital
movements,  the  ‘frontiers’ were  shifted  to  market-led  developments,  new
specific features appeared:
– Financial intermediation and innovations in conditions, mainly determined
by  market  forces  (Jan Koning in  Cambridge  (C12  in  1985),  David
Llewellyn in  Luxembourg  (C13  in  1986)  and  in  Nice  (C15  in  1989),
Rainer Masera in Dublin (C18 in 1994)).
– Competition and competitiveness, market imperfections and vulnerability
in a large spectrum of countries and financial centres (C18 in 1994 in
Dublin);
– Volatility,  risk  management  and  corporate  governance  in  financial
institutions and other firms and by public authorities (C19 in Thun in 1995
and C20 in Budapest in 1997);
– Internalisation  of  the  effects  of  globalisation  and  technology  (C22  in
Vienna in 2000 and C23 in Brussels in 2001).
The 1998 Frankfurt Colloquium (C21) and the Tallinn Colloquium (C24)
constitute exceptions to the classification followed in the preceding lists. The
implications of the introduction of the euro, and also of the EU enlargement
towards the East, for the financial sector of the accession countries were
discussed  in  a ‘government-led’ way  of  previous  times.  However,  the
presentations included many more details related to financial markets and
bank management. This reflects the impact of that major ‘public innovation’
on market operators and their expectations.
Anyhow, it is quite typical that in recent times more and more papers and
presentations  at  the  SUERF  Colloquia  are  given  by  professionals,  daily
64 Constants and Change Through Four Decadesinvolved  in  market  operations.  This  trend  reflects  the  general  interest  in
management problems at various levels. It may also explain the widening gap
between the statements by policymakers and their staff on the one hand, and
the contributions of market operators and of the young academics following
these operations, on the other hand. The latter emphasize the technicalities of
the issues and the cases they are working on. Implicitly, they accept volatility
and bubbles as a fact of life and they seek how to live with it and to profit
from it. Public authorities, on the contrary, focus on the vulnerability and
fragility of the present market-led and globalised financial system. These
divergent conceptions are quite fundamental but can be reconciled at SUERF
Colloquia.  At  the  Tallinn  Colloquium  for  instance,  the  gap  between
practitioners  and  policymakers  was  reduced  by  the  contributions  of
practitioners, also from the private financial sector. They searched to develop
and improve quite technical early warning models signalling the threat of
currency and banking crises in transition economies. Obviously, this osmosis
of macro issues and micro techniques should be promoted in future colloquia.
It highlights SUERF’s role and mission in providing a forum and a network,
where  professionals,  academics,  central  bankers  and  other  policy  makers
meet and work together for better mutual understanding and for stimulating
research and analysis of basic issues and driving forces in the financial world.
Intentionally,  this  Survey  ends  with  a suggestion  that  is  inspired  by  the
conclusion of PeterOppenheimerat the end of the 1988 Helsinki Colloquium:
“The solutions of one quinquennium or one decade or one generation
turn into the problems of the next. Happily so, in order that the world’s
economists and bankers may go on conferring...”
Indeed,  to  the  SUERF  Colloquia  may  be  applied  what  Martin Fase,
a dedicated former member of the SUERF Council of Management, said
about  monetary  economics  in  his  impressive  farewell  address  on  his
retirement  from  the  University  of Amsterdam  (28  November  2002)  (our
translation from Dutch): “This monetarylandscape somewhat resembles
a flower garden: a blooming flowerbed at one place wilts with the
passage of time and season. However, it almost imperceptiblyreproduces
itself in no less splendid flowers somewhere else in the garden. So, the
original splendour sinks into oblivion...” Maythe Surveyand the
Anthologyof this Jubilee contribution help to revive the forgotten
blossoms, highlight the present ones and, most of all, allow the future
ones to turn into splendid flowers...
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2 Excluding quotations in the Anthology of Part 2Part 2
AN ANTHOLOGY OF SUERF COLLOQUIA
PUBLICATIONS 1969-2003
“Anthology: from anthos flower + logia, logeia collecting ...: a usually
representative collection of selected literary pieces or passages...also:
something felt to resemble such a collection (his performance was an ~ of
hilarity)” (Webster’s International Dictionary).
“...Competition for Markets and Turf
In finance can get pretty Rough
But to see a real fight
Where everyone’s right
Attend a Colloquium of SUERF ...”
(An attempted limerick by Richard O’Brien at the end of
the General Report, Colloquium 1994 in Dublin)
69SUERF Colloquia and Colloquia Publications 1969-2003
in Figures and Locations
Number of Colloquia 24
Of which in:
Germany (Wiesbaden 1977, Berlin 1992, Frankfurt 1998) 3
Spain (Tarragona 1970, Madrid 1983) 2
France (Strasbourg 1972, Nice 1989) 2
The United Kingdom (Nottingham 1973, Cambridge 1985) 2
Belgium (Brussels 1976, 2001) 2
Switzerland (Basle 1979,Thun 1995) 2
Austria (Vienna 1982, 2000) 2
The Netherlands (Tilburg 1969) 1
Italy (Venice 1974) 1
Denmark (Helsingør 1980) 1
Luxembourg (1986) 1
Finland (Helsinki 1988) 1
Portugal (Lisbon 1991) 1
Ireland (Dublin 1994) 1
Hungary (Budapest 1997) 1
Estonia (Tallinn 2003) 1
Colloquia Publications
Number of Colloquia Books* 22
Number of Colloquia-related brochures in the SUERF Series** 10
Total Number of Contributions* 462
Total Number of different Authors (approx.) 477
Total Number of Pages*** (approx.) 8275
* 21 published Colloquium Books and the forthcoming volume on the 2003 Tallinn Colloquium
** in the absence of an overall Colloquium Book for the Colloquia of Tarragona (1970) and
Strasbourg (1972).
*** Includes an estimate of 350 pages for the 2003 Tallinn Colloquium Book
An Anthology of SUERF Colloquia Publications 1969-2003 71Colloquium 1: The Future of the International Monetary
System
Tilburg, April 1969
Joint initiative of John F. Kennedy Institute and SUERF
President of SUERF and Co-Chairman of the Colloquium: Hans W.J. Bosman
Colloquium Book:
Editors: H.W.J. Bosman and F.A.M. Alting von Geusau
Authors: Paul  Bareau,  Edward  M.  Bernstein,  Irving  S.  Friedman,  Milton
Gilbert, Emile Van Lennep, Javier Márquez, J. Petrivalský, Robert
W. Russell, L. Veltruský
Publishers: A.W. Sijthoff, Leyden and Heath Lexington Books, Lexington
Mass, 1970, 180 pp.
– On the state of the international monetary system at the end of the Sixties:
“Considerable freedom for economic transactions, resistance to changes in
exchange rates, the slow growth of acceptable monetary reserves, the neglect
of failures of automatic mechanisms for adjustment and the disputes over
permissible foreign accumulation of dollars and sterling – all these together –
constitute the structure of the international monetary system today and that
structure is designed (perhaps unintentionally) to place maximum stress upon
the willingness of nations to keep their economies closely in line with price
and cost trends in other major nations” (Robert Russell, Assistant Professor
of Political Science, Wisconsin State University, pp. 78-79)
3.
– On gold as a major reserve asset:
“It has also become increasingly noticeable that nations are now regarding
gold as the least liquid of their reserve assets, with the result that when they
begin to run deficits, their first thought is to preserve their gold stock.” (Emile
Van Lennep, Treasurer  General  of  the  Netherlands,  afterwards  Secretary
General of OECD, p. 20).
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3 It should be recalled that the title and the functions of the author refer to those existing at the
time of the Colloquium, as mentioned in the Colloquium Book. cf. the Short Reader’s Manual, in
Part 1.“It seems to me ... that the problem of gold is the key question with regard to
the future of the monetary system. If gold is to perform its normal role in the
system, action must be taken to assure an adequate regular inflow of gold to
monetary reserves. If not, the monetary authorities must reach a workable
arrangement for the full management of gold in the composition of reserves,
probably with the implication that gold must be a generally inactive reserve
asset.” (Milton Gilbert, Economic Advisor and Head of the Monetary and
Economic Department of the BIS, p. 70-71)
– On the Special Drawing Rights as a new reserve asset:
“The early activation of the Special Drawing Rights is necessary precisely
because there can no longer be a substantial increase in gold reserves and
there should no longer be a substantial increase in foreign exchange reserves.”
(Edward M. Bernstein, Director Research and Statistics Department of the
IMF p. 109)
– On the reform of the international monetary system:
“The most fundamental and promising structural changes would be to make
exchange rates somewhat more flexible than at present and to activate the
SDR arrangement for managed growth in world monetary reserves.” (Robert
W. Russell, p. 94)
– On the developing countries:
“I also take the position that the international monetary game should not be
an even one, that the industrial heavyweights should, by common agreement,
give  a handicap  to  the  developing  featherweights.”  (Javier Marquez,
Director, Centro de Estudios Latin-americanos, Mexico, p. 119-120)
– On the socialist countries:
“In our view the Comecon and world monetary systems will continue to
develop  differently  for  some  time  to  come.  In  view  of  the  conditions
prevailing  within  Comecon  it  is  useful  for  that  system  to  be  directly  or
indirectly supported by the gold base, whereas on a world scale, measures
should be taken towards the demonetisation of gold.” (Ladislav Veltruský
and Jiri Petrivalský, High School of Economics, Prague, p. 161)
74Colloquium 2: Monetary Policy and New Developments in
Banking
Tarragona, October 1970.
President of SUERF and Chairman of the Colloquium: Hans W.J. Bosman
No Colloquium Book
Two papers in SUERF SERIES nº1&2
Authors: L.A. Rojo, F.E. Aschinger
Publisher: SUERF, 1971 (16 + 15 pp.)
– An eclectic view on stabilisation policy:
“Recognizing the importance of the monetary supply is not equivalent to
centring  the  stabilization  policy  exclusively  on  the  management  of  the
quantity of money.” (SUERF Series nº 1, p. 14)
“Fiscal and monetary policies are ... two different instruments that used in
coordination  offer  the  components  of  a short  term  stabilisation  economic
policy...” (p. 13)
“Discretional action based on the best available information will probably
work better than any rigid rule though it will not be free from errors.” (p. 16)
(L.A. Rojo, Professor at the University of Madrid)
– On the impact and the control of the Eurocurrency Market:
“Individual countries cannot fully insulate themselves from the influences of
the Euromarket without adopting a comprehensive foreign exchange control
system. The Euromarket, which is of great service to the world economy,
should not be viewed solely from a protectionist angle. On the contrary, every
occasion should be seized to bring the Euromarket into play in support of
national monetary policy.
On the other hand, the Euromoney market should not serve as a safety valve
for escaping national monetary policy...
Hectic fluctuation of the Euromarket and the resulting disrupting effects are
frequently a result of economic policies in the main currency countries. It is
75up  to  these  countries,  the  USA in  particular,  to  make  allowances  for  the
Euromarket  by  adopting  policies  of  domestic  economic  stability  and
appropriate credit policy procedures...
International  endeavour  to  control  the  Euromarket  should  principally  be
aimed  at  offsetting  the  flow  of  hot  money  in  times  of  monetary  crises.”
(F.E. Aschinger,  Economic  Adviser,  Swiss  Bank  Corporation,  Zurich,
SUERF Series nº 2, p. 14-15)
76Colloquium 3: Aspects of European Monetary Union
Strasbourg, January 1972
President of SUERF and Chairman of the Coloquium: Hans W.J. Bosman.
No Colloquium Book
9 papers in 8 issues of the SUERF SERIES nº 3 through 10.
Authors: Paul Bareau, F. Boyer de la Giroday, Louis Camu, F. Cassell, August
Leeman, Francesco Masera, John E. Nash, Fabrizio Onido, Herbert
Weise.
Publisher: SUERF, 1972 (30 + 23 + 12 + 19 + 11 + 35 + 43 + 27 pp.)
– On the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system:
“Le principal évènement qui a marqué cette année est sans doute celui dont
nos avons pris connaissance le 16 Août dernier (i.e. The Nixon Declaration of
the inconvertibility of the dollar, 15 08 1971). Ce jour là, nous avons appris
qu’une  structure  monétaire  du  monde  avait  vécu  et  s’il  faut  regarder  cet
événement, qu’il me soit permis de citer Sartre, ‘avec des yeux réinventés’.
Depuis des années, les systèmes monétaires occidentaux ont vécu dans le
climat entretenu par une source de création de liquidités qui était le déficit
persistant de la balance des paiements des Etats-Unis et sa multiplication par
la création d’eurodollars...
Cette  source  de  création  de  liquidités  ...et  son  financement  pratiquement
illimité par le reste du monde ont pris fin...” (Louis Camu, President of the
Banque de Bruxelles, in the opening address, SUERF Series nº 3, p. 2)
– On the impact on European Monetary Cooperation, particularly on the
Werner Plan:
“The  breakdown  in  monetary  cohesion  between  EEC  countries  reflected
substantial divergencies of their cost and price structures; but the basic causes
went still deeper and are to be found not only in the lack of structural or
institutional machinery for achieving the required cohesion, but in doubts as to
whether, even if this machinery existed, the national governments would have
the will and ability to carry through the necessary adjustments in their domestic
monetary, fiscal and other relevant policies.” (PaulBareau, Economic Adviser
77to the International Publishing Corporation Limited, London, author of the
final report of the Colloquium, SUERF Series nº 3, p. 17)
“...Any choice of an “optimum” solution makes no sense unless at the same
time we understand what the “optimum” path is which leads to that solution.
Or else we fall into the temptation, which has long beset economists, of
amusing ourselves with more or less refined descriptions of a world which we
still do not know how to get into. This is, in my opinion the major logical flaw
in the Werner philosophy and more generally in the attempt to derive, straight
from  the  theory  of  interregional  payments  a set  of  consistent  criteria  for
unifying the present national currency areas into larger currency domains.”
(Fabrizio Onida, Professor of international Economics at the University of
Milano, in a discussion of the theory and policy of optimum currency areas
and their implications for the European Monetary Union, SUERF Series nº 9,
p. 25)
– Economists versus ‘monetarists’ in shaping EMU:
“One of the basic issues before the colloquium was the clash between those
who hold that monetary union can only be achieved and maintained when
economic and virtually complete political union have already been secured
and those who regard monetary union as one of the means and as providing
part  of  the  discipline  required  to  achieve  complete  economic  union.  Is
monetary union one of the foundation stones of economic union, or is it the
final coping stone of the arch?” (Paul Bareau, cf. supra, p. 17)
“The only serious argument in favor of a European currency area preceding
a complete economic and political unification is perhaps the pressing need for
a new international asset and official intervention currency alternative to the
dollar.” (F. Onida, cf. supra, p. 29)
– Fixed or adjustable exchange rates within EMU:
“The crucial question thus becomes: to what extent are the major advantages
which  a EMU  is  expected  to  bring  about  (a faster  process  of  economic
integration through institutional and policy harmonization; a more efficient
mechanism of financing and adjustment of externally disequilibria, which
implies a more equitable distribution of the burden of adjustment as among
deficit  and  surplus  regions;  a decisive  step  towards  a more  international
monetary system) more likely to follow from a mix of policy cooperation plus
parity  adjustments  rather  than  from  Werner’s prescription  of  policy
cooperation  plus  irreversible  parity  pegging?  ...”  (F. Onida,  cf.  supra,
p. 31-32)
78“There is a prima facie evidence that, for European countries characterised by
a smaller economic size and/or a greater weight of regional and structural
imbalances relative to their partner countries, joining a common currency area
under present conditions is likely to sharpen rather than help to solve the
problem of the current asymmetries in the burden of adjustment ... Even aside
from national interests the formation of a European currency area starting
from  unalterably  fixed  parities  does  not  seem  to  be  a necessary  nor
a sufficient condition for improving the efficiency of our present international
monetary system through a forced reduction of the dollar monopoly position.
(ibid, p. 31)
“...I am led to conclude that in the present situation a plan for intra-EEC
adjustable parities coupled with a common set of controls upon intra and
extra-community transfers, bank deposits is the most reasonable alternative.”
(ibid, p. 34)
– Diverging views on a common European currency:
“The views expressed on the need for a common European currency ranged
from the support for full and even immediate union ... to complete rejection
of the need for such project.” (P. Bareau, op. cit., p. 20)
“Si les pays européens entendent préserver leurs chances d’union – dans
l’indépendance – ils doivent tenter de se dégager de l’emprise du dollar.
A défaut d’une action qu’il faudrait immédiatement mettre en oeuvre sous
peine d’en voir disparaître la possibilité même, le choix qui leur est offert
aujourd’hui  se  situe  entre  les  deux  termes  de  l’alternative  suivante:  la
prolongation des perturbations actuelles qui risquerait de faire disparaître la
Communauté elle-même, ou la consécration de l’étalon dollar universel.
Dans  la  mesure  où  l’on  considère  ces  évolutions  comme  également
indésirables, on peut se demander, et l’on s’est demandé de divers côtés, s’il
ne serait pas possible de faire naître d’une action commune, un instrument
monétaire commun, qui tendrait à remplacer le dollar dans autant de fonctions
possibles au fur et à mesure des progrès de la construction économique et
monétaire.” (F. Boyer de la Giroday, Director of Monetary Affairs at the
European Commission, SUERF Series nº 10, p. 18-19)
“If the common currency is to have an operational meaning, rather than being
a symbol, and to work without creating tension and a clash of interest among
member countries, it cannot be a prius but only a posterius of economic and
79political  integration  of  the  Community  countries.”  (Francesco Masera,
Economic Adviser of the Banca d’Italia, SUERF Series nº 6, p. 5)
– The role of sterling after Britain’s entry into the EEC:
A British view: “The marriage” that has now been arranged is not one between
adebt-ridden Britain and areserve-rich Community – amatch of our liabilities
and their assets. The bride, in fact, brings a fine dowry. London might become
in effect a giant financial intermediary, taking in short term funds from other
parts of the Community and transmuting them into longer-term loans and direct
investments. The question is whether the main vehicle currency for those
transactions would be sterling or (Euro-) dollars or a ‘common’EEC currency.
I do not foresee Britain’s membership of the Community having a dramatic
effect on the international role of sterling ... The forces reshaping sterling’srole
are in the main global ones, and they seem unlikely to be fundamentally
changed by Britain’s accession to the Community ... My guess ... is that the
dollar will continue to serve as the dominant currency in international finance
and hence I would not expect sterling to enjoy (or suffer) a grand resurgence
within an enlarged EEC.” (Francis Cassell, Senior Economic Adviser, The
Treasury, London, SUERF Series nº 5, pp. 5, 10, 11)
A Continental view: “It appears quite natural that substantial scruples are
arising with regard to the integrative capacity of a currency that brings such
a world-wide network of connections and financial ties as dowry for entry into
the European ‘matrimony’... It is necessary in the interest of the European
partner countries, as well as in the self-interest of Britain, to fundamentally
adapt and streamline the role of sterling and to relieve it of the burdens and risks
which  no  longer  stand  in  a commensurate  relation  with  the  present
international economic capacity of the country. This applies especially to the
reserve currency function with all its implications ... Once the ‘historical
ballast’ is discharged and the British economy gains a new platform through
the monetary and economic cooperation with the European partner countries,
a certain regeneration of the international scope and efficiency of sterling is
quite within the reach of future development.” (Herbert Weise, Institut für
Weltwirtschaft, Kiel, SUERF Series nº 8, pp. 19, 29)
– On the future of Financial Centres in a European Monetary Union:
A Continental view: “La notion de ‘centre financier’ est en train de perdre
une grande  partie  de  sa  signification  géographique  bien  définie.  Le
développement des techniques et moyens de communication a contribué dans
une  mesure  considérable  à l’estompement  de  cette  conception...L’union
monétaire placera le développement des centres financiers sous un jour tout
80autre que ce n’était généralement le cas jusqu’à présent. En effet, lorsqu’on
soupèse  les  chances  de  développement,  l’on  parle  souvent  des  entraves
nationales  qui  se  situent  essentiellement  sur  le  plan  monétaire.  Leur
suppression favorisera ... les fusions et d’autres formes de coopération qui,
jointes  au  développement  des  moyens  de  communication,  réduiront
l’importance locale de Paris, d’Amsterdam Bruxelles, etc par rapport à un
marché non régional qui s’appuiera plutôt sur le développement institutionnel
que sur les avantages locaux...” (Auguste Leeman, Professor at the Catholic
University  of  Leuven  and  Executive  Director  of  Kredietbank,  Brussels,
SUERF Series nº 7, p. 6, 11)
A British view: “At least part of the reason for different modes of development
(of financial centres) is the difference between financial centres which have
traditionally been national and ‘inward’ looking and financial centres which
have  been  international  and  ‘outward’ looking  ...  Liberalization  of
international payments combined with the growth of the Eurodollar market
gave an enormous stimulus to the only financial centre capable of taking
advantage  of  these  developments,  namely  the  City  of  London  ...  Many
practitioners in the City have long felt that the internationalism and ‘outward’
looking orientation of the financial centre in London could actually find itself
reduced  or  hamstrung  by  European  legislation  on  many  international
transactions  (e.g.  international  insurance)  and  by  the  possible  dangers  of
a powerful  central  bureaucracy  with  little  experience  of  or  sympathy  for
international markets ... All (this) refers to preoccupations which have, in
a very  real  sense,  been  overtaken  by  events  ...  Today  and  in  the  future,
whatever  happens  to  the  larger  international  issues,  the  main  difference
between the members of the EEC (including the U.K.) are differences of
institutional  and  legal  structure.  Progress  in  such  matters  as  a European
company  law,  uniform  European  savings  and  investment  institutions  and
patterns,  uniform  investment  requirements  and  policies  of  insurance
companies and pension funds, uniform reporting and accounting practices of
public companies etc. etc. are likely to be far more important in determining
the final shape of financial markets and methods of intermediation than any
spectacular currency or monetary initiatives.
The fact that these institutional and legal factors are deeply rooted in diverse
historical,  sociological  and  political  backgrounds  is  a measure  of  the
problems of future integration, and of reasonable forecasting of the future.”
(John E. Nash, Executive Director, Samuel Montagu and Co, Ltd, London,
SUERF Series nº 4, pp. 4, 15, 17, 23)
81Colloquium 4: Multinational Enterprises – Financial and
Monetary Aspects
Nottingham, April 1973
President of SUERF and Chairman of the Colloquium: Hans Bosman
Colloquium Book:
Editors: J.G.S. Wilson and C.F. Scheffer
Authors: Lord O’Brien, G.Y. Bertin, F.H. Brittenden, John H. Dunning, Jack
Hendley,  J.  Koning,  A.J.W.S.  Leonard,  Nils  Lundgren,  W.A.P.
Manser,  John  Mellors,  Sylvain  Plasschaert,  Sidney  E.  Rolfe,
Sieghardt  Rometsch,  Edward  Thielemans,  Patrice  de  la  Vallée,
Donald W. Vollmer.
Publisher: A.W. Sijthoff, Leyden, 1974, xi, 241 pp.
– On the threefold dimension of the multinational company (MNC):
“(The MNC) is actually active in three dimensions. First of all, the national
dimension of the parent company, whence it extends its activities over the
world and which takes decisions on the strategically important points and
determines the arrangement of the whole. In the second place, the dimension
of  the  foreign  countries,  which  is  fragmented  by  political,  economic  and
sociological boundaries and which is occupied by the MNC via its local
establishments. And lastly, the MNC’s own specific dimension, created by
itself via its internal organisation and structure.
This threefold dimension gives the MNC a greater independence vis-à-vis its
environment and thence offers it possibilities which are not available, or at
least are available to a lesser extent, to the national enterprise.” (Edward
Thielemans, Director, Kredietbank NV, Brussels, p. 23)
– On MNC versus nation state:
“A traditional frame of reference in discussing MNCs has been the conflict
between  the  objectives  of  those  enterprises  as  part  of  the  international
economic  system,  attempting  to  allocate  resources  optimally  without
reference  to  national  borders,  and  the  needs  of  the  national  states.
Traditionally, those who place the higher priority on the legitimacy of the
objectives of the nation states have seen MNC as a threat to sovereignty while
83those who place a higher priority on international economic rationality see the
nation state as a residual barrier ... MNCs improve the international allocation
of resources, while the institutional arrangements under which the modern
world exists tend to make them contribute to international instability. The task
at  hand  is  to  concentrate  on  developing  both  national  and  international
policies  and  institutions  to  cope  with  the  stability  problem  rather  than
sacrifice real growth by interventions to restrict international firms ... It was
suggested  that  many  features  of  the  markets  in  which  multinational
enterprises operated such as tax differentials, privileged access to finance and
the like, were forms of market imperfection arising out of government action
...” (SidneyE. Rolfe , Professor at the Center for International Studies, MIT,
Massachusetts, USA, in the general report on the Colloquium, p. 222)
“The commercial interests of a MNC may not coincide with the national
interest of a country where it operates; and further work remains to be done
on how best such conflicts of interest can be reconciled, so as to preserve
national objectives without necessarily killing the goose that lays the golden
eggs.” (Lord O’Brien, Governor of the Bank of England, p. 11)
“Domestic management policies (are) more difficult to achieve the greater the
openness of the economy. But because MNCs (are) so much more involved
in international transactions than national firms and that a substantial part of
these (are) intra-group; because they (are) among the world’s largest and most
powerful  financial  institutions;  and  because  they  (operate)  in  a world
comprised  of  sovereign  states  each  with  different  fiscal,  monetary  and
exchange policies designed to meet its own particular objectives, the clash
between such firms and national governments (are) the more dramatically
expressed.”  (John H. Dunning,  Professor  of  Economics,  University  of
Reading, p. 183)
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– On the state of the debate:
“In  recent  years  no  major  theoretical  breakthrough  has  been  achieved
regarding  the  fixed-versus  floating-rate  debate.  Rather,  there  has  been
a consolidation of the respective arguments in favour of the two regimes
formulated essentially on the basis of empirical considerations concerning the
following fundamental points: (a) the stabilizing or destabilizing nature of
speculation;  (b)  obstacles  to  trade  and  foreign  investment  deriving  from
exchange-rate  uncertainties;  (c)  the  degree  of  anti-inflationary  discipline
imposed  by  the  two  regimes;  (d)  the  negative  consequence  of  temporary
fluctuations of the exchange rate around the trend.” (G. Carli, Governor of
the Banca d’Italia, in the opening address to the Colloquium, pp. 3-5)
– Findings according to the elasticity approach:
“... We have stressed: (1) the complex reaction of export and import prices to
a movement  in  exchange  rates:  we  found  generally  a relatively  small
deterioration in the terms of trade for manufactured goods in the very early
quarters after the depreciation and some further subsequent worsening; (2) the
need to disaggregate the balance of currents accounts. The impact of, say,
a depreciation will vary even in sign between the various components; (3) the
high elasticities in the medium-run but low ones in the short-run; (4) the quite
low supply elasticities in the medium-run, especially for raw materials ...
Some of those findings explain the slow adjustment of current payments to
changes in exchange rates.” (Herbert Glesjer, Professor at the University of
Brussels, p. 45-46)
85– Conclusions starting from the monetary approach to the balance of
payments:
“... It is misleading to argue that free exchange rates automatically eliminate
external  payments  problems  and  hence  that  the  policy-makers  can  direct
fiscal and monetary tools towards any desired internal objective. Flexible
exchange rates per se need not be unstable but if they make for instability and
variability of rates of domestic money creation in the various countries, then
they will indeed prove unstable. Such effects will be the more pronounced if
the home economy is highly open and integrated with foreign economies. In
these conditions the integration of the network of the world market might
suffer with a consequent generalised loss in welfare. This suggests that a case
can be made to establish, wherever possible, large currency blocks, floating
against  each  other  and  characterised  by  stable  rules  of  internal  monetary
growth.” (R.S. Masera, Economist at the BIS, Basle, p. 55, 65)
– On the impact of the oil shock:
“...If  flexible  exchange  rates  are  more  suitable  for  conditions  where  the
balance of payments is a small fraction of aggregate domestic product, while
fixed rates are better employed in conditions where it is a large part, one has
to point out that neither system of exchange can work well with the present
enormous oil deficits.” (Francis Forte, Professor and Vice-President Ente
Nazionale Idrocarburi, Rome, general rapporteur of the Colloquium, p. 221)
– How to assess the experience of flexible rates?
“Flexible rates came into operation in a period of great disturbances which
were to a large extent, provoked by the previous experience of fixed exchange
rates where frequent adjustments were rendered difficult by the fact that such
changes were regarded as a traumatic experience. I would say that floating
has not been ‘clean’ ... (The) previous disequilibrium situation was largely
due to the excess of the money supply in various countries, a situation that
proponents of flexible exchange systems do not suppose, particularly as they
believe that a country may try to insulate itself by way of flexibility ...”
(F. Forte ibid, p. 221-222)
“... If one wants to judge the present system’s performance one must not
forget that it is not a generalized system of floating, or even of managed
floating ... Currencies in the ‘snake’ cannot be said to belong to a system of
managed floating rates, but to a system of adjustable pegs, since they are
committed to a fixed relationship between them. Managed fluctuations may
not differ significantly from adjustable pegs ...” (ibid, p. 222)
86“... A tendency persists, under flexible exchange rates to reason in terms
similar to those employed under fixed rates: i.e. to consider rates behaviour
mostly as ‘one way’ and therefore to believe that if a currency has been
devalued, it is likely to suffer further devaluations and that if a currency has
been revalued, it is likely to be involved in further revaluations. This kind of
attitude may be destabilizing.” (ibid, p. 224)
– Towards a hybrid system?
“Il semble donc que le monde devra se contenter d’un système hybride où les
taux  de  change  resteront  flottants  mais  où  les  interventions  des  autorités
seront nombreuses. Un tel système devra permettre aux autorités d’un pays de
céder devant des fortes pressions sur leur monnaie tout en résistant à des
variations de taux qui leur paraîtront trop fortes ou mal dirigées.” (E. Mérigo,
Adviser at the Ministry of Finance, Madrid, p. 174)
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– Setting the stage:
“Nous avons retenu trois grands axes de réflexion. Le premier concerne les
forces  macro-économiques  qui  déterminent  fondamentalement  l’activité
bancaire et financière, le second s’attache aux problèmes relatifs à la diffusion
internationale de cette activité. Le dernier regroupe les questions liées au
contrôle de celle-ci ... (a) macro-économiquement, ce qui nous préoccupe
maintenant, en premier lieu, n’est plus l’organisation du recyclage des soldes
pétroliers mais la répercussion sur l’activité financière du grand mouvement
d’inflation au niveau mondial et national; (b) internationalement, l’avenir des
Euro-marchés n’est plus en question mais plutôt les formes selon lesquelles
le mouvement d’internationalisation des activités bancaires sera consolidé
ainsi  que  les  modalités  de  financement  des  besoins  des  pays  en  voie  de
développement (c) enfin, du point de vue contrôle, l’attention s’est déplacée
de la prévention ad hoc d’accidents bancaires et d’aide immédiate en cas de
difficultés,  à la  mise  au  point  de  mesures  plus  générales  garantissant  la
liquidité et la solvabilité bancaires. En d’autres termes, autorités et financiers,
sont,  souvent  en  étroite  concertation,  à la  recherche  d’un  niveau  de
réglementation qui garantisse une exposition aux risques compatible avec le
fonctionnement  d’un  système  financier,  où  il  y a,  à la  fois,  concurrence,
innovation, liberté et d’autre part protection de l’épargnant, répartition des
risques,  responsabilité  publique  en  matière  monétaire  et  financière  ...”
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College of Europe, Bruges; and Adviser to Paribank Belgium, in the general
report of the Colloquium, pp. 249-251 and in the English translation, pp. 3-5)
– On stagflation and crowding out
“The great question of 1976: will the recovery which is now in prospect be
frustrated  because  the  private  sector,  as  its  need  for  funds  increases,  be
‘crowded  out’ of  financial  markets  by  the  irreducible  appetite  of
deficit-spending  governments?  The  potential  danger  which  is  foreseen  is
quite distinct from the sort of competition for real resources which may occur
when productive capacity is at full stretch and involves ‘overheating’ ... The
problem identified as ‘crowding out’ is not one of over-employment of real
resources, but is seen as operating through financial markets at an earlier
stage of recovery with the effect of preventing the full employment of real
resources being reached at all.” (J.R. Sargent, Group Economic Adviser
Midland Bank Ltd. Group, pp. 35-36)
– On financial structures at times of inflation
“In Italy, external financing is on a vast scale and this applies especially to
indirect financing. Among financial intermediaries the credit institutions, and
especially the banking system, have a dominant role. Hence the enormous
scope for the tools available to the monetary authorities and the opportunities
for  effective  manoeuvre.  It  is  these  structural  factors  especially,  plus  the
traditional shortcomings of fiscal policy that explain why economic policy in
Italy is mainly a matter of monetary policy.” (Guido Carli, Mario Monti and
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, respectively (1) former Governor of the Banca
d’Italia and President of Ente Einaudi, (2) Professor at the University of
Torino and at the University Bocconi, Milano; and (3) Adviser in the Banca
d’Italia, p. 33)
“As a result of the process of continually rising prices, the solvency ratios of
the commercial banks and the savings banks have deteriorated over the past
ten years... From an appreciation of the valuable function that profits and
common equity fulfil in the Dutch economy, will be readily understood how
urgent  the  need  is  for  a recovery  in  earnings  and  with  it  the  necessary
improvement  in  solvency.”  (W. Eizenga,  Professor  of  Economics  at  the
University of Leyden, pp. 77-78, 79)
“Inflation is a gigantic redistribution in favour of owners of tangible assets
and at the expense of owners of financial assets... The rate of inflation will
have a decisive influence on how life assurance develops in the future and
90assurers will be well advised to do all they can to add to their range of
instruments for preserving the real purchasing power of the benefits they
offer.”  (K.-J. Steffen, H. Wienold and  H. Soldner,  Vereinigte
Versicherungsgruppe, München, p. 99, 110)
“Vingt-cinq années de croissance économique rapide, accompagnée de taux
d’inflation  élevés  avaient  en  effet  diminué  les  risques  de  défaillance  des
emprunteurs  et  altéré  le  sens  du  risque  dans  la  profession  bancaire...  En
rappelant aux banquiers qu’il existait encore des risques, les évènements de
1973  et  de  1974  auront  stoppé  une  évolution  dangereuse  des  structures
financières  occidentales,  sans  que  l’on  puisse  dire  aujourd’hui  si  les
conditions  d’arbitrage  ‘sécurité-rentabilité’ seront  maintenant  durablement
modifiées  au  profit  de  la  sécurité.”  (Daniel Deguen and  Jacques-Henry
David, respectively, Caisse Nationale des Marchés de l’Etat and Inspection
des Finances Paris, pp. 326-327)
– Divergent views on indexation of financial instruments:
“... Indexation should be a positive sum game for borrowers and lenders taken
together:  indexation  eliminates  the  purchasing-power  for  savers  and
investors; indexation eliminates the risk for intermediaries in that, as a result
of inflation, interest rates on their current, shorter-term liabilities may rise
faster than interest rates on their old, longer-term assets... In view of these
important advantages which indexation offers to both borrowers and lenders,
it seems difficult to understand why in recent years so little use has been made
of  financial  indexation  (and  floating  interest-rate  agreements)  in  the
industrialised  countries.”  (Roland Vaubel,  Institut  für  Weltwirtschaft,
University of Kiel, pp. 128-129)
“Financial indexation cannot be regarded as the solution to the problems
raised  by  rapid  inflation. At  best,  it  may  represent  a palliative  likely  to
produce positive results in given circumstances but at the cost of introducing
further  distortions  and  rigidities  in  the  present  economic  and  financial
structures.” (Rinaldo Pecchioli, OECD, Paris, p. 153)
– On regulation and supervision
“There must always be some conflict between competition and regulation.
The only completely safe financial system consists of a monopoly institution
whose liabilities are guaranteed by the government. The idea of competition
presupposes that some institutions will go on the wall or be swallowed up by
more powerful competitors, and this process of failure or difficulty creates
risk  and  uncertainty  in  the  financial  system.  It  is  only  natural  that  the
91authorities, faced with the need to tighten up the safety regulations for the
financial system after a period in which a number of institutions, mostly
small, have got into difficulties, should look to the large institutions as the
models of probity and strength... The authorities in all countries seem to be
operating under the slogan of ‘big is beautiful’ ... However the safety of the
larger institutions derives as much from the fact that everybody knows that
the authorities would never let them fail as from their inherent strength.
The essential feature of an effective system of prudential regulation is that it
should concentrate on the risk exposure of individual institutions, and this
cannot be done by detailed regulation.” (Jack Revell, Professor, University
College of North Wales, Bangor, p. 211-213)
“The failures of one or two banks and the well-known series of serious losses
incurred by a number of others as a result of imprudent or unauthorised
transactions in foreign exchange, which shook the banking system during
1974 with such unsettling effects on confidence and which in every case had
effects which crossed frontiers, served as a catalyst for much rethinking of
traditional  attitudes  both  within  individual  banks  and  within  supervisory
authorities...” (G. Blunden, Executive Director, Bank of England, Chairman
of the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices of the
Group of Ten, p. 195)
– On international harmonisation of banking regulations
C’est avec beaucoup de pragmatisme, qu’il faut aborder et conduire l’oeuvre
d’harmonisation des legislations bancaires. Les efforts déployés dans le passé
et actuellement montrent la difficulté technique de rapprocher des systèmes
nationaux  hérités  d’histoires  économiques  et  financières  et  d’institutions
politiques et administratives toujours spécifiques. Aucun modèle bancaire ne
s’impose avec évidence pour tous les Etats de la Communauté, à court et
moyen terme du moins. Par ailleurs, ce n’est pas du jour au lendemain que les
systèmes de contrôle pourraient être unifiés de manière suffisamment étroite
pour que l’harmonisation des régimes ait un sens positif, spécialement du
point de vue de la protection des épargnants. (Jean Le Brun, Professor in the
Université  Catholique  de  Louvain,  Adviser  Bank  Commission,  Brussels
p. 357)
92Colloquium 7: New Approaches in Monetary Policy
Wiesbaden, September 1977.
President of SUERF and Chairman of the Colloquium: Raymond Bertrand
Colloquium Book
Editors: J.E.Wadsworth and François Léonard de Juvigny
Authors: Carlo  D’Adda,  Reino  Airikkala,  Nino  Andreatta,  Andrew  Bain,
Jacques Baudewijns, Horst Bockelmann, Hans W.J. Bosman, Cesare
Caranza,  Paul  Coulbois,  Jacques-Henri  David,  Herman  J.  Dudler,
Economic  Intelligence  Department  Bank  of  England,  Research
Department Banco de España, Einar Forsbak, Leif Hansen, Banking
Department Central Bank of Ireland, Warren D. McClam, Tommaso
Padoa-Schioppa, Ralf Pauli, Peter Pauly, Jacques Pecha, Theo Peeters,
Kurt  Schiltknecht,  Helmut  Schlesinger,  Jacques  J.  Sijben,  Niels
Thygesen, Martin N.C. Thomann, Uwe Westphal, Manfred Wilms.
Publishers: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands,
1979, xiv, 390 pp.
– In a nutshell...
“... It became clear that the views of the monetarists had gained acceptance -at
any rate in part – over a wide field, especially during years when gathering
inflation  made  less  effective  the  customary  remedies  such  as  restrictive
measures by way of interest rates, money market conditions and banking
activity.  Nevertheless,  such  views  were  far  from  being  accepted  in  their
entirety. Central banks generally, while agreeing with the importance of paying
attention to monetary aggregates, stressed the need, in practice, for employing
additional means of regulation and expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of
simply controlling the money stock when, for example, inflation was being
imported. Among academic writers, also, were some holding similar opinions
... Discussions covered such fields as using the most appropriate among the
various monetary aggregates available and the means of regulation.” (John
E. Wadsworth, Honorary Editor-in-Chief of SUERF, pp. ix-x)
“The use of monetary targets has in practice been influenced more by the
force of events than by the new monetarism...” (Warren D. McClam, Deputy
Manager, BIS, Basle. p. 70)
93– Academic monetarist views on the theoretical foundations...
“(The emphasis on the theoretical foundations of monetary policy) is closely
related  to  the  fact  that  the  post-war  macro-economic  stabilisation  policy,
based  on  the  Keynesian  analysis,  has  not  been  successful  in  curbing  the
inflationary  process  during  the  past  decade  ...  We  cannot  endorse  the
philosophy of ‘learning to live with inflation” ... In this way habituation to the
inflation  phenomenon  becomes  an  independent  driving  force  in  the
inflationary process. In the long-run a return to sound and stable monetary
relations will become more difficult costly and painful ... The permanent and
increasing inflation of recent years in the Western-world is caused in essence
by a continuous and even an accelerating growth of the money supply in
relation  to  the  growth  of  real  production.  The  inflationary  process  is
essentially a monetary phenomenon which cannot come into effect unless the
monetary  authorities  provide  the  required  ‘monetary  fuel’ ... A policy  of
gradually reducing the monetary growth rate as to become commensurate
with the real growth rate of the economy, may contribute to an elimination of
the destabilizing impact of inflationary expectations. Wage negotiations and
price-setting by firms should not be determined by the rate of inflation in the
recent past, but rather by the lower rate of inflation which will be allowed by
monetary authorities in the near future.” (Jacques J. Sijben, Economist at the
University of Tilburg, pp. 13, 37)
“The rational expectation hypothesis implies that economic units are aware of
the effects of an excessive expansion of the money stock. They anticipate the
inflationary impact of such a policy. As a result, an excessive monetary policy
does not stimulate the growth of real variables in the economy, not even in the
short run. It leads only to inflation. Therefore, given rational expectations,
a monetary  policy  using  quantitative  target  variables,  and  adjusting  the
growth rate of these variables to the long-run expansion path of real economic
activity, seems to be the most appropriate monetary policy in our present
situation.” (Manfred Willms, Professor of Economics, Christian-Albrechts-
University of Kiel, p. 63)
– The Bundesbank as the reference for practical monetary policy?
“The Bundesbank has decided to use primarily a quantitative target ... The
movement of the money stock serves as an indicator of the effects of the
central bank’s measures on economic activity. On this point we are guided
less than we used to be by interest rates, changes in interest rates are not only
the  outcome  of  monetary  actions,  they  may  also  be  the  result  of  market
determinants or of a mixture of both ... Not very long ago, for instance, one
commentator  charged  us  with  ‘hindering  a policy  which  is  modern  in
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our policy is evidently not pronounced enough. Other observers fear precisely
the opposite, namely that there is too much ‘monetarism’ in our approach; in
their view we pay too little attention to current cyclical requirements ... The
compromise – at bottom a pragmatic one – between steadying the monetary
developments and an anti-cyclical orientation is evident from the practical
policies pursued by the Bundesbank since 1975 ...
Money creation processes in the banking system can start in a variety of ways,
and without any action by the central bank. This does not mean, however, that
the central bank is powerless to influence the bank’s money creation ... (The)
demand for central bank money is the connecting link between the central
bank’s money creation and the money creation of the banking system. This is
the point at which the central bank must exploit its monopoly of central bank
money, by setting the conditions – if necessary, harshly – on which it is
prepared to satisfy the banks’ demand for central bank money once it has
arisen... You may well come to the conclusion that the practical formulation
and the preconditions for the success of any monetary policy depend in a large
measure on the political and institutional conditions prevailing in a country.
I am sure that our experience of controlling the central bank money stock
cannot be transferred without difficulty to other countries; conversely, we are
always  initially  assailed  by  doubt  if  people  who  fail  to  appreciate  the
institutional differences from other central bank systems recommend us to use
these systems’instruments... This does not mean that we do not examine them
to see how far they can be used...” (Helmut Schlesinger, Member of the
Directorate of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt/Main, pp. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11)
“La première (‘vérité’), c’est que la crédibilité et donc l’efficacité de toute
intervention monétaire dépend d’abord des structures bancaires et financières
du  pays  où  elle  est  appliquée.  Condamnée  par  exemple  à soutenir  des
établissements fragiles dont la mise en liquidation pourrait être à l’origine
d’une crise bancaire, la Banque centrale ne peut avoir en France la même
autorité sur les banques que son homologue allemande qui trouve en face
d’elle des interlocuteurs à la fois plus homogènes et moins dépendants de ses
interventions. La seconde (‘vérité’), c’est qu’en agissant sur le comportement
des banques et sur la disponibilité du crédit, les autorités monétaires déplacent
tous les éléments de l’équilibre économique national suscitant par là une
multiplicité de réactions émanant de tous les agents économiques et, de ce
fait, difficile à prévoir. C’est pourquoi la politique monétaire est du domaine
du contingent. Adjuvant indispensable à la régulation de la conjoncture, elle
ne peut à elle seule tenir lieu de politique économique.” (Jacques-Henri
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Paris, p. 289)
“The central bank getting the same independence as the courts and separate
from national treasuries! (Reference to the All Saints Manifesto of November
1975: we must give the monetary authorities the same independence from
political  control  and  the  same  responsibility  to  the  rule  of  law  we  have
accorded the judicial system. It follows that the new institution or institutions
should  be  removed  from  the  jurisdiction  of  treasuries,  and  monetary
authorities should be appointed or elected for long periods of time if not for
life...). It must be a wonderful dream for monetarists, and for central bankers;
a dream that in all probability will never come true in this way. But that the
maintenance of the value of money would be greatly facilitated by a high
degree of independence of the central bank is a thesis which I would like to
support,  and  which  I base,  both  on  theoretical  considerations  and  on  the
experiences  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.”  (Hans W.J. Bosman,
Professor  of  Money  and  Banking,  University  of  Tilburg  and  Secretary
General of SUERF, p. 261)
– Monetary policy in open economies and its coordination, particularly in
the EEC
“Floating rates provide incomplete insulation from real external disturbances.
An open economy is open, no matter what its exchange rate regime (is). But
flexible exchanges do, however, permit different long-term rates of inflation.
Mussa has drawn further attention to the fact that since exchange rate changes
have real effects, at least in the short run, this makes such changes a concern
of government policy. It even implies that governments can use exchange
rates as policy instruments. The possibility has been recognized for some time
as the experience of the thirties has demonstrated. But as is well known policy
conflicts are bound to arise if everyone wants to devalue vis-à-vis everyone
else The potential for policy conflicts, therefore, remains under a managed
flexible  exchange  rate  system  and  consequently  also  the  need  for  policy
coordination... Policy coordination and stability of exchange rates are in the
first  place  matters  of  coordination  of  money  supply  policies,  and  not  of
exchange  rate  surveillance  and  intervention  rules...”  (Theo Peeters,
Professor, Centre for Economic Studies, Catholic University of Leuven, pp.
199-200)
“There is an inbred scepticism in most European central banks and Treasuries
towards  the  quantification  of  economic  policy  effects  for  the  purpose  of
national public debate or exchanges in international meetings, even when the
96historical experiences appear fairly well based in econometric work and in
general accord with the views of policy-makers themselves. To some extent
this scepticism is well-founded in the present state of knowledge on private
investment, consumption, imports and other economic variables; but it is also
a convenient  protection  against  a better  informed,  though  mechanical,
interpretation  of  national  policies  by  outsiders  such  as  international
colleagues ...
I would like to argue that there is a strong need for adopting an integrated
approach at the EC-level to the coordination of national exchange-rate and
monetary policies. In particular, it would appear that, without the focus on
some declared objectives for exchange rates, clear guidelines for monetary
policy coordination are not feasible...” (Niels Thygesen, Professor, Institute
of Economics, University of Copenhagen, pp. 209, 214)
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– Stormy Relations in growing interdependence:
“L’Europe  entretient  en  toutes  circonstances  avec  le  Dollar  des  relations
privilégiées mais orageuses ... Si ces relations ne sont pas faciles en toutes
circonstances, elles sont plus mal-aisées encore en temps de crise. Les liens
entre le Dollar et l’Europe sont alors resserrés- au point même parfois d’être
tendus- et la crise fait apparaître plus clairement l’ambiguìté fondamentale de
la relation entre les deux parties. Les pays européens se tournent vers les
Etats-Unis  tantôt  pour  demander  leur  aide,  tantôt  pour  rejeter  sur  eux  la
responsabilité des difficultés et, plus généralement, pour les deux à la fois ...
Apremière vue, cette attitude des Européens a de quoi surprendre, car on peut
trouver étonnant que ces pays adressent – en même temps – leurs requêtes et
leurs  reproches  aux  Etats  Unis  .On  peut  cependant  lui  trouver  certaines
justifications, car il n’est pas excessif de prétendre que, si le Dollar aide
l’Europe à surmonter des crises, il contribue aussi, dans une certaine mesure,
à les aggraver.” (René Larre, General Manager, BIS, Basle, p. 3, 4)
“In  the  evolution  of  the  post-war  world  economic  order,  a number  of
developments have increasingly limited the ability of the U.S. to determine
independently its own economic fate, or to determine single-handedly the
course of the global economy. The relatively faster rise in other countries’
output, the reduction in the U.S. share of world trade, the rising share of
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employ contemporary technology but retaining comparative advantages, the
inception of floating exchange rates, the development – still in its early stages
–  of  alternative  reserve  assets,  all  tie  U.S more  closely  into  the  world
economy. At the same time, these developments require that more of the
burden of global economic stabilization be shared by other countries, in both
the financial and nonfinancial spheres of cooperation...” (Daniel H. Brill,
Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury for Economic Policy, p. 26-27)
“It follows from recent experience that unattractive consequences can result
for  the  U.S economy  and  for  the  international  financial  system  from
independent,  national  decisions  on  macro-economic  policies  in  an
increasingly interdependent world economy. The United States can no longer,
if it ever could, afford to ignore so-called feedback effects from the rest of the
world. Especially in an environment in which exchanges rates can and do
fluctuate, if the U.S. economy expands significantly more rapidly than the
economies  of  other  industrial  countries,  it  appears  that  the  United  States
becomes not only a ‘locomotive’ but also a ‘sink’ – attracting the output of
other countries, enlarging its trade deficit, and in the extreme case causing an
excessive  depreciation  of  the  Dollar.”  (Edwin M. Truman,  Director,
Division of International Finance, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, p. 57)
– Divergent trends in saving and investment as an explanation of persisting
balance of payments disequilibria. A neo-Keynesian approach:
“The sharp increase of the divergence (in current account experience) is in
part a result of the difference between cyclical phases in the United States and
the  other  two  major  countries  (i.e.  Japan  and  Germany)  For  the  main,
however, the longer-run divergence reflects structural developments that are
affecting the rates of investment and saving in those countries. In the United
States, the secular growth and the level of investment have been relatively
well maintained. The overall rate of saving of the private sector and the
government, on the other hand, has declined. The two surplus countries, by
contrast, have experienced gradual reductions in the secular rates of growth
during the 1970s. These reductions in growth rates have been accompanied by
cuts  in  investment  that  have  not  been  matched  by  reduced  saving.  The
deficiency of savings in the United States was made good through capital
inflows.  Similarly,  the  excess  of  savings  in  the  two  other  countries  was
transferred abroad in the form of capital outflows. These capital flows were
not private capital flows but official capital flows recorded ‘below the line’.
This transfer mechanism, which took the form of a large and continuous
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banks was costly to Germany and Japan, since the real rates of return on
German and Japanese investments have tended to be negative over the past
five years. Further it may not be sustainable in the long run... The divergence
gives rise to external adjustment difficulties and places heavy pressures on
exchange rates. While the maintenance of exchange flexibility will be needed
to move gradually to a more sustainable pattern of current account balances,
it may not be desirable to place the whole burden of adjustment on exchange
rates. The  adjustment  process  would,  in  particular,  benefit  from  demand-
management  and  other  measures  that  bear  more  directly  on  saving  or
investment.” (Jacques R. Artus, staff member of the IMF, p. 63, 64, 87)
– Private capital movements as the ‘villains’?:
“The private capital flows that are needed ... are not forthcoming on a stable
and continuous basis. The United States have maintained a propensity to
export rather than import private capital, in particular direct investments. The
financial markets of the two surplus countries, on the other hand, may not yet
be sufficiently developed to allow a smooth transfer abroad in the form of
private capital flows of the excess savings generated at home. The lack of
well-developed markets for foreign bonds is particular constraining in this
respect. Pressures on exchange markets have tended to be substantial and
practically all of the transfer of saving has taken place ‘below the line’(i.e. as
official compensatory capital flows).” (J. Artus, ibid, p. 87)
“... One important element is the very uneven development of capital markets
in industrial countries. For instance, the situation in the German and Japanese
capital markets has prevented the generation of long-term capital outflows on
a scale and in a form that would not only have formed an adequate counterpart
of the large current account surpluses of these two countries of the past few
years... but which would also have made a precious contribution to providing
scarce  capital  resources  to  countries  in  dire  need  of  them.  Another
consequence... has been the absurd situation that countries in deficit have
been borrowing in the well-developed capital market of the country with the
largest deficit of all: the United States.
... Free (short-term) capital movements contribute significantly to economic
instability, both internationally and through their effects on the individual
domestic economies – under a par value as well as under exchange flexibility.
It is far from obvious that the industrial countries can live in a tolerable
fashion with this instability, or that they should be willing to accept the cost
connected  with  the  vast  hot  money  movements  of  today  and  tomorrow.”
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Professor at John Hopkins University, Baltimore, pp. 123, 126)
“International capital movements, especially on today’s scale, do indeed have
the capacity to make an impact on exchange markets. These movements are,
however,  not  an  autonomous  creation  of  the  Euromarkets  nor  are  these
markets the only conduit ... Capital movements have not been the cause but
a symptom of instability.” (Matthijs van den Adel, Centrale Rabobank, The
Netherlands, p. 147)
– On the ‘incontournable” inescapable Dollar:
“Le dollar américain avec sa variabilité au jour le jour considérable, ses aller
et retour à court terme très sensibles et ses fluctuations à long terme plus
impressionnantes encore, ne saurait revendiquer (l’) attribut de résilience-
stabilité. Mais, inversement de par son champ d’utilisation, il demeure – et de
très loin – la première monnaie mondiale. Il ne peut donc dans ces conditions
être question de lui ôter sa fonction de monnaie ‘véhicule’ou celle de réserve
de  valeurs;  cela,  au  demeurant,  pour  une  raison  très simple:  il  n’a pas
actuellement de substitut réellement crédible. Une chose et de constater qu’il
n’est plus qu’une monnaie de second best, une autre de lui trouver un
remplaçant: il n’en a point!”  (in  italics  in  the  original  text)  (Henri
Bourguinat,  Directeur  du  Laboratoire  d’Analyse  et  de  Recherches
Economiques, Faculté des Sciences Economiques, Université de Bordeaux,
p. 259)
“The Dollar will still be the main intervention currency, gradually losing the
other reserve functions, but actual and desired Dollar holdings will be brought
into  balance  increasingly  through  exchange  rate  fluctuations.  Reserve
diversification  and  exchange  rate  flexibility  will  feed  on  each  other  in
a circular  process  which  may  develop  irrespective  of  actual  payments
imbalances.”  (Sergio Siglienti,  General  Manager,  Banca  Commerciale
Italiana, p. 221)
“... The balance between return and risk that applies today with respect to the
Dollar is far from perfect, and it undoubtedly will remain imperfect over the
years ahead. But given the extent to which private holders especially have
continued to stay in dollars the alternatives apparently are not perceived to be
much better. I expect that the U.S. economic performance over the year ahead
will continue to be at least favourable enough in relative terms to justify the
confidence or optimism being shown both by those from abroad who are
making  more  and  more  investments  directly  in  the  U.S.  and  those  who
102continue to hold its currency. Thus, if the monetary system evolves along the
lines I hope and expect, with the basic conditions continuing to be set by the
market place, I think the dollar will continue to play a large role.” (Frederick
W. Deming,  Vice-President  and  Senior  Economist,  Chemical  Bank  New
York, p. 254)
– The starting European Monetary System: why and how?
An authoritative European voice: “A basic economic motivation of the EMS
has been dissatisfaction with floating exchange rate conditions in the last few
years, and the conviction that this monetary situation was having adverse
effect  on  economic  integration  in  Europe  and  in  general  on  growth  and
employment in the Community ...
...  (The)  exchange  fluctuations  have  managed  to  replace  partly  the  old
customs barriers in their negative effects on growth and on the development
of a large European market and of enterprises with such a dimension. The
dismantling of customs barriers and the progress towards integration was one
of the elements of faster growth in Europe in the 1960s. The instability and
uncertainty as to exchange rate movements between European currencies in
the last few years was felt to act as a brake on integration and growth ...
... Expressed in a positive way, the basic objective of the EMS is to contribute
to a lasting improvement of the present economic growth and employment
situation  of  the  Community  and  its  economic  integration  through  greater
exchange  rate  stability.  This  objective  will  be  met  only  if  the  system  is
conceived  in  such  a way  that  it  will  be  durable  and  contains  neither
a deflationary nor an inflationary bias.
Those who adhere to the exchange rate system should be ready to adjust their
internal monetary economic policies accordingly ... Agreement on this point
does not imply that one should wait for a complete disappearance of these
differences in inflation rates before adhering to the system. This system itself
has a sufficient flexibility and it should not prevent remaining real disparities
from  being  reflected  in  exchange  rates...”  (Jacques van Yperseele de
Strihou, Chairman of the Monetary Committee of the European Monetary
Community, p. 294, 296, 300)
An American view: “There are two necessary (but not sufficient) conditions
for the viability and longevity of the European Monetary System. Firstly
European policy-makers must not have illusions that the minimization of
exchange-rate  variability  will  always  promote  their  individual  nations’
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will not make exchange-rate variability an end in itself, and will not seem to
be  doing  so.  Secondly,  European  policy-makers  must  not  look  to  the
minimization  of  exchange-rate  variability  as  the  primary,  indeed  even  an
important, catalyst of greater convergence in their national objectives and
domestic macro-economic policies. That convergence needs to be actively
promoted  and  achieving  in  its  own  right,  as  a prior  step.  Exchange-rate
stability can result from, but cannot by itself engender, an integrated Europe.”
(Ralph C. Bryant, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. p. 172)
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– To be or not to be...
“Nous  sommes  ici  au  pays  de  Hamlet  et  la  question  fondamentale  (du)
colloque  ne  devrait-elle  pas  se  formuler:  ‘Pourra-t-on  continuer  à être
banquier dans les années 1980?’ Le métier de banquier devient un métier de
répartiteur d’une denrée rare et, le plus souvent, selon des critères qui sont
ceux de la réglementation ...” (Pierre Ledoux, Président de l’Association
Française des Banques, p. 10)
“The time had come for a topic of more direct concern to individual bank
managements, (facing) major new challenges: the rise in energy prices, high
rates  of  inflation,  balance  of  payments  disequilibria,  fast-growing
indebtedness  of  lesser  developed  countries,  rapid  structural  change  in
industrial economies and growing intervention by governments ...” (Preface
by the editors, p. ix)
– On competition and convergence among financial institutions:
“... My interpretation is that competition has considerably intensified among
banks and near-banks, and that it is likely to proceed further along this road
as remaining regulations are eroded in the 1980s. Some movement towards
universal banking is still in the pipeline, though not primarily through further
105concentration; since economies of scale beyond a certain level do not seem
important  there  was  no  reason  to  favour  further  concentration.”  (Niels
Thygesen, as general rapporteur, p. 334)
“It seems reasonable to expect that the breaking down of demarcation lines
between different types of financial institutions will continue. One of the
chief results of such a trend should be a further reduction in the traditional
distinction between different national banking and financial systems. ... In no
two countries will the role of banks in the financial system ever be exactly the
same. But the secular trend is clearly for past imbalances to be evened out,
and gaps filled in the range of services provided.” (Ian Morison, Inter-bank
Research Organisation, London, p. 57, 58)
“Le problème le plus important, c’est de placer dans des conditions de
concurrence équitable les diverses institutions financières.” (Pierre Ledoux,
op. cit, p. 10, in italics in the original text)
– On the vulnerability of savings banks
“The  structural  weakness  of  the  savings  institutions  is  not  that  they  are
involved in maturity transformation by borrowing short and lending long, but
that they commit themselves to fixed interest lending in a time of rapid and
variable inflation.” (Niels Thygesen, ibidem, p. 333)
“In  comparison  with  the  USA,  Dutch  savings  banks  had  much  greater
freedom to take suitable steps in response to rising interest rates – although
I would argue those steps have not been sufficient. More specifically, their
flexibility with regard to the asset side of the balance sheet was much greater,
besides which Dutch savings banks offer a complete range of services as far
as retail banking is concerned, which cannot be said of many American thrift
institutions.” (Wietze Eizenga, Professor at the University of Leyde, p. 78)
– On the impact of shrinking corporate profitability
“High  debt-equity  ratios,  high  borrowing  costs  –  no  doubt  implying
a significantly positive real interest rate in recent years – and considerably
increased perceptions of the risk attaching to extensions of the real capital
stock have combined to depress corporate loan demand.” (Niels Thygesen,
ibid, p. 334)
“On  peut  aujourd’hui  tenir  pour  acquis  que,  dès lors  qu’elle  accepte  de
financer des besoins permanents – et elle ne peut que l’accepter puisque les
autres sources de financement sont insuffisantes – la banque renonce de facto
106au remboursement de ses concours et se trouve liée à l’entreprise pour des
durées largement indéterminées, en ce qui est la caractéristique essentielle de
l’ère de l’endettement permanent.” (Jacques Guillou, Banque de l’Union
Européenne, Paris, p. 115)
“For  continued  investment  and  growth  of  the  entrepreneurial  sector,
a restoration of a positive gap, ex ante, between expected return and the cost
of capital is a prerequisite. The existence of an expected adequately positive
gap is decisive for the willingness of entrepreneurs to expand, for the private
investor to buy shares, for the willingness of the banks and the capital market
to lend.” (Torsten Carlsson, General Manager and Adviser, Skandinaviska
Enskilda Banken, Stockholm, p. 112)
– On bank performance: Inflation as the general determinant of the rising
cost of intermediation
“... There was much criticism on the emphasis (in the Revell Report) on
inflation as the general cause that lay behind the cost of intermediation. The
experts were more inclined to put the blame on such banking facts as branch
expansion and in general to seek special explanations for their own countries.
In terms of immediate causation the experts may be right since inflation has
little direct impact on institutions like banks whose liabilities are expressed
entirely in nominal terms ... It is necessary to identify the indirect routes and
to see how inflation combines with other factors ...” (Jack Revell, Professor
of Economics, University of North Wales, p. 291)
– New aspects of the crowding-out debate
“When  the  public  deficit  is  largely  financed  by  the  central  bank  through
creation of monetary base, an expansion of deposits takes place which allows
banks to finance both an additional share of the deficit and the borrowing
needs of the private sector. Crowding-out of the private sector is thus unlikely.
By contrast, the less there is monetary base creation, the more bank financing
of the public sector crowds out credits to the private sector and is unlikely to
be extended without some portfolio constraints on banks. Is lending to the
public sector a problem for the individual bank? The answer has been shown
to  depend  crucially  on  the  extent  to  which  such  lending  results  from
autonomous bank decisions. or from portfolio constraints, rather than on the
public  nature  of  the  borrower.  Spontaneous  lending  to  the  public  sector
contributes to the achievement of a bank’s objectives, although in the long run
it may downgrade in several ways both the contents of banking activity and
the  management  style.  On  the  other  hand,  lending  to  the  public  sector
107resulting from direct or indirect portfolio constraints increases the rigidity of
banking firms and prevents them from reaching their optimal liquidity-risk-
return  combination.  Constraints  may  thus  be  regarded  as  disguised  taxes
levied on banks ... They (the banks) are usually able to shift part or all of such
taxes on to other agents. To the extent they do so, banks may be viewed as
parts of the transmission mechanism of disguised fiscal policy, as they are in
the case of monetary policy.” (Franco Bruni, Mario Monti and Angelo
Porta, respectively Associate Professor, Professor of Monetary Theory and
Policy and Professor of Economics, Bocconi University, Milan, p. 150)
– On international financial intermediation after the oil shocks
“In their task of international financial intermediation the banks will face in the
eighties  three  interrelated  challenges  of  major  dimension:  (a)  to  finance
growing and probably more unstable international payments imbalance: this is
the recycling challenge; (b) to finance the huge investments required for the
development of new energy resources: theenergychallenge; and (c) to finance
the huge investments required in developing countries to increase productivity
and alleviate poverty: this is the development challenge ... Three major types
of action which the bank should undertake ... (a) weigh out more carefully the
price they charge for their international intermediation services, having in view
particularly  an improvement of the margin structure for  Euroloans  and
astrengtheningoftheircapitalbasis;(b)commit themselves to amore serious
management of their country risk exposure; (c) strengthening cooperation
between themselves and with international financial institutions.” (Damien
Wigny, Director, Kredietbank, Luxembourg, pp. 188, 210)
“OPEC’s ability to accumulate financial assets essentially depends upon the
financial  system’s willingness  and  ability  to  intermediate  the  amounts
invested.  A build  up  of  financial  assets  would  see  bank  balance  sheets
becoming increasingly overloaded with short term liabilities to OPEC on one
side and, on the other, increasingly exposed to LDC indebtedness ... Prudent
banks will need to hold greater capital, reserves and liquidity to face the
increasing concentration of their short term liabilities and the greater risk and
concentration of their longer term assets. Borrowing margins will accordingly
need to rise.” (GeoffreyMay nard and Peter A. Davies, respectively, Vice
President,  Director  of  Economics  for  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  and
Associate Economist, Chase Manhattan Bank, London, pp. 176, 177)
A dissenting  and  contested  view:  “Spreads  seem  more  closely  related  to
industrial production in the OECD countries than to measures of US liquidity.
I would infer, therefore, that declining spreads are also associated with better
108earning prospects for borrowers and therefore with lower levels of risk.”
(Bruce Brittain, Economist with the BIS, p. 232)
– A turning point in regulation and supervision?
The  trend  toward  more  detailed  (government)  control  has  also  been
noticeable  on  credit  markets,  and  has  interfered  with  private  banking
activities quite considerably. Bank management has had to pay even greater
homage to government requests and regulations, and to make decisions based
on macro-economic considerations ... The fact that there is today growing
opposition to government regulations is largely due to the notion that they are
very far from being as perfect as theory would have us believe ... It is also
generally agreed that the more all embracing public regulations are, the more
difficult it is to avoid goal-conflicts and inconsistencies ...” (Preben Munthe,
Professor at the University of Oslo, p. 261)
“We may expect that banks and supervisors will respond to the results of this
analysis (i.e. of the past) particularly in the following areas: 1. Improved risk
management; 2. Resistance to further erosion of profits and capitalization ...
To  meet  these  challenges  in  an  increasingly  interdependent  international
banking environment presupposes ever intensifying contacts and cooperation
between  the  parties  concerned  ...”  (H.J. Muller,  Executive  Director,  De
Nederlandsche Bank, pp. 274, 275)
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– Heading towards an international financial crisis?
“Risks to the Stability of the International Financial System: gloom without
drama.”  (Title  of  the  contribution  of  Luigi Spaventa,  Professor  at  the
University of Rome, p. 324)
“There is a marked deterioration in the world economy’s macroeconomic
performance  in  the  1970s as  compared  to  the  1960s.  The  worsening  of
macroeconomic performance, is, however, not necessarily synonymous with
increased fragility, The sequel of over fifteen years of rising inflation, of
increasing payments disequilibria and, more recently, of high real interest
rates and volatility of financial market variables do, however, leave the world
economy  more  susceptible  to  further  exogenous  shocks.  Combined  with
a deterioration of national and international financial relations, they may also
lay  the  ground  for  endogenous  instability  and  crises  in  the  international
financial  system  ... The  present  concern  with  the  possibility  of  a serious
financial crisis, followed by a collapse of the real economy goes beyond the
usual gloom associated with every recessionary or stabilization phase ...”
(Alexander Swoboda, Graduate Institute of International Studies and the
International Centre for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva, p. 396, 399)
111– Those international bankers ...
“...  Le  rôle  assumé  par  quelques  dizaines  de  banques  multinationales  –
notamment  américaines  –  dans  l’intermédiation  financière  internationale
appelle une analyse théorique et empirique des stratégies et comportements
de  ces  agents  ...  La  spécificité  de  la  firme  bancaire  n’est  pas  de  nature
à empêcher l’examen de sa multinationalisation à partir d’une extension de
l’analyse des multinationales industrielles. Les résultats de quelques travaux
empiriques  limités  aux  banques  commerciales  américaines  incitent  à une
certaine circonspection quant à la rentabilité des activités internationales. La
détérioration  de  cette  rentabilité  pour  6  des  plus  grandes  banques  de
l’échantillon, entre 1972 et 1979 fait redouter un désengagement relatif de ces
banques...” (Joël Métais, Maître-Assistant, Université de Paris Dauphine, pp.
65, 82, 83)
“... There has been a steady stream of new banks entering the market and it is
estimated that the number of banks participating in syndicated lending has
grown fivefold in the past decade. There are both good and bad aspects to this.
The number of new entrants has certainly helped to spread the burden and the
risks of international lending to sustain the necessary recycling of funds. On
the other hand, a large number of the new entrants have necessarily been
smaller and relatively less experienced than the larger and older established
banks, and therefore perhaps less well prepared to handle the specialised
problems  posed  by  international  lending.”  (W. Peter Cooke,  Head  of
Banking Supervision, Bank of England, p. 20)
“The banks were flooded with sizable deposits from the oil producing surplus
countries ... The banking system has for years accepted the deposits offered
to it and has tried to find outlets for them only afterwards ... It is small wonder
that in this process the solidity of the debtor as well as prudence suffered. The
result has been twofold. On the one hand, a large number of countries have
become saddled with a heavy debt burden ... The second result has been to
reinforce  international  inflationary  tendencies.”  (Tom de Vries, Alternate
Executive Director, IMF, p. 362, 363)
– A top international banker’s view:
“... There exists a curious conflict between bankers’ theoretical and practical
approaches... The oil price hike created international payments and financing
problems on an unprecedented scale. At the time, the banks seriously doubted
their capacity to cope with this huge task. However, the governments which
were called upon for support not only hesitated, but, moreover, were forced
by domestic constraints to cut development aid precisely at a time when it was
112needed  more  than  ever.  The  IMF  as  well  reacted  only  gradually  to  the
changed circumstances. And what were countries to expect of a World Bank
which,  on  the  average,  takes  three  years  from  credit  application  to
disbursement? The international banking system had therefore to fill the gap,
almost against its will ... Second, the banks had to meet these new financing
requirements when political tensions and a monetary system with floating
exchange  rates  considerably  heightened  the  risks.  The  fear  of  the
consequences  of  their  own  courage  is  understandable  and  has  found
expression  in  a banking  climate  which  might  be  described  as  cheerful
pessimism. Third, the oil shock brought about a change in the structure of
international financing. Whereas bond issues and export credits guaranteed by
supplier countries had previously been the chief instruments of international
capital movements, the emphasis has since been shifted to ordinary bank
credits. Instead of governments or buyers of foreign bonds, the banks have
become the principal risk bearers ... Fourth, the geographical scope of the
business has expanded considerably ... The widening of the geographical base
has naturally boosted the opportunities for international financial operations.
But  with  the  growth  in  foreign  exposures,  the  appearance  of  payments
difficulties  in  several  countries,  and  various  unexpected  political
developments, such as Iran, Poland or Argentina, the banker’s always acute
sense for risk aversion has been noticeably sharpened of late.
... In uncertain times one of the bank’s traditional methods of averting risks is
to grant financing for as short a term as possible in order to withdraw their
investments  rapidly  in  case  of  danger.  They  are  well  aware  that  such
a procedure pursued collectively may bring about just that collapse of which
all are afraid. But macroeconomic considerations of this type cannot seriously
influence the attitude of institutions which in risky situations do not wish to
be the last ones that – as a German saying goes – are bitten by the dogs ...”
(Rainer E. Gut, Chairman of Crédit Suisse, p. 8, 9, 14, 15)
– Once again the ‘mystery’ of Euro-markets
“...  The  substantial  growth  experienced  in  the  Euro-dollar  market  ...  is
associated not with a high internal multiplier but with a similar rapid growth
in monetary and financial aggregates in the United States. Thus, in line with
standard portfolio balance theory, all markets share in the distribution of any
increase in the total supply of dollar assets and through a learning process and
a strong competitive position, the Euro-dollarmarket has tended to increase its
share of the total. This is similar reasoning to that applied with the growth of
non-bank financial intermediaries within domestic financial systems.
113As  the  leakages  are  high  and  because  interest  rates  adjust  quickly
a continuous flow of funds from the United States is unlikely, the concept of
an internal multiplier is of limited value and, in any case, is likely to be low.”
– On the threat of the Euro-markets for national monetary policy
“The static credit effects of the Euro-markets are shown to be determined by
the profit maximising strategy of both domestic and Euro-banks, and the
competitive structure of the domestic market. The dynamic effects relate to
whether, from an initial competitive equilibrium between the domestic and
euro-markets,  the  effect  of  monetary  policy  is  offset  by  increased  Euro-
market intermediation... This depends upon the form monetary policy takes
and in particular the extent to which it relies on non-market and control
mechanisms and influences the competitive position of the domestic sector
vis-à-vis the Euro-sector. If policy is conducted in terms of the interest rates
and banks are not constrained in their liability management, and maximise
profits in both the long and short run, the Euro-markets pose no threat to the
conduct of monetary policy ...” (David Llewellyn, Professor of Money and
Banking,  Head  of  Economics  Department,  at  the  University  of
Loughborough, pp. 91-92, 106-107)
“The preliminary empirical (econometric) work finds evidence of close links
between US non-bank transactions in domestic currency and euro-dollars and
that to a large extent the growth of non-bank Euro-dollar deposits reflects
wealth-holders’ general  portfolio  allocations.  Euro-dollar  deposits  and
borrowing  are  also  related  to  trade  transactions.  Here  the  endogenous
expansionary process in the Euro-market is more difficult to disentangle.”
(R. BarryJohnston , Economist with the Bank of England, pp. 50-51)
“(Le phénomène des opérations en eurodevises) procède de leur absence de
réglementation et de leurs avantages fiscaux liés au statut ‘off-shore’ de ces
activités  sur  les  principales  places  financières  internationales  à partir
desquelles  elles  sont  menées.  Il  n’est  dès lors  pas  surprenant  que  les
opérations en eurodevises ne soient souvent que de simples substituts des
opérations de crédit domestique.” (Joël Métais, op. cit., p. 74)
– On the political economy of international indebtedness
“Ce n’est pas tout à fait un hasard si les problèmes de stabilité sont de nos
jours volontiers posés à propos du système financier international alors que
récemment encore ils concernaient plutôt le système monétaire international.
Ce glissement conceptuel est en effet significatif d’une évolution profonde
des relations monétaires et financières internationales ... Le développement
114progressif d’euromarchés a permis de répondre à l’accroissement très rapide
des besoins de financement qu’entraînait une intégration mondiale de plus en
plus  poussée  des  échanges  et  de  la  production.  Ce  mouvement  a abouti
à l’économie d’endettement international que nous connaissons aujourd’hui
et qui repose pour l’essentiel sur l’activité d’intermédiation de très grandes
banques  commerciales  à vocation  internationale.”  (Jeanne-Marie Parly,
Professeur at the University of Paris-Dauphine, p. 310)
“The tranquil and unconcerned view of the situation which prevailed until
recently  enjoys  now  less  widespread  support  and  is  held  with  far  less
certainty... why have such clouds appeared on the horizon of the international
financial scene? There are, first, some specific facts. Foremost, of course the
Polish case... In spite of rescheduling, Poland is in a state of ‘effective but
undeclared default’.
... A deterioration  of  the  liquidity  situation  of  the  LDCs  in  general  and
specifically of some of the largest borrowers from private sources has been
noticeable in the past year or so ...
The (recent) reduction in the growth of the debt, far from being the welcome
symptom of improved conditions of the borrowing countries, appears to be
the  result  of  increasing  constraints  on  credit  supply  and  also  on  credit
demand.” (Luigi Spaventa, op. cit., pp. 326-328)
“... In the ‘new concept of international financial morality’ debtors are not
expected ever to default, unlike in earlier periods of history. But the rules of
the game also require that creditors cooperate to avoid the debtor’s default
and  by  accepting  those  further  commitments  which  allow  everybody
concerned to pretend that the debtor is not defaulting ... This is, after all, what
rescheduling operations are about: both parties agreeing that formal default is
to be eschewed, the outcome will depend on the bargaining power of the
debtor.” (ibid, p. 334)
“May I leave to your imagination, to compare the immediate postwar period
up to the mid-1970s with the fragile world we are living in now. Personally
I have a strong belief that the present situation needs more cooperation on an
international  level;  but  the  precondition  for  this  cooperation  is  to  restore
confidence  between  lenders  and  borrowers.  This  confidence,  which  has
deteriorated so much in recent years, is in itself indispensable for solving
international  problems.”  (Stephan Koren,  Professor,  Governor,
Oesterreichische National Bank, Vienna, p. 6)
115“In spite of the talk about the importance of central banks and the necessity
for  closer  cooperation  between  different  institutions  it  was  felt  that  the
responsibility for their international lending remains with the participants in
the market. Finally banks will ultimately have to supervise themselves and to
rescue  themselves.”  (Fritz Diwok,  Secretary  General  of  the  Austrian
Bankers’Association, in his general report of the Colloquium, p. 420)
– The supervisors’ dilemma
“... On the one hand, the supervisory authorities have the responsibility for
restraining banks from overreaching themselves and exceeding the prudent
limits of lending, but on the other it is clear that to restrict the recycling
capacity of the banking system, in the absence of any viable alternative
intermediaries, might precipitate the very crisis which the prudential regime
is designed to avoid. In playing their part in coping with this dilemma, the
supervisors have to stand up and speak out for their first priority which must
be to maintain a sound prudential framework for the international banking
system.” (W.P. Cooke, cf. supra, p. 23)
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– The explosion of government deficits at a time of stagflation:
“...By 1982, only one country, Norway, (i.e. of the main fifteen industrialized
countries in the world) was recording a surplus, whereas nine years earlier
(i.e.  just  before  the  first  oil  shock)  only  three  countries  had  a deficit.”
(P.S. Andersen, Head of Section, BIS, in a penetrating empirical analysis,
p. 42)
“We certainly find ourselves in a gloomy situation of generalized increases in
government deficits and of low economic growth ... There is an important
structural component in such a situation, which can be seen as a characteristic
result of the slow response of government policy to a changing economic
environment, or rather, as governments are not that short sighted, as a result
of  strong  social  resistance  to  the  adjustments  required  ...  Several
developments have been taking place simultaneously in our financial systems
that ... are bound to be a check on unwarranted delays in adjustment: (a) ... the
important  and  generalized  upgrading  of  inflation  rates  ...  has  been  an
underrated influence upon financial policy. Such inflation rates deeply eroded
whatever monetary illusion pervaded agents’ behaviour and devastated those
117financial institutions and instruments that relied on low levels of inflation. ...
Inflation broke the rules of the game, forcing a complete reconsideration of
financial intermediaries and markets; (b) a second element ... is the marked
shift of monetary policy from interest rate targets towards quantitative targets
for monetary expansion ... the very shift to quantitative monetary control has
forced authorities to reconsider their instruments of action leading them ... to
allow for a growing role of market forces in monetary policy intermediation;
(c)  when  government  deficits  started  to  grow,  ...  these  could  have  been
accommodated by higher rates of monetary expansion, but this has not been
the rule. Instead, compensatory adjustments have tended to be imposed upon
the financing of the private sector, which incidentally may have contributed
to make “crowding out’ a lively subject; (d) other domestic developments
(p.m.); (e) On the external front ... the acceptance of floating rates (and) the
massive growth of the external debt of many countries ... Governments have
proved more sensitive to depreciating exchange rates than expected ... (The
growth of external debt) has implied a terrible erosion of the role of exchange
controls as an instrument of monetary policy and has forced authorities to be
extremely careful for the external repercussions of their monetary and fiscal
policies.”  (José Ramon Alvarez Rendueles,  Governor  of  the  Banco  de
España, p. 14-16)
– Towards a ‘law of government retrenchment’ in a non-Keynesian world
“It  is  high  time  to  reverse  for  good  this  (Wagner)  law  of  increasing
government  expenditure  and  to  replace  it  by  a ‘law  of  government
retrenchment’. And as concerns the Keynesian notion of fiscal policy as the
great  ‘stabiliser’,  we  should  recognise  that  this  concept  has  often  led
economic  policy  astray.”  (Otmar Emminger,  Former  President  of  the
Bundesbank, p. 27)
– A dissenting opinion
“... Derrière cette pression à la réduction-voire même à la suppression ‘par
décret’– des déficits publics, se cache une volonté d’empêcher en partie l’Etat
de poursuivre deux de ses missions principales: la régulation conjoncturelle
et l’allocation des ressources. Or c’est grùce à un déficit actif et contrôlé que
l’Etat peut effectivement diminuer l’amplitude des fluctuations économiques
et  participer  de  manière  décisive  à la  nouvelle  politique  industrielle,
nécessaire pour sortir de la crise Il convient dès lord de s’interroger sur la
stratégie réelle poursuivie par ceux qui souhaitent retirer à l’Etat – notamment
par  la  contrainte  politique  –  les  moyens  nécessaires  à son  action.”
(Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Professor at the University of Paris, p. 131)
118– Crowding-out: the star of the Colloquium?
“Quite clearly, it (i.e. the star of the Colloquium) turned out to be young
‘crowding  out’.  It  appeared  in  constantly  changing  disguises  –  financial
crowding out, portfolio crowding out, transactions crowding out, exchange
rate crowding out, indirect or ex post crowding out versus direct or ex ante and
versus accustomed crowding out, allocation policy – as against fiscal policy –
crowding out, crowding out of safety and crowding out of quality, not to forget
about over-crowding and crowding-in. Even when it produced a no-show, as it
happened in several econometric tests, it made an event out of it...” (Christian
Lutz, Director, Gottlieb Duttweiler Institut, Zürich, p. 411)
“... While, on balance, econometric evidence does not rule out some activity-
supporting  role  for  budget  deficits,  these  are  currently  seen,  at  worst,  as
constituting an impediment to economic recovery by crowding out private
investment and, at best, too high to exclude the possibility of counter-cyclical
fiscal  action.  This  apparent  contradiction  between  the  conclusions  to  be
drawn from most econometric models and the principles upon which fiscal
policies are presently based, stems from two shortcomings in the current state
of quantitative knowledge. The first is the imprecise estimation of the interest
rate effects of budget deficits, given the complexity of factors influencing the
private sector’s financial savings behaviour. The second derives from the
difficulties  of  assessing  the  impact  of  budget  deficits  in  a medium-term
context, and of incorporating expectations and confidence elements into the
analysis.” (Jean-Claude Chouraqui, Head of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Division, OECD, p. 247 – and in the same sense, for Germany, Rolf Caesar
pp. 83-84)
– Why interest rates have remained so high...
“In the first place interest rates remained so high in comparison to current
inflation because of the financing of large government deficits which, despite
some crowding-out, have meant that the total recourse to the capital market
has  risen  sharply.  In  some  industrialized  countries  more  than  half  of  the
available resources of the capital market is now taken up by the government
...  Secondly,  after  bitter  experience  in  the  past,  the  financial  world  has
gradually dropped the ‘veil’of money ... Thirdly, all over the world banks are
being compelled to resist the erosion of their solvency ...” (Pieter Korteweg,
Professor, Treasurer-General, Ministry of Finance, The Hague, p. 36)
“The American mix of fiscal and monetary policy, as long as it is keeping US
interest rates and the dollar high, is exerting astrong influence on other countries’
interest rates and monetary policies.” (Otmar Emminger, op. cit., p. 26)
119– Monetary policy and the policy mix at times of huge government deficits:
“... It is a fact that at the very time when exploding budget deficits became
a cause of concern, monetary targeting became a reality, which opened the
eyes to a truth: monetary and fiscal policy may be institutionally independent
from each other – but as soon as their aims are conflicting or their paces are
incompatible, one of them will win. And in this case, perhaps in contrast to
the early 1970s, it was, in general, the monetary policy which won. It is, quite
obviously,  this  change  of  conditions  which  made  crowding-out  a star...”
(Christian Lutz, op. cit., p. 418)
“With  the  decline  of  Keynesianism  and  the  rise  of  monetarism  the
relationship  between  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  has  changed  in  many
countries. High public deficits need not inevitably lead to an over-expansive
monetary policy. In fact, however, we see that in those European countries
where budget deficits are very high in relation to net national savings, central
banks  are  often  under  irresistible  pressure  to  finance  at  least  part  of  the
deficits by money creation ... Another important aspect is that high structural
deficits,  and  accumulated  indebtedness  with  its  high  interest  burden,  are
a corset  for  government  policy  and  severely  restrain  the  room  for
manoeuvring of fiscal policy.” (Otmar Emminger, op. cit., p. 25)
“It is difficult to isolate the discussion about the financing of the deficit from
a discussion about the size of the deficit. In most countries, solving the second
problem would also solve to a large extent the first one. It is however probable
that  policy-makers  reason  the  other  way  round,  by  solving  the  financing
problem  they  probably  think  they  solved  both  problems  ...”  (Joseph
Vuchelen, Professor in the Free University of Brussels, p. 309)
– The interesting and fairly representative Spanish experience
“... The need to counteract the expansive effect of government borrowing in
order to keep the growth of the quantity of money within the established
targets  has  had  a double  result:  in  the  first  place,  it  has  limited  the
independence of monetary policy itself, preventing it from having the effects
that might be foreseen in the struggle against inflation and involving it in
a hopeless battle, doomed to failure, to keep up the peseta’s exchange rate;
secondly, obliging the Bank of Spain to create its own version of short-term
debt, restricted to financial institutions, has distorted the whole structure of
interest rates with the resulting negative effects for an adequate financing of
the economy.” (Raimundo Ortega, Director General del Tresoro y Policita
Financiera, Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, Madrid, p. 407)
120– Financial system versus Government
“There  has  always  been  and  there  will  always  be  conflict  between
governments and financial systems ... If in the short run government has many
chances of overruling the financial system, the latter has, in the long run, a no
lesser chance of gaining the upper hand on government.
Consequently, financial institutions cannot claim that they are always on the
losing side, so let me say that financial institutions, rather than longing for the
non-existing of conflict with government, should take this for granted and
think how to make the best of such a situation ... I can see only one clear way
to achieve such a goal and it is by developing to their utmost those features
of  the  financial  system  that  reinforce  its  role  as  a power  able  to
counterbalance the unrealistic aspects and results of government economic
policy and activity. That is to say, by stressing the role of market forces ...”
(José Ramon Alvarez Rendueles, op. cit., p. 13)
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– Shifting which frontiers?
“The shift in financial frontiers has two different dimensions. The first, which
can be described as an external dimension relates to the extension of the
external frontiers within which the finance industry has been operating. The
extension of external frontiers in turn has two elements, that resulting in an
increase of clients for the existing and new services offered by the industry
but situated in a given area; and secondly, that leading to the extension of the
geographical  area  which  the  services  are  made  available.  The  second
dimension of the shift in financial frontiers can be described as the tendency
for the removal and disappearance of internal frontiers between the activities
undertaken by and confined to the institutions which have tended to specialise
in providing them ...” (Tadeusz M. Rybczynski, Economic Adviser, Lazard
Brothers & Co, London, p. 257-258)
– Factors and motivations:
“... One reason why (the recent acceleration in structural change) may have
been greater in the US and the UK is that the thrust of policy there has moved
particularly towards a greater reliance on markets, which in turn has pointed
towards deregulation. A second, more economic, factor distinguishing them
from Germany, is the greater volatility and level of both interest rates and
123inflation in the last 25 years. Some of the changes in instruments, markets, and
financial  behaviour,  have  been  primarily  defensive,  to  allow  financial
intermediaries to protect themselves, and in some cases their clients, against
the worsening uncertainties and risks caused by such volatility ... Important
though this essentially defensive response to worsening risk may have been,
I do not regard it as the main factor underlying the recent structural changes;
for many of the new initiatives have been undertaken by firms striving for
a larger share of the market ... Competitive pressures in domestic markets are
leading to the development of new technologies to extend more efficient, lower
cost methods from large customers in wholesale markets to smaller customers
in retail markets ... How confident can we be that the direction of causality runs
only from volatile financial markets to sophisticated innovations and not at
least in part, the other way?” (RobinLeigh-Pemberton, Governor of the Bank
of England, pp. 12-15)
“What were the factors responsible for the weakening and disappearance of
the internal barriers between the various financial activities in the UK and
those leading to the strong tendency towards conglomeration and changes in
the size and character of the financial industry? Broadly speaking the factors
behind this development fall into two groups. The fundamental economic
factors  (group)  include  an  increase  in  per  capita  and  total  income  and
technological advance within the industry. The regulatory framework (group)
cover  the  legal  and  institutional  framework  within  which  the  industry
operates ...” (T.M. Rybscynski, op. cit., p. 264)
“... While structural factors may often be the underlying cause of changes in
the financial system, legislative factors – particularly tax legislation – have
a crucial influence on their manifestation. Tax factors have a bearing on the
choice  between  debt  and  equity  issue,  on  the  merits  of  leasing  versus
borrowing,  and  on  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  index-linked
securities  to  both  borrowers  and  lenders  ...”  (Andrew. D. Bain,  Group
Economic Adviser, Midland Bank, London, p. 106)
“A continued thread in these (US) stories is the importance of large budget
deficits, just as the main thread in explanation of financial market change
a few years ago would have been inflation. Inflation has receded substantially,
but variable rate securities remain, even thrive, because real interest rates
remain unstable ...” (Patrick Lawler, at the time Economist, Division of
Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Washington, p. 122)
124“The  French  financial  scene  used  traditionally  to  be  distinguished  by  its
profusion of regulations and its segmented markets and circuits. This situation
is now in the throes of rapid and far-reaching change. Over the coming years,
the developments that are now getting underway can be expected to gather
added momentum, gradually bringing the financial structure of the French
economy still more closely into line with that of the other leading industrial
countries”  (Didier Bruneel,  Director,  Etudes  Statistiques  et  Monétaires,
Banque de France, p. 63)
– An (apparent) digression on the persistently high real interest rates:
“... The absolute level of (real) interest rates on financial assets is of no
particular consequence by itself. In particular, it is irrelevant for investment
decisions into real capital unless it is related to any useful (operational) rate
of return on capital investment.” (Wolfgang Gebauer, Assistant Professor,
European University Institute, Florence, p. 135)
“Real interest rates are not yielding to disinflation due to the high levels of
debt and insufficient savings, as the central monetary authorities have adopted
a necessarily  cautious  attitude  in  an  effort  to  prevent  any  resurgence  of
inflation ... A reasonable solution would be to reform taxation and trim the
American deficit, while at the same time targeting a smaller growth rate, more
in line with its domestic savings capacity. The resulting rise in household
savings rate could reduce the drain on international savings. The cutback in
public  deficits  and  the  continued  improvement  in  the  corporate  profit
ploughback rate, obtained by scaling down household consumption in other
countries, would greatly contribute to rebalance world financial flows. At the
end of the process could lie a lower real interest rate premium ...” (Michel
Develle, Chief Economist, Banque Paribas, Paris, p. 162-164)
“Changes in the observed volatility of interest rates and inflation did not
follow similar patterns across countries. Except for the general variability
following the breakdown of the international monetary system, differences
appear in national experiences ... We tested Fisher’s relation under the joint
assumption that financial markets are efficient and that ex ante real interest
rates follow a random walk. Our results show an obvious dichotomy within
the sample of countries: while the model provides a reasonable approximation
of the UK and the US experience, the results for the Netherlands, Belgium
and Germany lead to a rejection of the joint assumption and tend to support
the  view  that  there  are  asymmetries  in  interest  rate  adjustments  ...”
(Marie-Christine Adam and André Farber, Professors, Université Libre de
Bruxelles, p. 178)
125– Some major shifts:
“Because of greater competition, the emergence of liability management has
produced a new financial environment in which the prevalent liabilities of the
banks pay market-determined interest rates. As a consequence of the process
of financial innovation, fostered by liability management, a myriad of new
financial instruments has appeared in the last ten years ... The ‘marketisation’
of banking and finance – a term that refers to financial intermediation on
conditions  that  are  mainly  determined  by  market  forces  –  has  not  been
restricted  to  the  liability  side  of  the  balance  sheet  ...  Within  a more
homogeneous financial system both the liabilities and the assets of financial
institutions  pay  and  earn,  respectively,  market-determined  rates.  In  this
financial environment interest rate adjustment has become faster and more
important.”  (Jan Koning,  Head  of  Department  of  Financial  Statistics,
Netherlands’ Central Bureau of Statistics, p. 330-332)
“The  main  trends  which  seemed  to  emerge  from  our  discussions  were:
(abbreviated text) 1.The tendency for corporate borrowers to borrow more at
the  short  end  than  at  the  long  end  of  the  market;  2.  Governments  have
increasingly, in contrast to corporations, been borrowing at the longer end of
the  market;  3.  Preference  for  variable  rather  than  fixed  interest  rates  by
corporations; 4. Substitution of bond for bank loan finance much more on the
part of the public sector than the corporate sector; 5. Innovation in the type of
instrument used; 6. New equity instruments in the small to medium sized
sector; 7. International instruments ... used in preference to those available in
domestic  markets  ...”  (Christopher Johnson,  Group  Economic  Adviser,
Lloyds Bank, London, as general rapporteur, p. 349-351)
– Implications for monetary policy: are shifting frontiers destabilizing
monetary control?
“... The problem that the structural changes do bring are not that they diminish
the Central Bank’s power to control, but rather that the blurring of instruments
and institutions make it more difficult to assess and to interpret financial
developments, and thence to judge how to apply monetary controls ... In such
circumstances, if these are indeed a proper reflection of today’s reality, it
would hardly be possible, for the authorities to commit themselves rigidly to
achieving a specified numerical growth rate for any particular definition of
money over any period much longer than a year, or two .Nevertheless in a fiat
system world, there is an understandable fear that the growth of the money
stock, and thence inflation, is driven by the short-term expedients of the
authorities, which may not only have a bias to inflation, but also gives no
basis for confidence about longer term price stability, nor even what rate of
126inflation, might be reasonably expected. Against that background, there is an
understandable and justifiable demand for the authorities to adopt a degree of
pre-commitment,  to  submit  themselves  to  certain  clearly-defined  rules,
sufficient to allay fears about future uncertain inflation, and to provide the
necessary  basis  of  financial  stability  for  the  economic  system  to  work
effectively. It is the counter-balance between the shifting structure of the
financial system on the one hand, and the need for rules and pre-commitment
on the part of the authorities on the other, that makes it so hard to select an
optimal  form  of  monetary  targets  ...”  (Charles Goodhart,  Chief Adviser
Monetary Policy, Bank of England, p. 324-325)
“...The demand function for money has become sufficiently unstable to offer
less  guidance  for  policy-makers  than  was  hoped  when  targets  for  the
monetary aggregates were introduced in the mid-1970s ... A purely domestic
orientation of monetary policy is not stabilizing, if international factors cause
the money demand function to shift. To contain the impact of such shifts there
has  to  be  some  explicit  external  orientation  of  policy  which  brings  the
exchange  rate  into  focus  ...”  (Niels Thygesen,  Professor  of  Economics,
Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, p. 24, 26)
“Shocks generated by financial innovations may seriously complicate the use
of monetary targets ... In our opinion these targets still can play a vital role in
monetary policy, provided that the extent and frequency of financial shocks
remain with reasonable bounds. In addition to monetary target aggregates, the
central bank should also pay attention to other monetary indicators, especially
interest rates ...” (Jan Koning, op. cit., p. 340)
– Implications for supervision: again the supervisor’s dilemma ...
“Gilbert claimed that a policeman’s lot was not a happy one, but he could just
as well have been referring to a supervisor. The supervisor must try to balance
an  acceptance,  even  an  encouragement  of  competition,  and  with  that
innovation which leads business into new and unfamiliar territory, against the
various  risks  of  financial  difficulties,  whose  eventually  may  bring  down
obloquy upon his head ... As the form which change takes will depend on
policy and supervisory practices, the process becomes one of interactive give
and take between the supervisors and the supervised. Change will be allowed
to  proceed  more  freely  the  greater  the  degree  of  self  imposed  prudential
restraint exercised by the participants both in structuring their balance sheets
and in their conduct of competition.” (Robin Leigh-Pemberton, op. cit.,
p. 16, 18)
127“The need to adjust supervisory systems may arise because of weaknesses of
old  supervisory  instruments,  introduction  of  new  financial  instruments,
formation of new multipurpose institutions or groups of institutions, financial
innovations outside the supervised area, new information and communication
technology, new control systems and reporting and auditing procedures, new
tax systems, and because of changes in international financial markets ...
A continued internationalization of the financial services industry seems to
imply  a continued  internationalization  of  the  supervisory  systems  ...”
(Morten Balling, Professor, Graduate School of Business Administration,
Aarhus, p. 300)
128Colloquium 13: International Monetary and Financial
Integration – The European Dimension
Luxembourg, October 1986
President of SUERF and Chairman of the Colloquium: John Richard Sargent
Colloquium book
Editors: Donald E. Fair and Christian de Boissieu
Authors: Michel Aglietta, Michael Artis, Gunter Baer, Christian de Boissieu,
Ernst-Günther Bröder, Franco Bruni, Rolf Caesar, Paolo Clarotti,
Sylvester Effinger, Wietze Eizenga, Richard Freeman, Michel Galy,
Francesco  Giavazzi,  Jean  Guill,  Rolf  Hasse,  David  Llewellyn,
André Louw, Rainer Masera, Jan Michielsen, Marco Pagano, Hans
Pfisterer,  Jean-Jacques  Rey,  Jacques  Santer,  J.R.  Sargent, André
Swings, Geoffrey Wood.
Publishers: Kluwer  Academic  Publishers,  Dordrecht/  Boston/  Lancaster,
1988, xii, 405 pp.
– Any place for a European dimension in the world of monetary and
financial globalisation?
“... Financial phenomena on a worldwide scale tend to blur the European
identity.  The  questioning  of  the  traditional  philosophy  (of  European
integration) is so basic that one has to ask whether a European identity still
has a place in a global system of interdependent and open capital markets (in
italics  in  the  text)  ...”  (Michel Aglietta,  Professor  of  Economics  at  the
University of Paris X and General Rapporteur of the Colloquium, p. 386)
– Evaluating the first years of the European Monetary System (EMS)
“... The area of exchange rates, to which most EMS provisions apply, has
performed best. Whatever method may be used for measuring the variability
of nominal and real exchange rates, that of intra-EMS rates has been much
smaller than that of EMS vis-à-vis non-EMS exchange rates and of ‘intra
non-EMS’ rates. The ERM has thus offered the desired protection against
volatility and misalignments ... The external policy has consisted mainly of
defensive actions which were largely determined by the German authorities.
Notwithstanding  positive  signs,  the  exposure  of  the  System  to  external
disturbances remains rather high...Viewed from this angle (of economic and
129social  welfare)  the  performance  of  the  EMS  could  be  somewhat
disappointing. Growth of real GDP has remained rather depressed and the
situation in the field of unemployment and fiscal policy in the EMS has even
worsened... However, it would be unfair and probably premature to blame the
EMS for the lack of results in these areas...” (Jean-Jacques Rey and Jan
Michielsen, respectively Head of Foreign Department and Inspector General,
National Bank of Belgium, pp. 81-82)
“There  is  clear  evidence  ...  of  an  EMS  stabilizing  influence  on  the  key
intra-EMS bilateral rates and only slightly less strong evidence of a stabilizing
effect on wider exchange rate relationships; and this evidence extends to real
as well to nominal exchange rates ... It appears that the EMS currencies do not
afford experience of a medium-term misalignment on the scale experienced
by the dollar or earlier by the pound sterling. In this achievement the EMS has
proven a significant success and it is one of the reasons why membership of
the System has attracted support in the United Kingdom ... The EMS plainly
has afforded to its members the opportunity to pursue counter-inflationary
policies  based  on  treating  exchange  rate  adjustments  as  less  than  fully
accommodating ... But this is in itself weak evidence for the view that the
EMS has succeeded in providing a framework for cooperation as opposed to
a D-Mark anchor against inflation which member countries have been happy
to use. On the latter interpretation the EMS can be viewed as a regional
counterpart to the global post-1979 episode in which the theme of ‘putting
one’s own house in order’ has been dominant, and its success has been in
combining  the  function  of  a counter-inflation  framework  with  that  of
stabilizing intra-System real rates. This achievement, solid enough in itself,
unfortunately gives no firm basis for predicting the continuing success of the
System in a period when unemployment, rather than inflation, is the issue of
the  day  ...”  (Michael Artis,  Professor  in  the  Department  of  Economics,
Manchester University, pp. 210-212)
“The EEC should adopt either a system of floating rates, with a monetary rule
in each country, or move to a genuine currency union. Consideration of these
courses should not be put aside on the grounds that the EMS has succeeded;
for the EMS has been successful only because it has tried to do so little.”
(GeoffreyE. Wood ,  at  the  time  Professor  in  Banking  and  International
Finance, City University Business School, London, p. 45)
– Prudent approach to full Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
“Monetary integration must comprise ... an exchange rate union ... Such an
exchange rate union can be either a ‘pseudo union’ or a ‘complete union’ (to
130use the term coined by Max Corden in 1972). The first is an agreement to fix
exchange rates, the agreement perhaps being accompanied by promises of
economic  policy  coordination;  the  second  involves  pooling  of  foreign
exchange reserves, establishment of a central bank for the monetary union,
and the issue of a common currency for the union. Only the second has hope
of permanence ... Genuine monetary integration requires a common currency.
Only then would there be a convincing demonstration that the union was
complete, not pseudo ...” (GeoffreyWood , op. cit., p. 40)
“The liberalization of capital movements and the broader concept of financial
integration now seem to be the most important item on the agenda of the
further strengthening of the EMS. Assuming it succeeds, it may also turn out
to be a major challenge of the EMS ... This new stage of European economic
and financial integration should be a transitory stage to a more stable situation
where political responsibility for economic policy and welfare throughout the
Community is exercised at Community level. This is what economic and
monetary union is about; the shorter the transition, the better ... It may be
useful to have a new round of thinking on the transition process and minimum
requirements of the final stage of the economic and monetary union. While
the end of the road will be regarded as politically out of reach and may remain
so for long, it is increasingly the case that proposals for further strengthening
the EMS are gauged in relation to their ability to move the system forward in
the direction of this goal ... A‘Werner Report revisited’might help in focusing
action on the next most useful steps, be they monetary or non monetary.”
(J.-J. Rey and J. Michielsen, op.cit., pp. 85, 87-89)
“... Il est bien connu que l’utilisation privée de l’Ecu s’est développée plus
vite  que  son  usage  officiel  par  les  Banques  centrales.  Ce  déséquilibre  et
l’absence  de  passerelle  entre  l’usage  privé  et  l’usage  officiel  de  l’ECU
suscitent la plupart des interrogations actuelles ... L’ECU au niveau du SME
comme dans chaque pays membre, reste aujourd’hui une monnaie partielle.
Ceci apparaît dans la non-utilisation de l’ECU comme monnaie de facturation
et monnaie de règlement des opérations commerciales courantes et dans la
dualité de l’ECU traduite par la juxtaposition de ses formes publique et privée
... La question de la ‘réunification’ de l’ECU reste avant tout politique: un
règlement satisfaisant de ce problème signifierait que l’Ecu est devenu une
monnaie complète, ce qui suppose un degré d’intégration monétaire pour
l’instant hors de portée ... Apparaît ici un paradoxe de l’intégration monétaire
européenne: la logique de cette intégration a fait surgir une hiérarchie en
faveur d’une monnaie (le DM) et d’un pays (la RFA) par principe hostile
à l’utilisation  domestique  et  à la  promotion  internationale  de  l’ECU  ...”
131(Christian de Boissieu, Professor of Economics at the University of Paris,
pp. 189, 191-192)
– International monetary cooperation and/or, perhaps versus European
integration?
“Les  économistes  et  les  responsables  politiques  ont  souvent  tendance
à surestimer  les  inconvénients  des  systèmes  en  place  et  à exagérer  les
avantages des systèmes alternatifs. Ainsi, lorsque le régime de Bretton Woods
était encore en vigueur, avait-on tendance à mettre en exergue les avantages
censés découler du passage à des changes flottants ... Aujourd’hui, devant les
inconvénients de l’instabilité des taux de change (en particulier du dollar) la
tentation est grande de prôner un retour à des changes sinon fixes, du moins
soumis à de moindres fluctuations (cf. la proposition de zones-cibles pour les
grandes monnaies) ... Le succès indéniable du SME encourage sans doute la
vague de propositions tendant à accroître la stabilité des taux de change ...
... (Le) scénario de trois blocs monétaires (le dollar, l’ECU ou le DM, et le yen,
chacun s’appuyant sur une monnaie complète, est séduisant parce qu’il rétablit
de la symétrie dans des systèmes fondamentalement asymétriques.(Cependant,
il) a toutes les chances d’être transitoire. A un moment donné, les opérateurs
établissent une hiérarchie entre les monnaies. La hiérarchie n’empêche pas la
diversification  des  portefeuilles,  sauf  lorsqu’elle  marquée  au  point  d’être
représentable par un ordre lexicographique ...” (Chr. De Boissieu, op. cit., pp.
187, 201)
“... It appears that support for target zones must rest on attributes other than
their capacity to induce cooperative outcomes ...” (Richard T. Freeman,
Senior Economist, Division of International Finance, Federal Reserve Board,
Washington, p. 182)
“Closer international monetary co-operation between the United States, Japan
and Germany – if in fact, proved feasible over time – may indirectly have some
favourable effects on the evolution of the EMS ... The positive contribution
would be that closer co-operation between the three major currencies would
establish a framework for the EMS countries to conduct a common policy
vis-à-vis third currencies ... By contrast, there appears to be little scope for
promoting  the  official  ECU  as  an  international  reserve  asset  ...”  (Gunter
D.Baer, Assistant Manager for International Economy, BIS, Basle, p. 163- 164)
“It is clear that the EMS has certain achievements to its credit which a reform
of the world system might make more generally available. But an awkward
132feature here is that the control of exchange rates established within the EMS
has been purchased to a degree by restrictions on capital movements and it
seems clear that the removal of these restrictions will confront the System
with a new learning curve ...” (Michael Artis, op. cit., p. 217)
– The new learning curve of liberalization of capital movements and of
financial integration...
“Il n’est pas évident de concilier la mobilité des capitaux, la discipline des
taux de change et l’autonomie des politiques nationales ...” (Jacques Santer,
Prime Minister of Luxembourg, p. 9)
– Two conflicting views on financial integration
“There are two quite different approaches to the role of finance. The first has
Anglo-Saxon  origins  and  rules  international  financial  markets.  It  is
symbolized by the ‘big bang’ in the City of London. It sees finance as an
independent industry, having no particular link with the real economy of the
host country. Conversely, the second approach puts finance at the service of
financing the real economy, above all industry. This is the dominant concept
in  continental  Europe.  It  favours  financial  structures  which  allow  the
establishment of permanent relations between industrial firms and financial
institutions ...
... To make further financial liberalization in Europe compatible with the
stability  of  the  EMS,  it  would  be  possible  to  make  financial  assets
denominated in European currencies more attractive to residents of EMS
states  than  those  denominated  in  other  currencies.  European  financial
integration would then be characterized by the size of a large financial market
and by lower risks, without the necessity of capital controls erected at the
borders of Europe ...” (Michel Aglietta, op. cit., p. 390-391)
“Although the bulk of world financial intermediation is conducted through
national  mechanisms,  financial  intermediation  is  becoming  increasingly
global.  National  financial  systems  are  losing  some  of  their  tradition(al)
‘efficiency’ and ‘imposed’ competitive advantages and as such are becoming
sub-sets of a global financial system ... In the process, a two-tier structure of
banking is emerging in which the corporate sector increasingly has global
options while the financial intermediation of the retail/personal sector is still
limited mainly to within national financial systems.
It is a combination of interactive factors that has produced these trends. But
none  of  the  explicit  factors  identified  (competitive  pressures,  financial
133innovation,  technology,  de-regulation,  abolition  of  exchange  control,
structural change within national frontiers, and international objectives of
financial institutions) have a specifically European dimension.
... The EEC has made some, though limited, progress in terms of free trade in
financial services. It must be said that global rather than European factors
dominate and any European dimension is swamped by factors that operate at
a global level. In this sense, the European dimension to international financial
integration  is  largely  irrelevant,  or  at  least  of  second-order  importance.”
(David T. Llewellyn, Professor, Loughborough University Banking Centre,
pp. 258-260)
“Although free capital mobility may produce substantial welfare gains, it may
also have non-negligible costs in terms of increased volatility of domestic
interest rates and/or of need for more frequent realignments of nominal parities.
But since the increased interest rate volatility tends to die out as the maturity
of the assets lengthens, there exist relative simple ways to reduce these costs.”
(Francesco Gavazzi and  Marco Pagano,  Professors,  respectively  at  the
University of Venice and at the University of Rome, p. 282)
“L’efficacité du contrôle des changes n’est sensible que dans le court terme et
agit moins sur les mouvements de capitaux que par l’imposition d’une taxe
sur les mouvements des capitaux des résidents. Son élimination devrait se
traduire par une plus grande variabilité quotidienne des capitaux et des taux
de  change  mais  ne  modifierait  pas  durablement  l’équilibre  de  la  balance
courante...”  (Michel Galy,  Directeur  Adjoint,  Direction  Générale  des
Services Etrangers, Banque de France, p. 378)
“La  libéralisation  des  mouvements  de  capitaux,  même  si  elle  aura  plus
d’impact sur les pays qui ont une réglementation restrictive, aura aussi des
conséquences  heureuses  dans  les  pays  qui  ont  déjà  procédé  à une  large
libéralisation  de  ces  mouvements  ...  Mais  cette  libéralisation  ne  sera  pas
suffisante pour réaliser une intégration complète des marchés financiers en
Europe et ... à cet effet, il sera nécessaire de supprimer toutes les entraves
‘techniques’ à l’échange  des  services,  et  notamment  les  distorsions
fiscales ...”  (Paolo Clarotti,  Head  of  Division,  Banks  and  Financial
Establishments, CEE Commission, p. 325)
“A well-known source of difficulties for monetary targeting comes from the
instability of the demand for monetary assets, caused by structural changes in
the financial system and financial innovation.
134Capital mobility seems helpful to cope with this type of difficulty, provided
that the authorities control the domestic component of money expansion and
are ready to cushion the shocks to the demand for money with changes in
reserves. But this help is limited by the fact that capital mobility and financial
integration are themselves among the major causes of financial innovations
and of instability of the money demand function.” (Franco Bruni, Associate
Professor, Bocconi University, Milan, p. 236)
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– Adjustment as a colloquium topic:
“... The world has changed more in the last five years than at any time since
the return to convertibility in 1958 ... In a world where capital transactions
and  financial  innovation  have  taken  such  a pre-eminent  role,  where
international financial institutions have little power and where coordination is
recognized as imperfect and denounced as counterproductive by some, there
remains the need and finally most of the means – if one really want to use
those which are at hand- of an efficient adjustment process.” (André de
Lattre, Chairman, Standard Chartered Bank, Paris, pp. 17, 21)
“The notion of ‘adjustment’ entails the notion of some prior disturbance or
shock to which the economic system, or some parts of it, must adapt. The
Colloquium  has  considered  three  main  kinds  of  disturbance:  the  factors
having  generated  the  US  payments  deficit  on  current  account  and  the
corresponding surpluses of other countries, mainly Germany and Japan; the
international debt crisis; the stock exchange bubble of 1987, and the volatility
of financial markets generally.
137It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  initially  the  debt  crisis  was  a problem
analogous to the stock exchange bubble, calling for crisis management and
last-resort lending by monetary authorities, to ward off a threatened collapse
of financial institutions. With the passage of time however (it is, after all, six
years since the crisis erupted in August 1982, i.e. Mexico) it has become more
analogous to the US deficit problem: a matter of trying to re-arrange the
pattern  of  world  payments  in  a way  that  will  at  once  underpin  financial
stability and encourage a quickening or a continuation of economic growth.
And if we seem to be having some trouble with the global payments pattern,
let  us  also  recall  that  the  authorities  did  make  a good  job  of  the  crisis
management ...” (Peter Oppenheimer, University Lecturer in Economics,
Christ Church College, Oxford, p. 387)
– The new dimensions of adjustment
“... The general conclusion of this scenario approach is therefore that an
adequate adjustment policy should involve both the US and the other OECD
countries and that it would be extremely difficult to get the debt ratio under
control without serious economic losses ... Balance of payments adjustment by
means of the exchange rate mechanism is insufficient. Not only are reactions
to changes in exchange rates slow, but the various economies also show serious
rigidities.  Important  in  this  respect  is  the  laborious  process  of  structural
adjustment which should ultimately effect are-arrangement of the international
division of labour ... The classical instruments of monetary and fiscal policy
together with the exchange rates must be used very intensively to restore current
account equilibrium. Historical experience shows that policy coordination by
means of consultation may be the most fruitful. However, model exercises
place  this  role  in  a somewhat  different  perspective,  re-emphasising  the
implications of policy coordination for the developing countries.” (Martin
Fase, Deputy Director, De Nederlandsche Bank, pp. 254, 259)
“... The objective for countries in what is called the ‘industrialised” world ...
should  be,  for  the  group  as  a whole,  one  of  substantial  current  account
surplus, permitting capital exports and aid to finance the savings gap of the
developing world. This does not mean that all countries in the group must
have a surplus vis-à-vis the outside world, or must be in strict equilibrium
vis-à-vis  each  other  partner  in  the  group,  but  that  one  would  not  accept
situations  like  the  present  one,  where  the  United  States’ current  account
deficit is substantially larger than Germany’s and Japan’s surpluses, which
means that the US are both ‘sucking in’ Japanese and German savings and
also  receiving  transfers  from  the  developing  world,  a most  abnormal
outcome.” (André de Lattre, op. cit., p. 21)
138– Are the US imbalances intractable?
– Relativizing
“... I am suggesting that the US fiscal stimulus had little upward impact on
dollar interest rates or on the dollar exchange rate; and that the strength of the
latter up to 1985 had the effect partly of reducing US inflation and partly of
dampening the real domestic expansionary impetus of the budget. By the
same token, up to 1985 US policy imparted a twofold dose of expansion to
the rest of the world, whose exports benefited both from competitiveness or
relative price effects (due to the dollar appreciation) and from Keynesian
aggregate-demand effects (due to the fiscal impetus) Applying this scheme of
thought  to  developments  since  1985,  one  has  no  need  to  search  for  any
missing J-curves or wonder why the dollar’s depreciation has not done more
to improve the current balance of payments. There has been no exceptional
time lag, and the depreciation has had a sizeable effect – but almost entirely
on the internal balance... Correction of the current payments deficit is still
waiting  on  effective  action  to  narrow  the  Federal  budget  deficit  ...  The
financial  or  savings  surplus  of  the  US  private  sector  (households  and
corporations) has been low and relatively (though by no means completely)
stable over the business cycle. Hence any ‘excess’ financial deficit of the
combined government sector has fed through fairly promptly to the current
balance of payments ... If we deny the US budget deficit any special role in
keeping interest rates up, how do we explain the persistently high level of
interest rates world-wide through the later 1980s? Inflationary expectations,
and  especially  the  long  lag  of  these  expectations  or  anxieties  behind  the
reality ... seem to be an important element. Real (interest) rates have been
slow to decline. This is particularly unfortunate from the point of view of the
world debt problem, and is an argument for some generous form of assistance
or relief from the debt burden.” (Peter Oppenheimer, op. cit., p. 390-391)
– Emphasizing
“A common prescription for the cure of severe external deficit positions is
a significant  reduction  in  domestic  absorption. At  the  present  time  such
medicine appears difficult to prescribe when the patient is the dominantly
world economic player, the United States. A policy of substantially reducing
domestic  absorption  also  puts  at  risk  the  health  of  developed  as  well  as
developing countries. Another constraint on such a policy is the fragile state
of some sectors of the US financial system, which are still attempting to
recover from the severe shift in relative domestic and international prices seen
in the 1980s ... Neither are the incentives for domestic policy adjustment in
the surplus countries unconstrained in the short run or particularly attractive
139with respect to their longer-run consequences. The large surplus countries
have  for  several  years  been  pursuing  programmes  of  medium-term  fiscal
deficit correction, which short-term cyclically-motivated expansionary fiscal
exercises could seriously throw off course ... The already sizable depreciation
of the dollar ... would appear to make further major depreciation undesirable
... It is easy to arrive at the conclusion that the policy options available to the
major economies to restore external ‘equilibrium, or ‘sustainable’ current-
account balances are limited ... If policy measures are unlikely to induce
further adjustment, what private market forces could potentially operate to
secure  further  external  adjustment?  ...  The  longer  the  imbalances  remain
presumably the greater the chances are that financial markets will be subject
to periods of ‘excess volatility’ and that volatility could itself lead to asset
price misalignment. All this is a circuitous way of saying that in a world with
a high volume of international trade in financial assets the market-induced
adjustment of current-account imbalances may be slow in occurring without
direct  intervention  by  monetary  and  fiscal  authorities  and  may  entail
considerable instability in financial markets.” (Joseph Bisignano, Assistant
Manager, BIS, pp. 189-190, 202)
“... Le problème majeur qui guette l’économie occidentale pourrait bien être
celui qui naîtrait d’une finance que l’on prétendrait laisser aller sans aucun
contrôle  à l’échelle  mondiale  alors  que,  les  Etats-Unis  prétendraient,
simultanément, se cramponner aux instruments de la maîtrise de leur marchédes
marchandises et autres services. De ce découplage naîtrait vraisemblablement
de très sérieux effets pervers ...” (Henri Bourguinat, Professeur, Faculté des
Sciences Economiques, Université de Bordeaux I, p. 223)
– Going their own way
“If the fundamental problems stem from the excessive absorption of world
savings by the US, it cannot be the right medicine to compensate for larger
American budget deficits by larger ones elsewhere ... Germany’s contribution
should  be  to  foster  growth  not  by  stimulating  private  and/or  public
consumption, but by strengthening domestic investment, thereby stimulating
economic activity and switching resources from the export sector to domestic
production, from tradables to non-tradables. This policy is in Germany’s own
interest  as  well  as  that  of  its  partners.”  (Otmar Issing,  Professor  at  the
University of Würzburg, p. 124)
“(For small open economies) the flexibility of wages and prices is decisive to
the  overall  outcome  and  the  chances  of  maintaining  employment  in  the
adjustment  process.  The  room  for  manoeuvre  in  economic  policies  has
140become rather limited. Irrespective of the exchange regime, monetary policy
must to an increasing extent be geared towards the inflation target, while
fiscal  policy  has  to  be  used  to  correct  external  balance  in  situations  of
disequilibrium  ...”  (JohnnyÅkerholm ,  Head  of  Central  Bank  Policy
Department, Bank of Finland, p. 65, 66)
– The case for international policy coordination
“The rationale behind the coordination process – and we think it can only be
regarded as an evolving process – is that you need a mechanism to internalise
the externalities of  policy  actions  by  the  larger  countries.  Specifically,
multilateral surveillance is employed to see that the international spillovers –
both good and bad – of each country’s policies – including the feedback of
these spillovers to the country itself – are taken into account in the final,
multilateral policy bargain. In some cases, countries may also be able to use
‘peer  pressure’ to  help  them  take  policy  actions  that  are  unpopular
domestically but which are beneficial to them in the long run ...” (Jacob
A. Frenkel and  Morris Goldstein,  Economic  Counsellor  and Deputy
Director, IMF, p. 303)
“... The basic welfare proposition of coordination abstracts from the fact that
coordination  is  costly  and  in  itself  does  not  privilege  exchange  rates  as
a potential target for stabilization. However, analysis suggests that exchange
rate stability is an outcome of coordination and that, when countries agree to
fix exchange rates, they implicitly pledge to conduct policies which are closer
to those indicated by a full coordination than to those they would follow in an
uncoordinated  floating  rate  system.  Since  the  cost  of  a continuous
coordination of policy are substantial, this suggests that we might expect to
find major coordination directed at a regime-building enterprise in which
exchange rates have a privileged role...
Despite the collapse of the Louvre Accord and the evidence of international
discord generated en route, in key respects the story of international policy
coordination since the Plaza Hotel Agreement of September 1985 – taken as
a whole – has been a success ... The Louvre episode illustrates in a concrete
way what the theoretical constructions tell us: a significant coordination of
economic  policies  must  involve  their  adaptation  to  the  needs  of  the
international situation. This much is inescapable. Inescapable also is the logic
that reveals coordination to be in general a welfare-improving path. Lack of
it, after all, abetted the creation of the largest imbalances the developed world
has ever seen in peacetime ...” (Michael Artis, Professor of Economics at the
University of Manchester, pp. 232-233, 237, 240)
141“Given  improved  convergence,  cooperation  in  the  European  Monetary
System  has  now  reached  a stage  in  which  individual  countries  are
increasingly urging for monetary policy coordination in Europe and further
institutional development of the system. Close cooperation in Europe has
brought the international monetary system close to a multi-polar order in
which Europe and the Pacific region might be the centres, along with the
dollar  area.  However,  in  the  future,  too,  world-wide  monetary  policy
cooperation will probably end at the point where individual nations insist on
their freedom of action in economic policy ...” (Dietrich Lemke, Director,
Foreign Department, Deutsche Bundesbank, pp. 288-289)
– The ‘involuntary’ adjustment of developing countries...
“... The post-1982 adjustment (of the LDCs) has been largely ‘involuntary’
which is to say that it has not been achieved so much through adjustment
policies (although they are being enacted in most countries) as because the
external  sources  of  funds  needed  to  maintain  a given  level  of  foreign
purchases have suddenly dried up ... The forms which external adjustment has
taken in the most heavily indebted countries and the economic trends which
have taken shape as its result have had a very adverse impact on the growth
potential  of  those  countries  and  have  structurally  affected  their
creditworthiness and capacity to service the external debt... From the point of
view of their creditor banks, the awareness of these objective difficulties,
which can no longer be regarded as temporary, force them to question the
approach to management of debt crisis which they have adopted so far. The
strategy based on rescheduling has proved ineffective as a means of restoring
the main debtors to solvency and has merely enabled the creditor banks to
continue accounting their claims against debtor LDCs at face value and so,
formally at least, to avoid any capital loss. This result has been increasingly
revealing itself a fiction especially after the occurrence of some recent major
developments  such  as  the  sizeable  loan-loss  provisions  which  have  been
made during 1987 by the banks most heavily exposed towards the LDCs ...
Nevertheless, the major US banks are still unwilling to take this tendency
seriously enough to alter the long-standing interpretation of the debtor crisis
as a liquidity crisis rather than a real insolvency crisis.
... A policy of negotiated write-off of bank debts would certainly be given
a great boost if international financial organizations were to support debt
unfreezing plans by taking a direct part in the conversion programmes, for
instance by guaranteeing the bond issues and supervising the economic policy
commitments undertaken by the beneficiary countries ... This would help
towards the final objective of gradually restoring the banks to their proper
142role in providing finance to the LDCs, which means overcoming the present
phase,  where  their  main  contribution  has  been  to  cover  macroeconomic
disequilibriums, in order to go back to providing support for trading and
project  financing  ...”  (Sergio Siglienti,  Managing  Director,  Banca
Commerciale Italiana, pp. 309, 321, 326)
“The private sector financial flows to the developing countries need to be
guided and supported within an international framework which makes the
macro-economic  risks  marginal.  In  other  words,  the  rule  of  thumb  that
countries never default needs to be made a reality by the suitable development
of  world  institutions,  notably  the World  Bank. There  are,  however,  great
dangers both for developing countries and their creditors, in unsupported
private  sector  finance,  as  recent  experience  has  no  doubt  done  much  to
emphasise.” (Christopher Huhne, Economics Editor, The Guardian p. 342)
“The historical record suggests that sound economic policies in borrowing
countries are a necessary but, not a sufficient condition for a sustained flow
of  foreign  capital.  Over  the  longer  term,  net  foreign  lending  has  been
sustained  only  at  times  when  international  monetary  relations  have  been
governed  by  accepted  standard  –  whether  the  gold  standard,  the  gold-
exchange standard or the dollar standard ... Unpredictable movements in the
value of the currency unit (standard of deferred payments) add to the sum of
risks  facing  creditors  and  borrowers  as  a group,  and  can  bring  about
unintended wealth transfers from creditors to debtors or vice versa: in the
1970s,  bondholders  were  decimated,  in  the  1980s,  it  was  the  turn  of  the
debtors. But it is not as if these swings even each other out: the sum of risks
is greatly increased. In these conditions, lending and investment is directed
primarily toward lessening risks ... The present-day investor is interested only
in the debt instruments of top quality issuers that can be used as vehicles for
diversification  of  risks  caused  by  the  unpredictable  monetary  and  fiscal
policies of governments and the absence of an international standard. Indeed,
instability in the investor’s domestic currency provides an additional spur to
such international diversification. But this investment has nothing to do with
the economic function of a capital market. Indeed, the pro-cyclical character
of  contemporary  capital  flows  adds  to  the  instability  of  the  international
economy as a whole. Thus, the much-vaunted adaptability of the modern
capital market is bought at a high price: it denies financing to a significant
proportion of the world’s most productive investment opportunities.” (Robert
Pringle,  Senior  Fellow,  World  Institute  for  Development  Economics,
Helsinki pp. 381, 383)
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– At the centre of attention...
“The behaviour of individual economic agents and, particularly, of financial
institutions,  subjected  to  intensified  international  competition  in  an
environment of simpler and more unified national and international regulation
over a widening range of financial activity...” (Niels Thygesen, Professor,
Institute of Economics, Copenhagen, p. 3)
– Why is it all happening now?
“... What happens now is both a quantitative and a qualitative jump with
deregulation  proceeding  in  many  countries  at  a sharply  accelerated  pace,
capital  controls  being  reduced  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  innovation
becoming  a driving  force  and  finance  rapidly  internationalizing.  It  is  the
simultaneous occurrence of these factors, in many part of the world, at a rapid
pace which is the new phenomenon ...
I think there are two major forces at work, reinforcing each other. One is the
increasing internationalization of the non-financial sector. The other is that
existing regulations were largely set up for needs of the past and are therefore
145not well suited for present needs ...” (Alfred Steinherr, Director, Financial
Research Department, European Investment Bank, Luxembourg, p. 51)
“... Traditional divisions within the financial markets, often inherited from the
1920s and the 1930s had ossified regulatory frameworks over a nearly-fifty
year span. In the 1970s and in the 1980s fundamental economic forces set in
motion  a long  overdue  process  of  financial  deregulation,  first  in  the
international  markets,  then  domestically  in  all  major  countries,  albeit  to
different extents and in different degrees, in part as a consequence of the
profound diversity in inherited control systems. However, it soon became
clear that deregulation had to be accompanied by re-regulation. Because of
the very nature of the financial system, the two processes should be seen as
complementary. Rapid growth and diversification of financial transactions,
technological change, new market dimensions, securitization and financial
innovation proper, all required new approaches to ‘market design’. Innovative
regulation was – and is required – to create efficient market structures...”
(Rainer S. Masera, Director General, Instituto Mobiliare Italiano, p. 320)
– The European Dimension...if any
“...  None  of  the  factors  that  have  induced  the  globalization  of  finance
(competitive  pressures,  financial  innovation,  technology,  de-regulation,
abolition of exchange control, etc.) have a specifically European dimension ...
At the same time, there has been little globalization of retail banking. Whilst
this has been true to date, the position could change in the 1990s. Potentially
the arrangements envisaged for the post 1992 EC represent a major challenge
in  the  market  environment  for  all  financial  institutions  and  suppliers  of
financial services.” (David T. Llewellyn, Professor of Money and Banking,
University of Loughborough, p. 142)
“... It is clear that as we move towards 1992 in the financial services sector,
financial institutions in the Community will be the subject of new competitive
conditions ... 1992 certainly does not mean an overnight revolution; it does
not  mean  that  the  Commission  or  anyone  else  will  pull  a switch  on
31 December  1992  and  the  scenery  of  the  promised  land  will  suddenly
appear...But we are convinced that we are well on the way to achieving three
major  advances  in  the  financial  services  sector:  –  freedom  of  capital
movements;  –  freedom  of  establishment  (the  right  to  open  branches);  –
freedom for cross-frontier provision of services ...” (GeoffreyE. Fitchew ,
Director  General  for  Financial  Services,  Commission  of  the  European
Communities, p. 27, 28)
146“...  On  a soutenu  que  (l’union  monétaire)  n’était  pas  une  condition
indispensable au fonctionnement du grand marché intérieur. Elle en constitue
cependant  un  prolongement  logique  car  un  marché  unique  ne  peur
fonctionner  efficacement  qu’avec  un  système  de  prix  unique,  impliquant
à terme la fixation irrévocable des taux de change entre les monnaies des pays
membres,  prélude  à l’émission  d’une  monnaie  unique  ...”  (Philippe
Lagayette,  Deputy  Governor,  Banque  de  France  in  his  opening  address,
p. 15)
– The new competitive conditions... Global and country-specific aspects...
“... One trend observable world-wide is for banks to ‘despecialize’. In the
United  States,  Japan  and  the  United  Kingdom  this  means  the  legal  or
traditional  separation  of  commercial  banking  from  investment  banking  is
increasingly  considered  as  outlived.  On  the  continent  where  universal
banking has been the norm in many countries the model spreads and the
Second Banking directive accepts the universal banks as a model... The recent
tendency  to  merge  banking  and  insurance  activities  is  motivated  by  the
general  quest  for  global  finance  ...  The  general  trend  in  favour  of
‘despecialization’is not unchallenged. The major challenge is certainly going
to be cost-effectiveness and not regulation...” (Alfred Steinherr, op. cit.,
p. 59, 60)
“... The dominant change, and one that has been both created by competitive
pressures and itself reinforcing them, is the process of diversification and the
erosion of the historic structured basis of the financial system. The process of
diversification  has  involved  existing  institutions  widening  the  range  of
products and services, and institutions purchasing firms in other sectors...”
(David T. Llewellyn, op. cit., p.127)
“...La flexibilité dans les rapports qu’établissent les banques avec les marchés
pour diversifier leurs activités, moduler la structure et la taille de leur bilan et
gérer leurs risques ... est l’attribut premier de la banque à géométrie variable
(présentée ici comme alternative à la banque éclatée). Une telle institution
continue  à intégrer  la  plupart  des  activités  traditionnelles  qui  fondent  la
spécificité des banques. Toutefois les innovations financières engendrent de
nouveaux services et surtout des formes d’intermédiation qui remettent en
question le partage traditionnel des activités des intermédiaires financiers et
marchés  au  gré  des  évolutions  de  leurs  avantages  comparatifs  dans  le
financement  de  l’économie.  Si  on  considère  les  intermédiaires  financiers
comme  des  variétés  internalisées  de  marchés  financiers,  on  assiste
aujourd’hui à une certaine dilution de ces intermédiaires au sein des marchés
147consécutive  à l’érosion  de  leur  frontière  traditionnelle  sous  l’effet  des
innovations et du progrès technique. Ce caractère désormais mouvant des
contours  des  banques  fonde  la  notion  de  banque  à géométrie  variable.”
(Joël Métais, Professor at the University of Paris X, p. 66)
“A major factor in profitability trends (in the U.K.) has been a change in the
nature  of  the  banking  business.  Banks  are  not  exclusively  asset-  liability
transformers. Increasingly they earn income off the balance sheet through the
provision of various services ... Perhaps the most important contribution came
from a strategic shift (stock-adjustment) that banks made from wholesale to
retail  banking  activity  during  the  1980s ...  This  represents  a competitive
response of diversification in order to maintain overall profitability.” (David
T. Llewellyn, op cit., p. 139)
“...Il apparaît que les pouvoirs publics sont encore loin d’être parvenus à créer
sur le territoire français un véritable marché intérieur unifié, c’est-à-dire un
marché dans lequel toutes les dispositions sont prises pour que la concurrence
puisse s’y exercer dans des conditions saines et loyales, conformément aux
exigences du ‘level playing field’ ... Ce ne sera pas un des moindres mérites
de la construction européenne que de contraindre la France à créer ce marché
unifié. Mais il faut s’interroger sur les causes de la lenteur mise à la création
de ce marché. On peut considérer qu’elle résulte de trois forces: l’attachement
de  certains  réseaux,  très puissants  économiquement,  à leurs  privilèges,
l’assise politique dont ils bénéficient et surtout l’attachement de la haute
administration  à un  système  qui  lui  donnait  de  singuliers  pouvoirs  ...”
(François Léonard de Juvigny, Deputy Director, Association Française des
Banques, p. 94)
“...Competition  has  certainly  increased  in  the  last  decade  in  the  Italian
banking system, but the results are not clear-cut ... In a sense the evidence of
competition is to be seen in the way banks reacted to the stimuli coming from
the market conditions of the 1980s.Trying to maintain their market shares, all
banks changed their asset and liability structure following the general trend
for the banking system as a whole. Particularly they greatly increased the
weight of loans on total assets ... The experience of the 1980s has shown that
in a very dishomogeneous banking system, competition has had the effect of
increasing risk (probably enlarging existing differences) and forcing many
banks to suboptimal risk-profitability conditions... The reasons that in the past
led the Italian authorities to minimize structural changes (in comparison to
other countries) were by no means compelling but now risk creating a sort of
vicious circle. The approach to the problem of less efficient banks will be the
148real trial of regulators’policy in the coming years. If barriers to exit continue
to be rather strong, the effects of competition could be perverse ...” (Marco
Onado, Professor of Economics, University of Bologna, pp. 103, 104-105)
“...Although Germany did not completely miss the trend towards deregulation
and innovation, for many years things did not change much here compared
with  the  dynamic  development  in  other  countries.  Despite  the
‘Restliberalisiering’, regulation of the markets is still high owing to – in part
– obsolete ideas of consumer protection or of monetary policy supervision. In
fact  it  acts  as  a brake  on  innovation.  Securitization  is  also  still  strongly
underdeveloped. This continues to rob the German capital market of that
breadth and depth which international issuers and investors are used to at
competing financial centres ... Due to the somewhat belated start and the
continued  efforts  of  its  international  competitors  Frankfurt  has  to  make
double efforts if it is to catch up with the leading financial centres in the world
and to keep the top position on the European continent...” (Norbert Walter,
Senior Economist, Deutsche Bank, Frankfurt, pp. 150-151, 153)
– The impact on regulation and supervision...
“... We assume that deregulation leads to more competition, which leads to
more efficiency, and thus there is a trade-off. Less regulation, more efficiency.
On the other hand, one might also reason that from the point of view of social
efficiency a certain minimum amount of regulation is necessary. This is an
argument  about  the  externalities...,  like  the  importance  of  having  a good
payments system, the safeguarding of people’s wealth, the protection of the
investor, and indeed the allocation of funds between savers and investors. So
we are looking for the banking system to be not just efficient in itself by its
own measurements, but also to play a role which is efficient for the economy
as a whole. These two do not necessarily coincide...” (Christopher Johnson,
Chief Economic Adviser, Lloyds Bank, London, p. 361)
“... La critique essentielle que l’on peut adresser au modèle de la banque
universelle concerne la sécurité des dépôts. Car même si la diversification des
activités  permet  de  réduire  le  risque  global  de  l’institution,  il  n’empêche
qu’elle  accroît  le  problème  des  asymétries  d’information,  parce  qu’elle
complique l’évaluation des risques et qu’elle rend de ce fait plus incertaine la
valeur des dépôts ... Il n’ y a d’autre solution que de rendre plus exigeant le
contrôle des activités bancaires ...” (Patrick Artus and Jean-Paul Pollin,
Head of Department of Economic and Financial Studies, Caisse de Dépôts et
Consignations,  Paris  and  Professor  of  Economics,  University  of  Orléans,
respectively, pp. 258-259)
149“...  (Dans  le  domaine  des  valeurs  mobilières)  il  en  résulte  un  défi  pour
les autorités  qui,  elles  aussi,  devront  dépasser  les  schémas  traditionnels
où, bien  souvent,  la  protection  du  ‘petit  ‘épargnant  était  préoccupation
prioritaire,  sinon  exclusive.  Aujourd’hui  déjà,  l’institutionnalisation  et
l’internationalisation des marchés, la taille des intermédiaires et les moyens
technologiques mis en œuvre posent les problèmes de supervision en termes
tout à fait différents.” (Georges Martin and Marc van Turenhoudt, Head of
Economics  Department  and  Adviser  respectively,  Association  Belge  des
Banques, p. 219)
“... The period (from 1981 to 1985) saw a clear change internationally in
supervisory  approaches  to  the  solvency  position  of  banks. After  years  of
steadily  declining  national  solvency  requirements  (denoted  by  some  as
a competition in laxity), the supervisory authorities decided to join forces not
just to put an end to this situation, but to redress it ... Agreements were made
to improve the banks’ financial credibility. To this end banks will have to
strengthen  their  capital  ratios.  One  way  to  achieve  this  is  by  improving
profitability;  the  completion  of  the  European  internal  market  holds  out
prospects in this regard. The enlargement of the market will speed up the
process whereby national and sectoral boundaries are increasingly fading. For
the  supervisory  authorities  this  development  calls  for  closer  cooperation.
A major  new  supervisory  area  will  be  that  of  financial  conglomerates...”
(Peter A.A. Cornet, Chief of Banking Supervision, De Nederlandsche Bank,
pp. 276, 285)
“... Existing differences in Europe in the very structure of the financial system
and in the regulatory frameworks make the system-competition inherent in
the Single Market a major challenge ... The problem lies in the dosage of
minimal harmonization and mutual recognition which is likely to lead ... to
competition between supervisory frameworks with a gradual convergence on
the  arrangements  that  best  meet  the  needs  of  the  market  ...”  (Rainer
S. Masera, op. cit., pp. 329-330)
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– Strong emphasis on research-based discussion...
“SUERF  aims  for  a profile  different  from  those  of  our  competitors.  Our
colloquia provide a forum for the exchange of the results of recent research
and ideas among economists in universities, research institutions, banks and
other  private  financial  institutions,  central  banks  and  treasuries  and
international  institutions  ...”  (Niels Thygesen,  Professor,  Institute  of
Economics, Copenhagen and President of SUERF, in his opening address,
p. 3)
– Focusing on saving-investment relations...
“Central to (all the sub-themes) is the role of the financial system in allocating
savings and investment and the extent to which it is becoming relevant to see
that role in a European – or possibly a global – context ... In recent years,
there has been a perception in many industrial countries that savings have
constrained investment, with historically high real interest rates tending to
keep additions to physical capital below a longer-run optimal rate ...” (Niels
Thygesen, op. cit., p. 4)
151“Almost all the issues of the four commissions, namely: private savings and
tax incentives, – public sector imbalances, – international transfer(s), and the
policy mix towards EMU in Europe are not only controversial but really most
urgent policy problems which are to be solved within a very short time span.
What  seemed  for  a while  an  academic  discussion  of  loosely  connected
technical  questions,  suddenly  became  the  subject  of  radical  changes  in
economic, institutional, and constitutional relations in the real world ... The
topics are not only part of the European challenge in preparing some decisive
steps towards EMU and the European Union in the 1990s, but they also form
part of the fundamental changes going on in Central and Eastern Europe.”
(Manfred Wegner, former Director, IFO Institute for Economic Research,
Munich, in his general report, pp. 429-430)
– The savings puzzle
“The decline in the private saving rate... remains a puzzle and a cause for
serious concern. What policy should the government adopt? Auseful first step
would be to reduce government dissaving. The saving concept of greatest
relevance to future welfare is net national saving. It makes little difference
whether an increase in this rate occurs because of greater saving in the private
or public sector ... I conclude that tax incentives are not an effective means of
increasing  national  saving,  and  that  governments  are  better  served  in
designing a tax system to focus on its revenue-raising function: that means
emphasizing a simple system with a broad base, low rates, and the minimal
number of special exceptions. Within that framework national saving can
most  effectively  be  increased  by  simply  reducing  the  magnitude  of
government dissaving.” (BarryBosworth , Senior Fellow, The Brookings
Institution, Washington D.C., in an extensive survey of the US experience in
the 1980s, pp. 48, 65)
“The fall in national saving rates in the 1980s is marked. Moreover, national
saving rates have fallen by similar proportions of national income in all of the
major countries – roughly 6 percentage points ... In answer to the question of
why policy-makers are so concerned with the level of saving, ... my principal
objective is to offer a (fourth) reason for thinking that governments might be
concerned about the level of domestic saving. It is based on the idea that, in
a regime of liberal financial markets, there are costs to a policy of raising the
growth rate, unless additional measures are taken to cope with the demand
expansion  that  results  from  the  optimal  response  of  agents  to  a positive
supply-side shock to the future growth rate. The economic fashion of the
1980s was  supply-side  reform.  Over  a wide  range  of  areas,  the
1980s witnessed, in a number of countries, a movement aimed not only at
152improving the efficiency with which resources were being used but also at
raising the trend rate of economic growth. Another related and important
trend in the 1980s was the move to open up financial markets to competition
with a combination of deregulation and the abolition of controls on capital
movements. The combination of the two sets of reforms was powerful. Was it
beneficial?  I believe  it  was.  But  it  is  easy  to  see  why  there  has  been
scepticism, in particular over the effects of financial liberalisation ... Unless
the problems posed by the demand consequences of a supply-side shock can
be managed satisfactorily, the supply-side cupboard will be bare ...” (Mervyn
A. King,  Chief  Economist  and  Executive  Director,  Bank  of  England,
Professor London School of Economics, in his opening address, pp. 30-32, 43)
“... As for the saving functions specifications, both inflation and real income
growth  are  precisely  estimated  and  positive  which  is  in  line  with  the
misperception  hypothesis  by  Deaton  (1977)  but  does  not  eliminate  other
interpretations. The unemployment rate positively affects saving. The new
finding here is that the normal interest rate positively affects the household
saving rate, which also conforms with the liquidity constraint interpretation.
Finally, the cross-section time-series country data evidence is partly in line
with the Life Cycle Hypothesis – in the case of the demographic variables –
and partly contradicts it, in the case of the income growth variable. Moreover,
cross- section data provide some weak evidence fort the hypothesis that the
marginal income tax tends to negatively affect the level of household saving.”
(Erkki Koskela and Matti Virén, Professors at the Universities of Helsinki
and Turku respectively, as the result of an econometric study of 17 OECD
countries over the period 1979-1988, p. 157)
“(Four tentative conclusions) 1. Some of the broader trends in the allocation
of savings in recent years appear to have been partly related to tax factors; 2.
It  is  by  no  means  clear  that  specific  incentives  have  an  impact  on  the
aggregate level of savings; 3. The lifting of barriers to capital movements as
well as the lower degree of segmentation between markets tends to impose
a downward pressure on tax rates on capital income; 4.Given the growing
internationalisation of financial markets it has become more difficult to use
the tax system to pursue domestic objectives ...” (Julian S. Alworth, Head of
Section  and  Claudio E.V. Borio,  Economist,  Monetary  and  Economic
Department, BIS, Basle, in an analysis of 16 OECD countries, p. 99)
– No escape from public sector imbalances and from the debt problem
“Clearly, German economic and monetary unification (GEMU) was the most
severe real shock by far to affect either German economy in their post-war
153history ... Financing GEMU is an exceptional historical challenge ... There is
no way to avoid a major departure from the previously protected time path for
public expenditure and revenue... It should be noted that the present situation
is exactly what had been called for during much of the 1980s. Back then
Germany was widely criticized for under-absorption ... The question of how
public transfers to Eastern Germany by the Bonn government are financed
therefore concerns the whole of the EC. In the final analysis the issue boils
down to this: the higher the share of tax financing in Germany, the less will
there be upward pressure on domestic interest rates, and, indirectly, on foreign
interest rates too. Conversely, exclusive reliance on deficit financing will tend
to further increase the scarcity of capital and drive up real interest rates in
Europe. This in turn, may force a number of European governments to tighten
their  own  fiscal  policy  in  an  effort  to  increase  savings.  Such  a situation
obviously would be highly unwelcome in the face of a general slowdown in
economic  activity  as  seems  imminent  today  ...”  (Hans-Peter Fröhlich,
Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Cologne, in a much discussed contribution,
pp. 291, 297, 299, 300)
“The overall impression... is that the (Dutch) government has been able to
finance its relatively strongly rising debts in the 1980s rather easily ... (This)
implies that the disciplinary influence that has been exerted on government
financial behaviour by the financial markets has been rather weak ... This
conclusion does not mean, however, that the position of government finance
is  stable  in  the  sense  that  it  is  able  to  absorb  external  shocks,  and  that
financing  and  refinancing  is  possible  irrespective  of  other  policies  ...
A substantial reduction of the public sector deficit will – by the ensuing fall
in the public debt ratio – diminish the vulnerability of government finance by
making  public  outlays  less  sensitive  to  interest  rate  movements,  and  by
increasing  the  robustness  of  the  confidence  of  the  investors  that  the
government is able to meet its obligations ...” (Simon K. Kuipers, Professor
at the University of Groningen, pp. 179-180)
“... The dark side (of the Italian debt story) is the persistence of a fiscal
imbalance: in spite of a rapid rise in the tax burden, debt growth had slowed,
but not stopped owing to the inability to curb expenditures and to the increase
in the cost of debt relative to the growth rate. Debt management offers a less
discomforting prospect, as there have been considerable improvements in the
structure of and the market for Italian debt: in spite of the size of the gross
issues, their placement seems to meet no particular difficulty. Can we draw
any conclusion as to the sustainability of the Italian fiscal position? What we
can say with certainty is that, as debt grows, the cost of solvency rises with
154time, because the primary surplus and, hence, the overall tax burden, required
to stop debt growth increase with the level of debt ...” (Luigi Spaventa,
Professor of Economics at the University of Rome, pp. 194, 196)
– Transition Policy for Central and Eastern Europe
“The transition may be divided into three phases on the basis of the trend in
production:  deterioration,  stabilisation,  revival.  The  deterioration  and
stabilisation phases taken together will extend over 6 to 7 years, between
1989 and the start of ‘self-sustaining growth based on market principles’... In
the deterioration phase there is a fall in GNP and in industrial production ...
Public transfers and aid are needed to arrest the fall in production, to help
maintain control of the situation and to prepare the following stabilisation
phase. If there is an imperative need of public aid in the deterioration phase,
it will become less pressing (in the latter phase) as its place is progressively
taken over by private capital flows. The need for western aid will indeed
diminish the better it has fulfilled its role as a catalyst. The aim of transition
should not be to catch up with the western industrial countries in terms of per
capita GNP but to reach a stage where growth becomes a self-sustaining
process, on the one hand, and, on the other, the creditworthiness of these
countries is re-established, that is to say their ability to assure the interest
payments on their foreign debt. This is the reason why self-sustaining growth
should be of the export-led variety ...” (Conrad Reuss, Economic Adviser,
Bank Brussels Lambert, Brussels, pp. 308, 309, 310, 311)
“In  the  short  run,  the  ability  to  switch  resources  to  compete  in  foreign
markets, to restructure and modernize capital stock at home and to meet
domestic consumption demand that has become significantly more selective
depend  both  on  the  breadth  and  speed  with  which  adjustment  effects
materialize and on the availability of foreign financing. Unfortunately, the
ability to attract foreign private investment flows of any size depends, in turn,
on  the  demonstration  that  a successful  transformation  of  the  economy  in
question is already well-rooted ...
(Lessons to be drawn from recent experience): 1. The importance of not
allowing  production  costs  to  rise  for  non-economic  reasons.  2. Although
gradualism  as  such  is  to  be  eschewed,  complete  opening  up  to  outside
competitive forces may need to be accomplished over time, however, with the
time path set out very clearly. 3. Institution building, including the transmission
of  market  signals  (price  structure,  financial  system,  and  enterprise
accountability)  must  go  hand  in  hand  with  stabilization  efforts.
4.Administrative priorities need to aim at supporting the initiative of investors
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need to focus on managerial transformation as well as the spreading of assets
among the population. 6. Perhaps most importantly, confidence in the financial
system and in the predictability of economic policies, particularly tax and
financial policies, must be such as to help innate high propensities to save into
savings in financial assets ...” (Helen Juntz, Special Trade Representative and
Director, International Monetary Fund, Geneva, pp. 287-288, 289)
“...  The  already  implemented  system  conditions  have  enlarged  the
possibilities  for  foreign  capital  entry  into  Czechoslovakia.  They  are
supplemented by a whole range of further legislative and legal measures
guiding  the  entrepreneurial  activities.  It  is  natural  that  foreign  investors
expect at least reliable and stable conditions which could, to maximum extent,
eliminate  possible  risk  factors.  Of  great  importance  in  this  direction  are
special agreements on investment protection. The content of such agreements
concentrates first of all on: – investment inviolability ..., – the most favoured
clause ..., – the free transfer guarantee ...” (Egon Hlavatý, General Director,
State Bank of Czechoslovakia, Bratislava, p. 332)
– Transition Policy in EMU
“... The first stage of EMU really began long before the date officially set to
start the whole process. In mountain climbing, it is well known that climbing
starts only when one has walked a long time already. Beyond a number of
formal steps, the challenge of stage One is to allow further progress towards
convergence,  further  progress  meaning  a catching  up  process  for  some
countries, aconsolidation for others. The required convergence is by no means
unambiguous: the substance is dictated by the need to manage currencies
within the ERM, the need to eliminate out-of-line performances when they are
inconsistent with adherence to EMU and the need to remedy a number of
difficult-to-identify rigidities which run the risk of putting the country at
a competitive disadvantage when EMU is implemented. To some extent, the
process of strengthening convergence is led by market forces which influence
both the private and the public sector in trying to improve their competitive
position in the new environment. It may be that more leadership could be
exercised  from  Community  institutions,  particularly  the  Council.”  (Jean-
JacquesRey, Executive Director, National Bank of Belgium, Brussels, p. 409)
“Il y a une asymétrie des coûts et avantages dans le temps. La Communauté
supporte  aujourd’hui  les  coûts  d’ajustement,  ceux  liés  à l’incertitude  de
change; il n’y a plus de réelle souveraineté monétaire nationale et l’ajustement
par les taux de change amontré ses limites. Al’opposé, les avantages de l’UEM
156ne seront recueillis, pour l’essentiel, qu’à la troisième étape avec la monnaie
unique. Ces considérations militent pour une transition la plus courte possible.
Une des difficultés de l’actuelle négociation est qu’elle prend souvent l’allure
d’une défense excessive des symboles nationaux. Chaque pays a ses valeurs et
ses préférences en matière économique et monétaire. Lorsq’elles sont brandies
comme des drapeaux sur un champ de bataille, elles en deviennent des symboles
...” (Giovanni Ravasio, Director General for Economic and Financial Affairs,
DG II, Commission of the European Communities, pp. 25, 26)
“... Taking part in the process of European integration has a high domestic
political value in some countries, especially in the weaker economies where
it is considered a sign of international distinction and respectability ... Being
denied access to the union because of the persistence of a fiscal imbalance
would thus represent a dramatic loss of prestige with the electorate and would
at  the  same  time  ignite  expectations  of  currency  devaluation  ...”  (Luigi
Spaventa, op. cit., p. 201-202)
“... Despite the transitory cost of disinflation it inevitably warns us against the
temptation of believing that the change of regime can be consolidated without
nominal convergence. From that standpoint, reducing inflation to a level close
to the Community average is a necessary condition for a sustainable catching-
up process ... The parable of union and cohesion suggests that the regime
needs  to  be  initiated  by  strong  budgetary  adjustment  in  Greece  and
consolidation by continued budgetary and monetary restraint in Portugal. In
Ireland, nominal convergence was achieved faster but structural adjustment
for real convergence has been slower ...”(Jorge Braga de Macedo, Professor
at  the  University  Nova  de  Lisboa,  Director  for  National  Economies,
Commission of the European Communities, p. 278)
“... For the first time in a generation, or more, in 1993 most EC savers will be
free to decide where to put their money once the Single European Market is
in full operation ... As investors scan the European markets, they will realise
that the advent of the single currency will create a fundamental change in the
nature of government debt. It will no longer be an automatic safe haven for
their savings: risk and reward will have to be assessed ... The markets do not
perceive  public  debt  as  the  residual  of  Keynesian  demand  management
techniques  –  they  are  merely  the  intermediary  for  collective  saving. The
question posed by the saver is simple: will that government pay the interest
and principal on this loan on the due date?” (Graham Bishop, Salomon
Brothers International, London, pp. 211-212)
157“... The conclusion from the evidence on the US is clearcut: a stabilizing
function of the federal fiscal system ... is virtually non existent ... For Europe
it seems that the argument in favour of a large Community budget or greater
fiscal  coordination  is  less  general,  hence  less  powerful  than  often
perceived ...” (Jürgen von Hagen, Professor, School of Business, University
of Indiana, Bloomington, p. 356)
“In  face  of  system  changes  like  those  experienced  now  –  with  the
developments in eastern Europe, the German reunification and adjustment
burdens and power debates triggered by the Gulf War – attention should focus
on measures strengthening existing relations and maintaining the viability of
the EMS, instead of introducing new inflexibilities that only add to emerging
conflicts  ...”  (Beate Reszat,  Economist  at  HWWA Institut  für
Wirtschaftsforschung, Hamburg, p. 421)
“... The combination of a small Community budget with large, independently
determined national budgets leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of
fiscal  coordination,  the  global  fiscal  policy  of  the  EMU  would  be  the
accidental outcome of decisions taken by Member States. There simply would
be  no  Community-wide  macro-economic  fiscal  policy  ...”  (Alexandre
Lamfalussy  (1989)  as  quoted  by  Dirk J. Wolfson,  Professor,  Scientific
Council for Government Policy, The Hague, p. 368)
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– The New Europe...What does it mean?
“... The ‘New Europe’ refers to two transitions and their articulation. On the
one hand, Eastern European economies are still in the transition process to
a market economy, and this process is going to continue for several years. On
the other hand, EC countries, or some of them, are keen to implement an
economic  and  monetary  union  (EMU)  and,  in  some  respects,  a political
union ... The two European transitions are different in kind; in some respects
quite  opposite.  Whilst  Western  Europe  is  searching  for  more  trade  and
monetary  integration,  some  Eastern  European  economies  are  exposed  to
a powerful wave of disintegration, after the dismantling of the Comecon. On
the other hand, East and West are facing common challenges: the search for
models of capitalism, intermediate between pure laissez-faire and unlimited
interventionism;  the  search  for  efficient  financing  of  non-financial  agents
(firms,  households,  ...)  in  the  context  of  deep  banking  and  financial
fragility ...” (Christian de Boissieu, Professor at the University of Paris I and
President of SUERF, p. 3)
159“... The global economy is still burdened by misdirected developments in
major industrial countries during the 1980s ... In this uncertain environment
the  European  Community  should  provide,  in  full  knowledge  of  its
responsibilities,  a stable  framework  for  the  process  of  democratisation,
liberalisation,  and  economic  growth  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  This
cannot be done without cost, i.e. the cost of opening up the EC to both new
members and their products. But it would be short-sighted to look only at the
adjustment cost, and not to see the benefits for Europe ...” (Hans Tietmeyer,
Deputy Governor, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt, p. 12)
– Which economic model for Central and Eastern Europe?
“... The challenge for economists and policymakers is to extract from an
increasingly obsolete body of expertise and from a still-to-be applicable body
of knowledge insights that can help the reforms along in an orderly fashion ...
For  the  economics  profession,  the  challenge  is  the  result  of  the  growing
obsolescence of the strand of literature dealing with central planning and the
lack of applicability of the knowledge available with regard to the operation
of market forces ...” (Manuel Guitián, Associate Director, Monetary and
Exchange Affairs Department, IMF, Washington, p. 114)
“(In the basic paper the author refers to, he) distinguishes between the insider
system of corporate ownership of Germany, Japan and most of Continental
Europe and the outsider systems of the UK and US. Insider systems are
characterized  by  small  stock  markets,  high  concentrations  of  corporate
ownership and high levels of ownership by families and companies of other
companies. Outsider systems are characterized by large stock markets, low
levels of corporate ownership and low levels of inter-corporate ownership...
In the context of Eastern Europe (the) presumption in favour of the insider
system has to be tempered by the paucity of resources to manage firms within
the corporate or the financial system ... There is a trade-off between following
the gradual transfer of control from state to individual owners via institutional
ownership  (top-down)  as  against  direct  individual  ownership,  possibly
followed by state and institutional ownership and control (bottom-up). The
justification  for  the  bottom-up  approach  is  that  managerial  abilities  will
emerge through initial privatisation. Putting firms up to auction will allow
those  of  greatest  ability  to  gain  control  of  enterprises.  The  reason  for
scepticism with the bottom-up approach is that the social/private divergences
are  sufficiently  great  during  the  transition  period  to  make  the  natural
emergence of a ruling class implausible ... Reliance on markets to allocate
ownership is likely to reveal the seriousness of the market failures that justify
160state and institutional/corporate ownership during the transition period ...”
(Colin Mayer,  Professor  of  Economics  and  Finance  at  the  University  of
Warwick, p. 62-63)
“...We  suggest  that  reliance  on  the Anglo-American  model  under  chaotic
conditions and in the absence of a reasonably sophisticated infrastructure is
inappropriate, and runs the risk of public disillusionment and rejection of
market-based reforms in general ... The West has been long on advice to
convert the command-type economies into flourishing market-driven systems
by the classic reforms of deregulation, abandonment of price controls and
subsidies, (etc.) ... The experience of going “cold turkey” into a free-market
system has been a good deal more painful than anything that any Western
country has imposed upon itself since World War II ... The place to start in
Eastern Europe is with the laws and the institutions – the infrastructure ...”
(RoyC. Smith and Ingo Walter, respectively, Professor of Banking and
Finance, New York University and Professor of International Management,
INSEAD, Fontainebleau, pp. 56, 57, 58)
“...Privatisation (in the UK) has symbolised a determination to take seriously
the need to instil commercial spirit in the public sector. The government
would  neither  interfere  in  managerial  decisions  nor  intervene  to  prevent
bankruptcy  ...  There  has,  however,  been  an  increasing  trend  to  regard
privatisation  not  only  as  a symbol  of  the  new  commercial  management
approach but as its cause, and hence to be too ready to allow commercial
freedom to firms which do not face competition. ...Where competition and
privatisation are alternative policies – as has sometimes been the case – then
it is competition which should be put first...” (John Kay, Chairman, London
Economics, London, p. 84)
– Economic reform in the East: some scanning of plans, factual evidence
and opinions...
“There is no unique blueprint or ‘royal road’to a successful economic reform.
Catching  up  with  the  economic  progress  made  in  the  West  over  several
decades will not be easy task in any case ...” (Hans Tietmeyer, op cit., p. 7)
“... Vouchers represent artificial capital that may generate domestic demand,
avoid  the  need  for  costly  prior  valuation  of  assets,  and  thereby  allow
privatisation to proceed both much more rapidly and, according to prevalent
sentiments, more fairly, compared with sales to either domestic or foreign
investors ... Remarkably, plans to use vouchers as an important element in the
transition process have emerged more or less independently in anumber of East
161European countries. No two countries have adopted identical policies, and
arguably the different situation of different countries implies that the policies
should differ...” (John Earle, Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski,
respectively Visiting Professor of Economics, Central European University,
Prague,  Associate  Professor  of  Economics,  New  York  University,  and
Professor of Law, Columbia University, New York., pp. 16, 22)
“(Under two assumptions made by the author) democratisation (understood as
representative  political  institutions  and  a legal  framework  for  a market
economy) should be followed by privatisation and then by liberalisation of
prices ... These sequential considerations lead to the conclusion that either
price  liberalisation  in  Poland  has  been  introduced  too  early  or  the
privatisation progress has been too slow as price reform became effective ...”
(Christoph G. Bandyk, Vice-President, Investment Banking, Swiss Bank
Corporation, Zurich, formerly Ministry of Privatization, Prague, pp. 98-99)
“... The most significant risk is not yet very much addressed: the Romanian
plan involves issuing securities of hundreds if not thousands of companies,
some tens of millions of bearer ‘certificates of ownership’, securities that
most of the people don’t understand ... Maybe we should bear in mind the
failure of the ‘System’ of John Law or the “South Sea Bubble”: ambitious,
tempting, but not very sound systems and instruments can lead to disaster, if
introduced too early for their time and even if at the beginning everything
looks fine ...” (Theodor Nicolaescu, Director General, National Agency for
Privatisation, Bucharest, pp. 108, 109)
“...  The  real  choice  (for  Russia)  is  how  to  minimize  the  damage  of
disintegration,  to  build  up,  in  a relatively  short  time,  a new  system  of
economic and financial relations within the former USSR, to prepare the basis
for a fundamentally new type of possible union ...” (Andrei Anikin, Institute
of  World  Economy  and  International  Relations,  Moscow  and  Professor,
University of Moscow, p. 396)
“... In terms of restructuring the first problem is not to ‘pick winners’, in the
near term the objective is only to liquidate the obvious losers that are the
heaviest drain on available resources. This would free resources to be used
more  profitably  elsewhere  in  the  economy;  also  the  example  set  by
liquidating some of the least profitable enterprises would engender behavioral
changes in other enterprises. Success in recovery lies both in liquidating loss-
making ventures and in promoting successful ones... Privatization will take
years to complete. Meanwhile pressure must be put on enterprises to use
162resources efficiently...” (Millard F. Long, Senior Advisor, Financial systems,
World Bank, Washington, pp. 142, 143)
– Monetary and Financial Reform and Policies in the East...
“...  The  previously  centrally  planned  economies  face  one  of  their  most
difficult  challenges  in  the  area  of  banking  reform. And  yet,  meeting  the
challenge can prove to be the litmus test of the effectiveness of the reform
process and of the efforts made by the countries to the east of Europe and
beyond  to  install  market-economies  ...  Progress  has  been  made  in  the
conversion of the monobank structures typical of central planning into two-
tier  banking  systems  along  the  lines  of  those  existing  in  the  market
economies. But the depth of progress has been more apparent than real. On
the  central  bank  front,  ...(installing  a currency  board)  can  be  seen  as  an
arrangement that provides an alternative to an central bank. But it can also be
considered as the first step toward the establishment of a full-fledged central
bank. On the commercial bank front, a measure of progress has been made
but, so far, its scope has been limited on two fundamental counts: the lack of
competition in the banking sector, due to excessive concentration and undue
reliance  on  public  resources  and  subsidies;  and  the  vulnerability  of  bank
portfolios... At present, the interplay of weak portfolios, restricted credit flows
and resulting inter-enterprise arrears exhibits vicious circle characteristics,
which does not bode well for efficient bank reform...” (Manuel Guitián, op.
cit., pp. 120, 125, 126)
“... Akey objective of banking reform is to improve the efficiency of resource
allocation. However, there is limited evidence in Hungary, Poland and the
CSFR  of  a significant  increase  in  competition  and  changes  in  portfolio
composition ... Although bank privatisation by itself would not directly lead
to greater competition, it would contribute to the process of de-specialisation.
In the medium-term competition by the non-banking financial sector might
become a significant factor. However, it might be necessary to adopt a more
drastic approach by restructuring the portfolios of the large savings banks and
credit banks ...” (Hans J. Blommestein, Senior Economist, OECD, Centre
for Co-operation with European Economies in Transition, Paris, p. 165)
“... The economies of the formerly communist countries need an efficient
monetary  and  financial  system  to  mobilize  and  allocate  saving  and
investment.  Until  the  transmission  linkages  –  from  the  instruments  of
monetary policy to financial markets, and from financial markets to the rest
of the economy – have been developed in Eastern Europe, monetary policy is
unlikely to be effective. Inflation is likely to remain one of the most pressing
163problems of Eastern economies as the liberalization of prices needs to be
continued and as the present large scale distortions in relative prices have to
be  further  corrected  ...”  (Wolfgang Duchatczek and  Aurel Schubert,
respectively,  Deputy  Director  and  Economist,  Austrian  National  Bank,
Vienna, p. 250)
– Excerpt from the General Report
“...  P.S.  Andersen  stressed  the  importance  of  domestic  savings  for  the
development of the East. Heinz Handler and Alfred Steinherr estimated the
capital needs of Eastern Europe so that this region can partially catch up with
the West by 2005, allowing for an initial no-growth period until the mid
1990s. According to Handler-Steinherr, an import of foreign capital of more
than 150 billion dollars is required for only five countries ... Since there is
a global shortage of capital, growth in Eastern Europe, however, cannot rely
on  foreign  capital  inflows.  From  these  points  the  two  papers  are
complementary to each other: if the East does not get the foreign capital, then
it will not catch up with the West (Handler’s and Steinherr’s conclusion),
unless it discovers the importance of domestic savings (Anderson’s point). In
this context, two different views can be stressed. The first argues, by using
historical examples, that the import of foreign capital may be harmful or, at
least,  that  foreign  financing  has  not  been  essential  to  economic  growth.
Instead, an efficient allocation of domestic savings is needed (disciplining the
country from inside) The second view holds that the best way to get domestic
market  reforms  is  to  force  a country  to  make  itself  eligible  for  foreign
investment  (disciplining  the  country  from  outside)  ...”  (Georg Winckler,
Professor of Economics at the University of Vienna, p. 429)
“... The external situation of reforming countries with respect to possible large
capital imports is hardly improving. The attractiveness of reforming countries
for  risk-averse  private  investors  is  remaining  modest  as  long  as  the
turnaround  to  a well  functioning  market  economy  is  not  achieved...”
(Gerhard Fink, Professor, Economics Department, University of Vienna,
p. 354)
– Transition in the West: the bumpy road to EMU...
“... I believe that the further integration of European countries in the direction
of an Economic and Monetary Union is necessary, for economic as well as for
political reasons. Given the changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the
necessary extension of the Community, Europe needs a real perspective for
strengthening the process of integration ... It is however essential that the
concept agreed upon at Maastricht be given a realistic economic and political
164basis. Without such a basis the vision of Maastricht could turn out to be an
illusion. We have just experienced turbulences on the exchange markets that
show what can happen if economic reality is ignored. The increased stability
orientation  of  member  states’ economic  policies  in  the  course  of  the
1980s was  a major  factor  behind  the  success  of  the  European  Monetary
System. This implied, however, that imbalances were recognised in time, and
prompt and appropriate action was taken to deal with them ... The events on
the exchange markets over the last few weeks have their deeper-lying causes,
above  all  in  the  divergences  that  have  built  up  between  some  countries’
economies in the five years since the last realignment of exchange rates in the
EMS. I very much hope that after the recent exchange rate adjustments a new
and durable basis for the functioning of the EMS will soon be restored. The
EMS  is  an  important  stop-over  and  also  a test  on  the  road  to  EMU  ...
Broadening the Community’s membership contains the potential danger of
retrogression to a free trade area with a tendency towards disintegration. The
possible frictions resulting from broadening the Community may call not only
for the necessary deepening of the cooperation but also for an institutional
reform  of  the  Community. Accommodating  countries  with  heterogeneous
economic  conditions  and  social  preferences  could  pose  new  problems.
Europe might as a result develop at variable speed. Under no circumstances
should such an approach be allowed to lead to internal instability, which
might even put the cohesion of the core group at risk ...” (Hans Tietmeyer,
op.cit., pp. 9, 10, 11)
“... Within the Community as presently composed any development toward
genuine political union would ... be likely to be controversial as the Danish
referendum  has  demonstrated.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  others  could  block
a Franco-German agreement unless they were united, which they are not.
Franco-German  cooperation  will  probably  remain  the  core  of  European
integration, and whatever its inconvenience for the others, it is preferable to
the absence of such cooperation ... Thus the others face the choice between
joining or not joining. A case can be made for a European Community in
which members do indeed have that choice. Not integration à la carte, but the
choice  between  a limited  number  of  menus:  one  comparable  to  EC
membership  as  it  is  now,  including  participation  in  the  internal  market,
a second comprising EMU, and a third one also including the other pillars,
notably a common foreign and security policy ... It could reconcile deepening
and widening as far as the EFTAcountries are concerned. And it would enable
the  Community  to  hold  out  the  perspective  of  membership  to  Central
European countries, thus contributing to stability in a part of Europe where
disintegrating  forces  are  gathering  strength  ...”  (André Szász,  Executive
165Director, De Nederlandsche Bank, Professor of European Studies, University
of Amsterdam, pp. 233-234)
– Financial developments in the West...
“... Several developments... might indicate that, in some limited respects,
banking may exhibit some of the characteristics of a ‘declining industry’... In
various  ways  the  related  pressures  of  competition,  deregulation,  financial
innovation, and technology have eroded some of the comparative advantages
of the banks in their traditional financial intermediation business. Regulation
to some extent exaggerated the comparative advantages possessed by banks
because it created a protective market environment ... Market pressures are
eroding the market imperfections which gave rise to the banks’ comparative
advantage over intermediation in capital markets ...” (David T. Llewellyn,
Professor of Money and Banking, Loughborough University, pp.190-191)
“Inexorable demographic trends, technological advances that cannot easily be
halted by politicians, the strong probability of an effective single financial
market, and the probable result of a single currency across much of Europe:
these four factors will operate in combination to produce a growing pool of
highly mobile financial savings seeking to protect their real value. The basic
precondition to achieve that goal is price stability, but the second is the need
for  a diversified  group  of  creditworthy  borrowers  of  those  savings.  If
individuals are building up fixed obligations, then there will be a major role
for bonds...” (Graham Bishop, Vice President, Salomon Brothers, London,
p. 418)
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– Setting the stage: Is competitiveness the lifeblood of banking or is it
a dangerous obsession?
“...  Competitiveness  is  the  lifeblood  of  any  industry  and  banking  is  no
exception. Very few industries have been subjected to such rapid changes in
the past decade with the impact of technology, the globalisation of financial
services and the development of financial derivatives which were unheard of
a short time ago. In stressing the importance of competitiveness, however, let
us not lose sight entirely of the wider obligations of banks to the communities
which they serve. Banks enjoy a privileged status in a sense, because of their
impact on economic life. As a central banker, I must be very conscious of the
regulatory aspects of banking and of the obligations on the authorities to keep
pace  with  new  developments  ...”  (Maurice O’Connell,  Governor  of  the
Central Bank of Ireland, Dublin, in his opening address, p. 6)
“We  are  undergoing  rapid  technological  change  in  financial  industries,
affecting  the  competitive  environment.  And  as  they  compete  vigorously,
167banks must be, like Caesar’s wife, above suspicion. From the record of the
past few years, I would suggest that Caesar had better start checking up on his
wife,  as  she  seems  to  have  been  a little  bit  ready  for  experimentation,
diversification and seeking joint venture partnerships. Even Caesar had to
compete and never knew when friend would become a foe ...” (Richard
O’Brien, Chief Economist, American Express Bank, London, p. 497)
– A solid injection of theory on the junction between financial economics
and industrial organization...
“... The recent research on the operation of credit markets and the associated
revitalization of credit in macroeconomics is based on the new economics of
asymmetric information and incomplete markets. This view, concentrating on
the independent influence both of the amount and availability of credit and
the  credit-rationing  mechanism  on  economic  activity  is  called  the  ‘credit
view’ ...  Recently  in  economic  literature  the  lemons  principle  and  the
associated  asymmetric  information  has  been  applied  to  the  operation  of
financial markets, especially to explain the phenomenon of credit rationing
and the importance of the quality of the financial structure of economic agents
for  macroeconomic  performance.  The  asymmetric  information  approach
provides  an  important  transmission  mechanism  for  how  disturbances  on
credit markets affect aggregate economic activity ... The new microeconomic
view has also been applied to the operation of the credit market, emphasizing
the  issues  of  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  resulting  in  quantity
adjustments on this market ... Based on the Stiglitz-Weiss’analysis the rise of
bad-loans in the banking system and its attendant increase in outstanding debt
of firms and households, coinciding in time with a cyclical downturn, has
increased financial fragility ... The primary danger for financial stability is
that  a downturn  of  the  business  cycle  will  interrupt  the  cash  flows  of
households and firms, giving rise to an inability to service the accumulated
debt. Such a process can lead to a crisis in the financial system with negative
spill-over effects to the real economy. The robustness of the financial system
can  be  maintained  by  stable  government  policies  and  an  institutional
environment that encourages sufficient diversification of risks, reducing the
risk for future economic and financial crises.” (Jacques Sijben, Professor of
Money and Banking, Tilburg University, pp. 354, 365, 369, 375, 376)
“...  The  traditional  approach  which  treats  the  financial  system  as  an
epiphenomenon and the intermediary-rentier as destined for euthanasia, does
not entail the need for a theory of financial innovation. By contrast, (the
functional approach of the financial system) requires an explicit theory of the
dynamics of the financial system, a theory of financial innovation. Process
168and  product  innovations  in  the  financial  system  have  four  main
characteristics:  they  reduce  agency  and  information  costs,  second  they
complete the markets; third, they reallocate and reduce risk; and fourth they
reduce transaction and settlement costs ... It is not proper to speak simply of
disintermediation in the American financial system, i.e. a process in which
borrowers obtain financing directly from lenders through the markets. Even
when  one  acknowledges  in  full  the  importance  and  implications  of
securitization, it would appear more correct to describe the complex process
of  innovation  as  being  characterized  by  a diversification of the forms of
intermediation. A growing role is being played by non-bank intermediaries
(institutional investors) and investment banks (in fact securities houses and
thus  non-banks)  that  operate  in  close  relationship  (competitive
complementarity) with the financial markets ... The regulatory neutrality that
underlies  the  Single  Market  can  allow  banks  in  Europe  to  maintain
a significant  role  in  financial  intermediation.  However,  this  requires  the
capacity  to  achieve  economies  of  scale  and  scope  in  the  production  of
financial  services  through  appropriate  operational and  organizational
strategies.  Mere  growth  and  unfocused  diversification  (the  financial
conglomerate) are unpromising paths to produce such results. Institutional
despecialization goes hand in hand with operational specialization: what are
required,  then,  are  multispecialist  intermediaries  with  focused  growth  ...”
(Rainer Masera, Director General, Istituto Mobiliare Italiano, pp. 11, 12,
14-15)
– Evidence on markets and strategies: same causes, various banking
strategies, often analogous effects...
– Real estate:  “...  The  recent  property  boom  –  indeed,  the  1980s in
general  –  looks  increasingly  like  one  of  those  once-in-a-lifetime
periods when the ‘boom that will never end’ mentality takes hold, and
people temporarily suspend customary prudent standards. Bankers are
presumably as prone to such ‘bubbles’ as are others. How else are we
to explain why banks and financiers, many of which had experienced
more  than  a century  of  property  and  share  booms  –  and  busts  –
suddenly started to behave as if property and share prices could never
fall?”  (Mervyn K. Lewis,  Professor  of  Money  and  Banking,
University of Nottingham, p. 61)
– Entry arrangements in the United Kingdom: “... Financial deregulation
in the UK has created an unusual opportunity to study entry by firms
previously restricted to a core business ... The general availability of
169resources, as proxied by firm size, appear to encourage wholly-owned
ventures  and  discourage  collaborative  ones,  lending  support  to  the
argument that control costs make joint ventures problematic in many
areas.  Collaboration  appears  to  be  used  as  a means  of  easing  the
resource constraint. Conversely, it appears that risk and high initial
outlays  encourage  collaboration  –  presumably  to  facilitate  risk
spreading. The result also suggests – for financial service firms at least
– that the remaining regulatory requirements exert a strong influence
on the choice of entry arrangements ...” (HilaryIngham and Steve
Thompson,  respectively,  Senior  Lecturer,  School  of  Management,
Manchester  University  and  Professor,  School  of  Management  and
Finance, University of Nottingham, pp. 196, 197)
– Les surcapacités bancaires en France: “... Dans la période récente, la
création  de  nouveaux  guichets  a été  déterminée  par  des  motifs
d’accessibilité  et  des  motifs  stratégiques  plutôt  que  par  des  motifs
d’efficacité, l’augmentation des capacités en guichets ne s’étant pas
accompagnée d’une réelle augmentation de l’activité par guichet, mais
plutôt d’une réduction ... La dispersion des coûts bancaires s’explique
davantage par des différences d’efficience entre banques que par des
différences des caractéristiques des marchés sur lesquels les banques
opèrent. Enfin la part des crédits inefficients parce que trop risqués
a augmenté au cours des dernières années, expliquant le déplacement
de la frontière rendement – risque du portefeuille des crédits bancaires
vers  la  droite  ...  L’élimination  des  surcapacités  constitue  l’issue
principale permettant d’ajuster les capacités bancaires au niveau de
l’activité  ...”  (Michel Dietsch,  Professeur,  Centre  d’Etudes  des
Politiques Financières, Université de Strasbourg III, p. 92)
– Efficiency in Swiss Banking:  “Size  appears  to  be  both  a curse  and
a blessing. Large banks are more efficient but suffer from diseconomies
of scale. Scope on the other hand, seems to offer no cost advantage:
scope economies do not appear to exist and a diversified product mix
is  associated  with  higher  inefficiencies  ...  Efficiency  and  factor
productivity  have  increased  in  Swiss  banking,  a sign  of  effective
competition  ...  Stiffer  competition  should  place  added  pressure  on
banks to economize, causing a growing number of inefficient banks to
fail  ...”  (George Sheldon,  Deputy  Director,  Labour  and  Industrial
Economics Research Unit, Basle University, pp. 129, 130)
170– Idem in Spanish Banking: “... 1. In reaction to the intensely competitive
environment, (Spanish) banks have clearly improved global efficiency
at  the  firm  level  ...  2.  Size  is  a strategic  instrument  to  increase
efficiency to be only systematically useful, in what refers to the size of
the branch ... 3. The strategic benefits of specialization are difficult to
establish. Partial evidence shows that those activities most traditionally
related  to  banks  –  the  creation  of  means  of  payment  and  loan
production – enhance efficiency and profitability ... 4. The employment
of factors has been seriously conditioned by external regulation ... In
this respect the margin for differentiated strategies appears to be very
narrow ...
Under these circumstances, we tend to think that – in what refers to size
and specialization – the less externally identifiable components of the
strategies are the most relevant ones. Such components depend upon
the  intangible  assets  of  the  firm  related  to  experience  and
organizational  culture,  questions  about  which  microeconomics  has
very little to say.” (Francisco Pérez and Javier Quesada, Professors,
IVIE and Valencia University, pp. 146-147)
– Idem in Italian Banking: “... The reaction of the Italian banking system
was in a certain sense the best reply to the changing of regulatory and
structural conditions. The rapid expansion of loans allowed to reach
two essential objectives more rapidly: the re-balancing of assets, which
were excessively concentrated in public debt securities due to credit
ceilings previously in effect, and the diversification of the customer
base, which had been limited by constraints on geographic expansion ...
It appears the market re-adjustment process is on the verge of being
completed.  From  an  asset  perspective,  the  objectives  of  banks  are
changing:  once  banks  have  achieved  an  optimal  balance  between
securities and loans and a degree of customer diversification which is
deemed efficient, their attention shifts to profit objectives ... Banks are
accordingly being asked to modify their operations in order to satisfy
the new needs arising from the market. In introducing the universal
bank model and sanctioning the end of the separation between banks
and non financial firms Italy’s acknowledgement of the second EU
banking directive provides the banks with the possibility to operate in
a broad array of financial services ... This competitive strategy will in
turn have important repercussions on industrial structure. Indeed the
possibility  of  consolidating  or  even  increasing  market  share  will
undoubtedly  be  easier  for  the  very  large  banks  capable  of  fully
171exploiting the economies of scale and scope which are connected to
a diversified supply. As a result, the dichotomy between small and large
institutions  should  grow  stronger  ...”  (Pietro Modiano, Laura
E.Mollame and  Virna Valenti,  respectively  Chief  Economist,  and
Economists, Credito Italiano, Milan, pp. 221, 222)
– Idem in Austrian Banking: “... It seems that Austrian banks seem to
develop into ‘big banks in a small country’, i.e. go for home market
ownership as a necessary prerequisite for profitability improvement
and  conquering  surrounding  foreign  markets.  The  large  banks  are
trying to exploit these differences (in information and high cost of
information) by market segmentation and at the same time to reduce
risk  by  diversification  ...”  (Gerhard Fink,  Professor  Vienna
University;  Peter Haiss,  Secretariat  Bank  Austria  Lecturer,  Graz
University;  and  Reinhard Petschnigg,  Economist  and  Austrian
National Bank Lecturer, Vienna University, pp. 168-169)
– ’Bridge, Poker and Swedish Banking: “...This paper has pointed out the
importance of two concepts: liquidity and organizational stress ... The
higher the liquidity of an industry’s core product, the higher the risks
of  introducing  rapid  institutional  changes.  Organizational  stress  is
a consequence of uncertainty in a particular field, i.e. the higher the
uncertainty,  the  higher  the  stress  caused  by  the  actions  of  an
organization’s competitors. This stress is also likely to be stronger in
a field with a limited number of actors ... On a more practical level
(this)  demonstrates  the  need  to  be  careful  in  redesigning  systems.
Although the big leaps may appear more spectacular, signalling an
ability to act, it seems that a step-by-step procedure, a kind of muddling
through, would be a more appropriate way to proceed.” (Lars Engwall,
Professor of Business Administration, Uppsala University, p. 237)
– Not so in Estonia: “... Our measures for overcoming the banking crisis
have been well chosen. Firstly, we do not have so much free money as
in Finland and Sweden where the renovation of the banks has been
carried out with the financial assistance of the state. Secondly, all our
banks had taken too great risks and if the state had helped some of
them, the others would have followed the former more risky policy ...
Thirdly, the banks should fight against risks and crime by themselves
and  not  only  hope  that  police  would  defend  them...”  (Mart Sörg,
Professor of Money and Banking, Tartu University, p. 182)
172– Competition among Financial Centres in Europe; a beauty contest
  London: “... The evidence ... suggests that London has maintained its
position as one of the world’s leading international financial centres,
despite the increase in competition in recent years ... The arrival of the
European Single Market does not appear so far to have had a dramatic
impact on competition between financial centres. However, it seems
fair to assume that in the longer-term its impact will still be important.
It is likely to increase competition between both intermediaries and
financial  centres  in  Europe:  in  doing  so,  it  will  increase  the
competitiveness of European financial centres, in relation not only to
each other but also to the rest of the world ...” (David G. Raikes and
Andrew Newton, respectively, with European Division, and Financial
Markets and Institutions Division, Bank of England, p. 333)
  Finanzplatz Deutschland: “Innovations and structural change within
‘Finanzplatz  Deutschland’ are  therefore  leading  to  a gradualist
approach borne by the strongest market participants ... Now that the
Federal  Government  has  explicitly  proclaimed  the  promotion  of
‘Finanzplatz  Deutschland’ as  a political  objective,  the  Bundesbank
may, and indeed must, support that objective. This is a new task ... and
one to which classically trained central bankers in Germany have not
been accustomed. If, however, the two aims should clash with one
another, the safeguarding of the currency clearly has priority for the
Bundesbank over promoting Germany as a financial centre ...” (Gerd
Häusler,  Member  of  the  Board,  Deutsche  Bundesbank,  Frankfurt,
pp. 254-255)
  Preserving Switzerland’s charm:  “...  Preserving  Switzerland’s
attractiveness in the international market segment and its role as an
international financial sector in principle requires more caution with
respect  to  international  reactions  than  the  preservation  of
competitiveness in domestic markets. Regulatory competition (partly
‘competition in laxity, partly ‘competition in stringency’) is possible
and  should  be  encouraged  ...  (On  the  other  hand)  for  bankers  in
Switzerland the goal is to increase the efficiency and quality of the
services provided in order to be able to benefit from a well engineered
regulatory  environment  in  difficult  times...”  (Niklaus Blattner,
Economic Adviser, Swiss Bankers Association and Associate Professor
of Economics and Director LIU, Basle University, pp. 344, 348-349)
173  Ireland (of course): “...The small size of the economy implied that
Dublin was never going to rank among the major financial centres in
the world. Nevertheless, like a number of other small financial centres,
the International Financial Services Centre has developed a number of
niche specialties – banking, corporate treasury, insurance and mutual
funds – on the basis of a good infrastructure, available skilled labour,
low costs, favourable tax incentives and an independent supervisory
regime...”  (Thomas O’Connell and  Neil Kennedy,  Advisors,
Economic  Affairs  and  Financial  Sector  Department  respectively,
Central Bank of Ireland, Dublin, p. 283)
– Some evidence and conclusions on financial fragility and breakdowns
“... What can safely be concluded from recent experience in the case-study
countries (UK and Scandinavia) is that big shocks to banking systems (such
as sharp changes in regulation) almost inevitably produce unstable reactions.
However, it cannot be concluded that the aftermaths of such shocks (the
transitional effect of the system moving between two different steady-state
market environments) indicate the characteristics of the new de-regulated
environment  itself  once  the  adjustment  has  been  made,  and  the  lessons
learned. It is hazardous to make generalisations about the characteristics of
a new steady-state environment from the experience of moving to it from
a different regime. Nevertheless, the de-regulated banking environment may
have made banking potentially more fragile. The erosion of economic rents
induced  by  previous  regulation  is  likely  to  have  made  banking  a more
vulnerable industry than in the past. Secondly, it is possible that the capacity
created during the period of regulation was excessive and not sustainable in
a more competitive and de-regulated environment...” (Harald A. Benink and
David T. Llewellyn, respectively Assistant Professor of Finance, Limburg
University, and Professor of Money and Banking, Loughborough University,
pp. 461-462)
“...  The  impression  is  that  the  Nordic  governments  have  considered  the
financial strength and future stability of their banking industries to be at least
as important as the efficient operation of banking production. Deregulation
was  a forceful  push  for  increased  efficiency  but  banking  policies  after
deregulation have to a substantial degree worked to contain the competitive
pressures released. This has been apparent in the governments’ attitude to
large bank mergers, foreign entry, and national ownership of large banks. The
efforts to remove excess banking capacity may also be seen as a way to
improve on the stability of the banking industry...” (Sigbjørn Atle Berg,
Head of Financial Research, Norges Bank, Oslo, p. 491)
174“... Our ability to deal cost effectively with the problems of bank stability is
not high. Lender of last resort and deposit insurance facilities appear to be
inadequately focused and mispriced and the lack of an international lender of
last  resort  is  highlighted.  In  particular,  the  exposures  of  small  countries,
headquartering large banks with significant foreign currency deposits, require
attention  ...  Consideration  should  be  given  to  the  concept  of  two-tiered
deposit insurance with the first tranche provided by private markets and the
remainder provided by a consortium of central banks ...” (Philip Bourke,
Professor, Graduate School of Business, Department of Banking and Finance
University College, Dublin, pp. 415-416)
“... Although the five crises – i.e. the Penn Central bankruptcy (1970), the
crisis in the Floating-Rate Notes (FRN, 1986), the failure of the Junk Bond
Market (1989) the Swedish Finance Company and Commercial Paper crisis,
(1990), the collapse of the Ecu Bond Market (1992) – differ in important
respects  –  there  are  sufficient  parallels  tentatively  to  justify  their  being
described as a common syndrome. In particular, the collapses tended to occur
in  markets  for  instruments  that  were  themselves  financial  innovations
(whether in terms of instrument or currency), whose properties in periods of
stress had not yet been evaluated. Institutional investors rather than retail
clients tended to be the main investors in the markets ... The crisis tended to
follow a bull market in the instrument, which entailed heavy issuance in the
primary  market,  declines  in  yields  and  yield  spreads  relative  to  other
securities,  rising  trade  volumes  and  narrowing  secondary  market  bid-ask
spreads  (as  ‘liquidity  trading’ increased)  ...  These  patterns  indicate
a collective self-deluding failure on the part of market participants to attach
more than a low probability to a crisis of the type that emerged. A ‘shock’ to
such confidence ... led in each case to a major re-evaluation of the securities’
value. The consequence was heightened uncertainty (both for investors and
market makers), an increase in selling, withdrawal of market makers and
widening of spreads. In each case they culminated in a collapse of liquidity
and of market prices that made primary issuance virtually impossible... and
which persisted for some time except for the Penn Central crisis, where the
authorities intervened ... Finally, the instability shown poses a general issue
whether it is appropriate to rely heavily on securities markets to provide
finance – is it a cause for concern if owing to this, banks, which should in
principle  have  a comparative  advantage  in  overcoming  asymmetric
information between borrower and lender as well as being able to maintain
credit lines during market crises, are forced to withdraw from lending to some
sectors?”  (E. Philip Davis,  with  Bank  of  England,  but  seconded  to  the
European Monetary Institute, Frankfurt, pp. 393-394, 395, 400)
175“... Plus un système de paiements est vulnérable aux risques de crédit et de
liquidité, plus les conditions d’accès doivent être restreintes. En ce sens, le
principe de séparation des responsabilités contenu dans la deuxième directive
bancaire aggrave sensiblement les niveaux de risque dans les systèmes de
paiement européens... C’est  un  enjeu  auquel  les  banques  centrales  de  la
Communauté se devaient de réagir. Les principes structurants doivent éviter
les  détournements  de  trafic  par  les  banques  qui  arbitrent  entre  les
réglementations différentes. Cet arbitrage affaiblit la sécurité ders systèmes
de  paiements.  Les  principaux  problèmes  à traiter  pour  éliminer  cet  effet
pervers de la concurrence bancaire sont: les conditions d’accès, l’organisation
du règlement, les méthodes de réduction des risques ...” (Michel Aglietta,
Professor  at  the  University  of  Paris  X and  Adviser,  Centre  d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, p. 437)
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– Volatility: Anything New?
“... Volatility is here to stay ... Volatility was not invented by central banks nor
was it a market reaction to the creation of the species called central banker.
As the story of the seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine
in the Old Testament shows, volatile earning streams were an issue long
before  today’s money  was  known,  let  alone  central  banks  ...”  (Markus
Lusser, Chairman of the Swiss National Bank, in his opening address, p. 3)
“... Being a natural contrarian, I shall argue that (the) perception of worsening
risk, though fashionable, has been much exaggerated. Volatility is notsecularly
increasing; the recent globalisation is not only desirable, but takes us back
towards the condition that had already been obtained at the start of this century;
the monetary authorities have not lost control over monetary policy; and the
emergence of derivatives has not made the financial system riskier ... It would
not surprise me if, by the year 2010, we looked back at the decades of the
1980sand 1990sas being one of general stability and relatively little structural
change ... Many of the problems and disturbances that we face today are neither
new, nor by the most objective standard particularly virulent ...” (Charles
Goodhart, Norman Sosnow Professor of Banking and Finance at the London
School of Economics, pp. 41, 45)
177“... Research at the BIS suggests that in a number of markets recent asset price
volatility is not much different from what we observed in the 1970s to mid-
1980s. What may have changed, however, is what might be called ‘outlier
volatility’i.e. the degree and frequency of sudden large price adjustments that
go beyond what could be expected on the basis of conventionally calculated
statistical  distributions.  The  equity  market  crash  in  1987,  the  European
exchange market crisis of 1992, the long-term bond price slide in the spring
of 1994 and the Mexican Peso crisis in December last year were all outlier
events, difficult to anticipate.
Although average volatility may not have risen, the chances for large short-
term but potentially disruptive price movements may indeed have increased
...” (Andrew Crockett, General Manager of the BIS, p. 17)
“... Price volatility on financial and exchange markets is steered by capital
movements and portfolio arbitrage, based on market expectations. Central
banks always run the risk of being taken by surprise. They should be forgiven
if  volatility  reflects  unforeseeable  events.  At  least  they  should  try  to
understand the genesis of expectations ... Exchange rates, in particular, are
shaped by capital movements more than by international trade. Therefore
trade  and  activity  are  influenced  by  exchange  rate  volatility. Volatility  is
triggered  by  spontaneous  changes  in  expectations,  while  globalisation
facilitates transmission of external shocks. Such volatility has entailed not
only day-to-day or intraday fluctuations, but also medium-term deviations
from levels consistent with fundamentals ...” (Robert Raymond, Director
General  of  the  European  Monetary  Institute,  Frankfurt,  in  his  Marjolin
Lecture, pp. 362-363)
– Analysing, measuring and evaluating volatility and risk, not always in the
same way...
“...Financial risk refers to the possibility of gain and loss to net worth due to
unexpected  price  changes  ...  The  main  point  of  making  the  distinction
between volatility and risk is that the former implies the latter only to the
extent that it is unexpected ... Generally, financial asset prices tend to move
in an unpredictable fashion in more or less efficient markets so that volatility
generally implies risk.
Amongst  the  most  important  factors  which  cause  financial  volatility  are:
institutional change ..., deregulation of financial institutions and markets ...,
financial  innovations  in  products,  services  and  markets  ...,  technological
development ... and globalisation of international financial markets.
178Some countries seem to be inherently more volatile than others ... Using an
equally weighted average of the variables included in a study for the period
January 1973 – December 1994, the overall rankings in terms of country
volatilities are (from highest to lowest): Britain (especially in interest and
exchange rate volatility), Italy (particularly in industrial production and in the
stock  market),  Japan,  Germany,  France  and  the  United  States  ...”  (Colm
Kearney, Professor at the University of Western Sydney, pp. 89, 90, 104)
“...  Interest  and  exchange  risk  have  become  larger  at  the  same  time  as
intermediation  margins  in  traditional  banking  have  been  eroded  and  the
ability of financial institutions to rely on oligopoly rents to withstand shocks
has been reduced. The erosion of oligopoly rents has also reduced the ability
of financial institutions to rebuild equity after bad times without going to the
market, thereby enhancing their vulnerability to successive negative shocks ...
These considerations suggest that the bank failures and banking crises of the
past decade are essentially the result of the lack of risk matching between the
assets and liabilities of traditional depository institutions ... A major question
for the future of the financial system is whether the risk allocation in banking
and  finance  can  be  improved  before  banking  crises  become  altogether
unmanageable... An alternative assessment of the developments that have
reduced safety in banking and finance would put more weight on the role of
deregulation,  innovation,  and  the  recklessness  of  financial  institutions  ...
I consider this assessment to be mistaken and harmful. It exaggerates the
power  of  prudential  regulation  and  supervision.  It  fails  to  recognize  the
fundamental unsoundness of traditional banking in a risky and increasingly
competitive environment. Finally it detracts from the potentially beneficial
role of ‘new’ instruments in actually reducing the overall risk exposure of
financial institutions...” (Martin F. Hellwig, Professor of Economics at the
University  of  Basle  and  Taussig  Research  Professor  of  Economics  for
1995/1996 at Harvard University, pp. 27-28, 29-30)
“... In the bond market turbulence of 1994 we find more evidence of the bond
market’s own dynamics at work than of measurable uncertainty regarding
fundamental macroeconomic and financial factors. Let us compare the 1994
bond market decline with the 1987 stock market crash ... In terms of the
market dynamics which we have emphasised, both incidents reinforce the
connection between bear markets and high volatility. Both incidents saw an
intensification of spillovers and a broadening of their geographical scope. But
the importance of foreign disinvestments distinguishes the 1994 bond market
decline from the 1987 crash, and this may make it more modern. Similarly,
foreign investors’ extensive use of leverage sets the 1994 episode apart from
179the crash of 1987, when leverage remained a domestic phenomenon. The role
of fundamentals in the two cases remains problematic ... There is just a little
weight to be given to the view that increased uncertainty regarding monetary
policy  drove  up  bond  volatility...”  (Claudio E.V. Borio and  Robert N.
McCauley,  respectively  Head  of  Section  in  the  Monetary  and  Economic
Department, and Economist at the BIS, pp. 82-83)
“... The events outlined above (i.e. equity markets in 1987, ERM crisis of
1992-1993,  bond  markets  in  1994,  Mexican  crisis  of  1994-1995)  have
a number of common features, consideration of which enable similar patterns
in the future to be more easily detected, to offer clues about the appropriate
response of the authorities. These (features) included: heavy involvement of
institutional investors in both buying and selling waves; bank lending played
a rather subordinate role; international investment; signs of overreaction to
the  fundamentals  and  excessive  optimism  prior  to  the  crisis;  at  times,
inappropriate monetary policies; a shock to confidence which precipitated the
crisis, albeit not necessarily sufficient in itself to explain the scale of the
reaction; rapid and wholesale shifts between markets, often facilitated by
financial innovations ...” (E. Philip Davis, on secondment to the European
Monetary Institute from the Bank of England, p. 152)
– How to cope with financial risk? Market discipline, private risk
management or publicintervention?
“...  The  mere  existence  of  asymmetric  information  doesn’t justify  new
regulations.  It  is  a pure  act  of  faith  to  believe  that  the  consequences  of
volatility, unpleasant as they may be at times, could be efficiently prevented
by new regulation ... What is needed is a strengthening of market discipline
and  personal  responsibility  ...  Sensible  self-regulation  helps  to  assure  the
underlying integrity of the market. Furthermore, if market forces rather than
regulation  are  to  provide  the  basic  control  mechanism  for  risk-taking
activities, the market must be able to assess the risks incurred by firms. This
is  the  reason  why  disclosure  is  so  important.  Disclosure  is  the  basis  for
well-informed investment decisions...” (Markus Lusser, op. cit., pp. 8, 10)
“...Diversification and hedging opportunities have greatly increased in recent
years,  with  improvements  in  financial  technology,  the  growth  of  new
instruments  and  financial  markets.  Both  are  useful  in  confronting
diversifiable Knightian risk (i.e. an uncertain event in which the distribution
of  possible  outcomes  is  known  or  can  be  approximated  by  the  study  of
previous random outcomes). But ... both are subject to practical limitations.
At times some hedges may fail to work as anticipations and diversification
180opportunities  may  decline  if  prices  in  different  markets  begin  to  move
similarly  during  stress  periods.  Moreover,  all  risk  cannot  be  hedged  or
diversified  away.  Equity  capital  should  be  sufficient  to  absorb  non-
diversifiable risks – shocks to a financial institution which cannot be easily
hedged or hedged at all. From the experience of the last ten years I would
argue that a number of institutions seriously overestimated their ability to
hedge and diversify market and credit risk.”
“...Clearly this (the need for protection against undiversifiable risk) requires
a prudential  capital  cushion.  The  question  is,  how  much?  There  is  no
scientific  answer  to  the  question. All  that  can  be  said  is  (that)  systemic
protection requires both a strong capital cushion on the part of individual
institutions  and  the  availability  of  official  support  in  the  event  of  truly
unforeseen  shocks  of  major  proportions  ...  This  presents  a fundamental
dilemma for financial authorities. An excessive or poorly structured safety net
for the financial system may have the effect of insulating intermediaries from
desired  market  discipline  and  create  a perverse  incentive  structure  by
potentially encouraging risk taking. This can only be offset by increasing the
market discipline of financial institutions. And market discipline can only
result  from  improvements  in  information  and  incentives.  Greater
transparency of the activities and risk exposures of financial intermediation
along with the incentives to monitor them, are a necessary ingredient for the
fundamental health of the financial industry ...”(Andrew Crockett, General
Manager of the BIS, pp. 20-21)
“... Practitioners and regulators need to stop thinking about risk in terms of credit
risk and market risk with no correlation between the two. They should add
refinancing risks to the list. Even more important, they should take account of
correlations  between  the  different  classes  of  risks  ...  To  the  extent  that
counterparty credit risks are difficult to assess, prudential supervision should
begin to think in terms of the overall system rather than the individual institution.
To assess system risk exposure, supervisors will have to make asubstantial effort
at coordinating reporting of interbank positions ... across financial sub-sectors
and across countries. Achieving transparency through such coordination may
actually  be  more  important  than  some  of  the  other  efforts  at  regulatory
coordination that are going on ...” (Martin Hellwig, op. cit., pp. 36-37)
“... However good a bank’s internal control system may be, serious losses can
still be made. Once capital is impaired, the danger of loss, perhaps from the
conscious assumption of a riskier strategy of management, loss to depositors,
deposit insurance or taxpayers, increases. Thus, in addition to provide an
181outside  overview,  almost  a form  of  consultancy,  on  banks’ internal  risk
control models and methods, the supervisors will want to impose increasing
constraints  on  bank  activities  pari-passu  with  a worsening  decline  in  its
capital, with a view to closure, or enforced take-over, before its capital is
exhausted ...” (Charles Goodhart, op. cit., pp. 55-56)
“... In many respects we believe that many of the institutional features of bank
regulation should remain in their present form. In particular, bank regulation
and the ‘safety net’ should remain in the hands of the central bank or of an
institution closely associated with it ... With respect to the new supervisory
frameworks developed in recent years – the (1988) Basle Capital Accord,
(etc.) – it is possible to draw several tentative conclusions from the discussion
in this paper: 1. It is necessary to subject the present system of capital ratios
to a period of stress in order to appreciate whether the capital requirements
have indeed been able to safeguard the financial system ... 2. Risk-sensitive
capital  requirements  are  potentially  useful  tools  in  the  arsenal  of  bank
regulators. However, practical measurement appears fraught with problems ...
3. The incremental complication which accompanies each revision of the
guidelines ... is likely to be a never ending process...” (Julian S. Alworth and
Sudipto Bhattacharya,  respectively,  associated  with  Mediolanum
Consulenza,Visiting Professor at Università Luigi Bocconi, Milano; Professor
of Finance at the London School of Economics, pp. 316-317)
– Organising risk management in the private sector
“... Today’s trading organisations are typically organised around three major
classes of market risk; namely foreign exchange, interest rates, and equities ...
Whereas in the past an organisation may have been subdivided into treasury
services, cash securities, futures and options, today the preference lies in
organising  the  business  along  risk  sub-categories  (e.g.  a currency  pair  or
a particular  equity  market).  Synergies  can  be  achieved  by  managing
derivatives together with their underlying instruments. In the past many banks
were organised regionally, today a specific market risk is preferably managed
centrally in one global book ... Furthermore, in the past, settlement, middle
and back office functions were often allocated to the trading areas, whereas
today the concept of segregation of duties requires separate management.
This development in internal organisation structures reflects the development
in the financial markets...” (Robert S. Gumerlock, Head of Operations and
Control at SBC Warburg, a Division of Swiss Bank Corporation, p. 161)
“... It is a major challenge to embed financial technology in the continuously
changing  organisational  structure  of  a multinational  (industrial)  company
182(Philips) ... The risks pertaining to the use of financial instruments are limited
by defining the ‘internal bank’ as the sole interface to the external financial
institutions and by imposing limits. The use of statistical analyses indicating
‘normal variation’ in currency movements is a powerful tool for increasing
knowledge  about  risk.  By  adopting  the  use  of  multi-currency  confidence
intervals  for  a portfolio,  the  business  risks  can  be  made  visible  and
cost-effective policies for protecting margins can be implemented ...” (Arjen
E. Ronner and  Dirk A.M. Trappeniers,  respectively,  Director  of  the
Insurance and Risk Management Department of Philips Finance, Professor of
Financial  Econometrics  at  the  Free  University  of  Amsterdam;  Financial
Consultant at Philips Finance, pp. 180-181)
“... However valuable computer simulations are for testing the sensitivities of
net interest income to movements in interest rates, they should be used in
conjunction with other methods and techniques that a bank has at its disposal
for risk exposure management. It should be clear by now that measuring
interest rate risk in retail banking is very difficult, despite its importance for
earnings growth and stability ...” (Mervyn K. Lewis and Phillip Morton,
respectively,  Midland  Bank  Professor  of  Money  and  Banking  at  the
University of Nottingham, Visiting Professor in Economics at the Flinders
University of South Australia; Manager, Product Development, Lloyds Bank
(BLSA), Montevideo, Uruguay, p. 248)
– Impact of volatility and financial risk on monetary and exchange policy...
“... I start from the presumption that there is no current serious threat to the
Central Bank’s traditional ability to direct monetary policy via its command
over short-term interest rates, whether from private financial dynamics or
otherwise.  Where,  instead,  structural  changes  have  caused  problems  for
monetary control relates to the questions of how to decide on which interest
rates to focus and how to monitor the effect of such interest changes, and
through what transmission routes, on the economy ... When the Central Bank
now raises the general level of short term interest rates, it can no longer be
confident of the effect on certain key interest rate differentials (as it could in
the past because the imposed stickiness of competing bank/housing finance
deposit rates). There is less, quasi-automatic rationing effect. In order to have
the same overall impact on the economy the (relative) price effect of interest
changes has to be greater ...
As the example from the 1980s suggests, there is no evidence, known to me,
that recent market developments, e.g. the still increasing size of the foreign
exchange (forex) market, the growth of derivative markets etc. have led to
183any  worsening in  the  proclivity  of  the  forex  market  to  behave  in  a way
difficult  to  explain  in  terms  of  fundamentals.  Indeed,  compared  to  the
1970s and 1980s, the forex market in the 1990s has, perhaps, been more
responsive to fundamentals (and that includes the recent debacle of the ERM
in Europe).” (Charles Goodhart, op. cit., p. 49, 51)
“A number of countries, including the UK, have reacted to the difficulty in
predicting the velocity of money, particularly when faced by liberalisation, by
abandoning intermediate monetary targets in favour of final target (ranges)
for price inflation. Nevertheless the UK has maintained monitoring ranges for
both narrow and broad monetary aggregates. In face of high capital inflows
Poland has widened its exchange rate band. Russia, in contrast, where the
currency  has  been  appreciating,  has  recently  introduced  a short-term
exchange rate target range to operate alongside a central bank credit ceiling
under the IMF programme ... It would be unwise for either Russia or Poland
to base monetary policy on monetary targets to be adhered too rigidly and
unthinkingly. Better would be to identify monitoring ranges: a shift of either
broad  or  narrow  money  growth  outside  the  monitoring  range  should  be
regarded as prima facie evidence that domestic monetary objectives were
unlikely to be met and that corrective action would be needed unless other
evidence indicated that the monetary aggregates were giving a misleading
signal  ...”  (Bill Allen, Glenn Hoggarth,  and  Lionel Price,  respectively,
Deputy Director, Monetary Analysis at the Bank of England; Advisor on
Monetary Policy at the Bank’s Centre for Central Banking Studies and also
IMF external Advisor on money operations and policy in Eastern and Central
Europe  and  Asia;  Director  of  the  Centre  of  Central  Banking  Studies,
pp. 353-354)
“... The sterilization of intervention by all EMS countries and not just by
Germany  is  in  part  responsible  for  the  collapse  of  the  exchange  rate
mechanism  of  the  EMS.  Sterilized  intervention  signals  a non-credible
commitment to long-run exchange rate stability. Foreign exchange markets
understood this signal perfectly well and hence have launched a speculative
attack ... Ultimately the collapse of the EMS was caused by the fact that
neither the Bundesbank nor the central banks in the remaining EMS countries
were prepared to give up some monetary autonomy for the sake of exchange
stability. In my view the key to future successful exchange rate targeting lies
alone in international policy coordination, which needs to be re-enforced in
the EMS. Economic and Monetary Union differs from the old EMS primarily
in the degree to which monetary policy is coordinated and subject to joint
decision making... Exchange rate stability must be viewed as the outcome of
184a process of policy coordination and convergence in Europe, and not vice
versa ...” (Axel A. Weber, Professor for Economic Theory at the University
of Bonn, in his Marjolin Prize-winning contribution, pp. 277-279)
“...  The  main  effect  of  financial  globalisation  was  to  accelerate  the
transmission of shocks from one currency to another. No country is sheltered
from such external shocks ... Although it is not possible to prevent such
shocks, a cooperative solution may be preferred to disorderly conditions, at
least to minimise their impact. Preventing shocks or reacting properly to them
within  the  framework  of  a loose  cooperation  mainly  based  on  national
goodwill can only be a global strategy. Cooperation could, in theory, be more
justified  and  more  easily  applied  at  a regional  level,  when  the  mutual
openness of the economies involved would make any deviation of exchange
rates vis-à-vis some measure – which can be approximate – of the purchasing
power  parity  very  harmful  ...  If  the  target  can  easily  be  determined,
difficulties lie in the transition. This is what it is all about today, on the basis
of the Maastricht Treaty ... The challenge is to find the optimal path between
some flexibility which would be compatible with the variety of individual
situations and a smoothly organised transition ...” (Robert Raymond, op cit.,
pp. 367-369)
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– Setting the stage...
– An introductory ‘semanticexerc ise’
“...  The  concept  ‘Governance’ is  related  to  words  like  influence,  power,
ruling, leading, guiding, directing and inspiring. The concept of ‘Governance’
refers to ways of organizing business, the formation and management of joint
stock companies, company law provisions on capital, regulation by laws and
statutes of manager/shareholder relations, procedures for the appointment of
supervisory boards, definition of the respective responsibilities of managers,
board members, auditors etc.
...  The  concept  ‘stakeholder’ is  broader  than  the  concept  ‘owner’ or
‘shareholder’. Employees, trade unions, suppliers, tax authorities and other
public authorities can be important stakeholders, but they will not normally
be shareholders ... Most stakeholders want to play a role in the ‘Governance’
structure – they want to influence corporate decision making in accordance
with their own interests, and some of the stakeholders who are not owners do
have the power to exert a certain influence ... But in most cases, it is through
ownership  that  people  and  institutions  acquire  influence  over  business
management. Managers are hired by boards of directors, which in turn are
187elected in stockholder meetings, where the owners can exercise their voting
power.
... It is not an exaggeration to say that the decisions of managers of companies
and banks strongly affect the corporate and financial landscape of Europe ...
The institutional structures and the governance systems vary from country to
country and they vary through time. There are, however, clear signs of system
convergence. In Western Europe, the implementation of the Single Market
and international financial integration stimulate the convergence process. The
impact of international competition and integration is also felt in Central and
Eastern Europe, and financial regulatory systems in that region seem to be
gradually adapted to the principles reflected in EU directives ... There are
several similarities and common features. In all parts of Europe we can find
countries which are moving towards governance systems in which financial
markets can be expected to play a stronger disciplining role on corporate
managers. And in all parts of Europe, we can observe cases of privatisation,
in  which  it  is  a main  goal  for  efficiency  reasons  to  expose  managers  to
tougher  monitoring  from  different  categories  of  private  investors,  whose
interest in corporate performance lies in the fact that they will suffer losses, if
companies are mismanaged ...
... It seems to me that irrespective of Corporate Governance systems, it is
essential that there are stakeholders who are seriously involved in company
affairs ... In Corporate Governance stakeholder indifference is understandable
but deplorable, stakeholder politeness is all right but secondary, stakeholder
involvement, however, is crucial ...” (Morten Balling, Rector, Aarhus School
of Business, Aarhus, Denmark, in his keynote speech, pp. xi, xii, xxv, xxvi)
– Insider and outsider systems of Corporate Governance...
“Corporate governance has been traditionally associated with aprincipal-agent
relationship problem. Investors (the principals) employ managers (the agents)
to run firms on their behalf. The interests and objectives of investors and
managers differ. Corporate governance is concerned with ways of bringing the
interests of the two parties into line and ensuring that firms are run for the
benefit  of  investors.  For  example,  Demb  and  Neubauer  (1992)  state  that
‘corporate governance’is a question of performance accountability ...
... Ownership in most countries is in the hands of either other corporations or
individual investors. Cross-ownership of shares by one firm in another is
commonplace  and  large  family  holdings  frequently  dominate  institutional
investments.  This  gives  rise  to  a system  of  ownership  which  has  been
188described as an ‘insider system’ (Franks and Mayer, 1994) to distinguish it
from the ‘outsider system’of the UK and the US where ownership and control
rests with the outside, usually institutional investors ...
... Ownership and the structure of boards affect the way in which companies
are managed and controlled ... Firstly, the flow of information may differ.
Closer relations between investors in companies on continental Europe and in
Japan  may  encourage  better  informed  investors.  Secondly,  investors  in
different countries may have different incentives to intervene ... Where there
are large dominant shareholders, the returns to active governance are greater.
Thirdly, markets for corporate control, in particular hostile takeovers are less
active in most countries than in the UK and US. The market for corporate
control is regarded as an important discipline on the behaviour of firms ...”
(Colin Mayer,  Professor  of  Management  Studies  and  Deputy  Director
(Academic)  of  the  School  of  Management  Studies  at  the  University  of
Oxford, pp. 237, 238-239)
– The Large Shareholder (LSH) as stakeholder in Corporate Governance (CG)
“... Two dimensions are relevant to assess the pros and cons of the presence of
a large shareholder: (1) the degree of collusion between the LSH and the
management; and (2) the context in which the LSH operates, whether or not the
market for corporate control is efficient ... A LSH – insider in an environment
that does not allow for takeovers – and therefore for the correction of adverse
selection problems – could be harmful in the absence of adequate outside
shareholders who act as watchdogs. On the contrary, when LSH do not collude
with management, they may effectively limit managers’ moral hazards, both
because they foster market discipline and, when markets are particularly under-
developed, they may monitor the management directly. In conclusion, two
points may be remembered: 1. It is widely held that the presence of LSH is
particularly  beneficial  in  financial  systems  that  are  not  fully  developed  ...
However, a role for LSHs is present also in countries with efficient financial
markets: where ownership dispersion creates a free-rider problem, a LSH can
facilitate a takeover, thus strengthening market discipline. 2. It is important to
study the incentives that the LSH has to monitor. The size of his stake is an
important variable, but other elements should be considered. For example, the
activity of the LSH: (whether it is a bank, a mutual fund, or a private non-
financial investor) and therefore the other business relations that it may entertain
with the firm ...” (Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Battaglini, respectively,
Professor  of  Economics  at  Bocconi  University  Milano,  Co-Director  of
CEPR’s International Macroeconomics Programme and Research Associate of
the NBER; Ph.D. candidate at Northwestern University, pp. 170-171)
189– The Banks as stakeholders in Corporate Governance (CG)
“... Debt finance acts as a discipline device. This reflects the important role of
banks and other financial institutions in financing the business sector. It is
often the case that banks, because of close relationship with companies, may
be better informed than other providers of capital. Obviously, it is in their own
interest that banks signal financial and economic crises at an early stage and
in response, enforce harsh restructuring plans in the firm. If management does
not comply with their demands, banks can credibly threaten to withdraw their
loans and to shut out the credit channel. The credibility depends to a large
extent  on  the  priority  of  debt  finance... Without  priority  of  debt  finance,
restructuring plans would not be carried out as soon as possible, which forces
other providers of capital to demand higher rates of return. In this sense debt
finance is complementary, since it allows the company to attract other sources
of capital from financial markets at reasonable costs ...” (Wilko Bolt and
Marga Peeters, Economists at the Econometric Research and Special Studies
Department of De Nederlandsche Bank, p. 94)
“... Should we trust banks when they sit on the board of directors? The answer
is not unambiguous. The type and degree of a bank’s monitoring activity is
deeply influenced by its lending activity. A bank tends to protect its credits
and thus to minimize the probability of default; a lender derives no benefits
from extra profits since its payoff is limited in good states of nature. This is
not to say bank monitoring cannot be useful. In a mature industry, say the
steel industry, a bank could do a very good job, and the side effects would be
limited  since  extra  profits  are  in  any  case  very  small.  But  many
entrepreneurial  activities  will  not  take  off-for  example  when  new
technologies are at stake – if financiers are not ready to take risks. In such
cases  an  efficient  market  for  corporate  control  is  the  best  mechanism  to
allocate  resources  ...  A too  close  firm-bank  relationship  hinders  the
development of such a market because the bank may use its lending power to
entrench its control. This is the reason for keeping a wary eye on ‘banks on
the board of directors’ ...” (F. Giavazzi and M. Battaglini, op. cit., p. 192)
“... The role of banks and other financial institutions in the Italian corporate
governance system has been traditionally very limited ... Family and coalition
devices of corporate control both reduced corporate transparency and, most
likely, demanded more confidential services than banks were able to provide
...  The  only  exceptions  were  Mediobanca  and  local  banks:  the  former
specialized in preserving family and coalition control ... Local banks, thanks
to the fiduciary networks in local communities, appear to have fostered the
development of small firms which benefit to a large extent from flexible local
190labour markets. For many years after the war, probably until the early 1960s,
weak  bank/firm  relations  did  not  prevent  fast  growth,  which  was  indeed
warranted by the working of the other corporate governance institutions ...
When the self-sustained growth of the reconstruction came to an end, fast
rising wages squeezed corporate profits and Enti pubblici were burdened with
the constraints to achieve social goals, then the existing corporate governance
became  inadequate  and  the  negative  consequences  of  weak  bank/firm
relations came to the fore. Today, consensus has grown on the need for the
Italian system of corporate control to undergo a revision; together with the
privatisation of State-owned companies ... pressure is growing for the banking
system to change too ... This note suggests that the new setting should likely
preserve the distinctive features of the existing two-tier banking system that
the Italian economy carved out of its experience and needs ...” (Fabrizio
Barca, Giovanni Ferri and Nicola Pesaresi, respectively, Division Chief at
the  Research  Department  of  the  Bank  of  Italy;  Head  of  the  Credit
Intermediaries  Office  of  the  Bank;  National  expert  to  the  European
Commission  (Directorate  General  IV –  Competition),  seconded  from  the
Bank of Italy, pp. 36-37)
– CG in Japan
“...  Among  large  shareholders,  banks,  particularly  main  banks,  have  an
important  governance  role.  Some  evidence  suggests  that  the  financial
institutions’ role is more productive than inter-corporate ownership ...
It is not yet clear which of a number of competing hypotheses explain the
banking crisis. At least three possibilities exist: (i) The main bank system
never did provide monitoring and control of borrowers but it took the ‘bubble
years’ to reveal how easily the system had allowed bad management and
decisions ... (ii) The system of main bank and large shareholder monitoring
functioned  well  in  the  past  but  broke  down  as  the  result  of  increased
competition  and  deregulation  ...  Banks  and  shareholders  reduced  their
monitoring in this period ... (iii) The governance structure has not changed
significantly. The crisis is the result of ex ante reasonable decisions being
confounded by ex post results ...” (JennyCorbett , Research Associate of the
Center on Japanese Economy and Business at Columbia University, New
York, p. 131-132)
– Institutional Investors as stakeholders in CG
“...  The  growth  of  the  institutional  sector  (pension  funds,  insurance
companies,  investment  companies)  has  been  the  driving  force  behind
structural  changes  in  both  the  process  of  corporate  governance  and  the
191structure  and  modus  operandi  of  OECD  capital  markets  ...  Institutional
investors have been growing in size dramatically over the past two decades
or so ...
The expansion of the institutional sector has had a growing influence on
finance  governance  channels.  First,  institutional  investors  have  enhanced
their corporate governance role in the form of an increase in market control
via equity and debt. Second, an increase of direct control via equity in the
form of an increase in shareholder activism by institutional investors has been
an important characteristic of the change in corporate governance in the past
decade. Third, direct control via debt is an important mechanism of corporate
control in Continental Europe and Japan, although the corporate governance
role of institutional investors is far from uniform in these countries ... It can
be expected that the determinants of the growth of the institutional sector
(financial  deregulation,  liberalization  of  the  investment  activities  of  the
institutional sector, an aging of the population, privatization of social security,
the growth of the money management industry) will continue to affect both
the  structure  and  modus  operandi  of  financial  markets  and  corporate
governance  ...”  (Hans J. Blommestein,  Senior  Financial  Economist  at
OECD, Paris, pp. 41, 42, 67)
“...  Given  the  size  of  their  shareholdings  the  power  of  the  institutional
investors  cannot  be  doubted.  In  his  seminal  work,  Hirschman  (1970)
identified  the  exercise  of  institutional  power  within  an  ‘exit  and  voice’
framework,  arguing  that  ‘dissatisfaction  (may  be  expressed)  directly  to
management’, the voice option, or by selling the shareholding, the exit option.
The latter choice is not viable for many institutional investors given the size
of their holdings or a policy of holding a balanced portfolio. The meetings
between  institutional  investors  and  companies  are  therefore  extremely
important as a means of communication between the two parties ...” (Chris
Mallin, Professor of Finance at Nottingham Business School, the Nottingham
Trent University, and Associate Fellow of the Centre for Corporate Strategy
and Change, Warwick Business School, p. 229)
“... The CG arrangement in the Netherlands cannot be extricated from the
European and other international forces and developments. There is a very
real chance that CG of a more Anglo-Saxon guise will become dominant in
Europe. CG exercised by insurers and other institutional investors (such as
pension  funds)  –  in  particular  the  Financial  Governance  variant  –  will
manifest itself substantially in due time. This applies primarily to CG within
192the Netherlands. In so far as institutional investors make use of international
(external) investment managers, this effect will be relatively much weaker.
In doing so, an emphasis on the long-term investment perspective will be
a countervailing  force  against  an  undesirable  emphasis  on  short-term
benchmarks.
An  increase  in  CG  of  insurers  (and  perhaps  of  pension  funds)  may  be
accompanied  by  very  undesirable  risks.  This  is  all  the  more  so  since
competition  policy  in  the  European  Union  and,  in  particular,  in  the
Netherlands  is  becoming  stricter  and  is  defined  primarily  in  legal  terms.
A considerable effort will therefore be required of prudential supervisors –
and of those who play a role in this, such as external accountants and actuaries
– with the danger of slipping into systems of supervision which are inferior
from  the  perspective  of  society  as  a whole  ...”  (Arend Jan Vermaat,
Chairman of the ‘Verzekeringskamer’ (the Insurance Supervisory Board in
the Netherlands), p. 320-321)
– Some additional evidence on country – or sector – specific aspects
– Board size and composition in Spain
“... Our results indicate that a Board of Director’s characteristics influence
a firm’s performance. This empirical evidence indicates that outsider non-
executive directors influence positively a Board’s capabilities to evaluate and
discipline  managers  ...  Our  results  relating  to  a Board’s size  suggest  the
existing  of  non-linear  relationship  between  this  variable  and  Board
effectiveness.  They  show  that,  initially  increases  in  Board  size  enhance
a Board’s effectiveness and a firm’s performance, but after a certain point,
increases in a Board’s size decreases a firm’s performance. When the Board
is large, the negative effect outweighs the positive one, resulting in an overall
negative relationship ...” (A.I.F. Álvarez, S.G. Ansón and C.F. Mendez,
respectively, Professor and Assistants, in the Department of Finance at the
University of Oviedo, Spain, p. 12)
– Privatisation and CG in the Czech Republic and in Poland
“... In a nutshell, speed may be deemed less important than the search for an
effective governance structure, but only if there is a well-defined and credible
privatization strategy binding the management to immediately adopt practices
consistent with profit maximisation in the presence of hard budget constraints
while authorities keep pursuing sound macroeconomic policies and creating
a regulatory framework that will allow resources to be allocated efficiently.”
(Tito Boeri and Giancarlo Perasso, respectively, Professor of Economics at
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the Economic Department of the OECD, Paris, p. 84)
– Shareholding Concentration and Pyramidal Ownership Structures in
Belgium
“...  We  have  shown  that  the  Belgian  equity  market  is  similar  to  most
Continental  European  ones  as  few  companies  are  quoted,  ownership
concentration  is  strong,  pyramidal  ownership  structures  are  used  to  lever
control and there is a market for share stakes. Typical for Belgium is the
dominance  of  holding  companies  as  large  shareholders.  Pyramiding  of
shareholding  structures  violates  the  one  share-one  vote  rule  as  ultimate
shareholders can exercise control with a low percentage of cash-flow rights.
Despite the strong concentration of relatively stable large shareholdings, the
existence  of  a market  for  small  share  stakes  reveals  the  importance  of
reaching  critical  control  levels  (blocking  minorities,  majorities  and
supermajorities) for the exertion of corporate control ...” (Luc Renneboog,
Assistant Professor in Finance at the Department of Applied Economics of the
Catholic University of Leuven, in his Marjolin Prize-winning contribution,
p. 287-288)
– Stock Exchange Governance in the European Union
“... The exchange as a firm view is gaining ground in Europe despite being
enforced with varying degrees of conviction in the different Member States.
Where stock exchanges are defined and regulated as enterprises, they are
most frequently owned by their members although that there are some cases
of  investor-owned  exchanges...  Self-regulation  is  expanding  and  the
exchange-management  companies  subsequently  gain  regulatory  and
supervisory powers. However, conflicts of interest may arise especially in the
case of member-owned exchanges. These conflicts, which could be limited by
investor ownership, must necessarily be considered by exchange governance
structures. One remedy, in the case of member-owned exchanges is to ensure
that the governing bodies are representative of all their constituencies, so that
the exchange policy and regulation reflect a fair balance of interests ... An
additional remedy is to create independent executive bodies which take care
of market management and supervision and are to some extent, separated
from those in charge of the exchange policy. Adifferent course of action is to
separate market surveillance from exchange governance and to assign the
former to distinct self-regulatory bodies ... A weakness of this separation,
however,  is  represented  by  the  circumstance  that  the  quality  of  trading
services is not controlled by the enterprise running the exchange ...” (Guido
Ferrarini, Professor of Law at the University of Genoa, pp. 156-157)
194– A European-wide Code of Good Practice for Corporate Governance?
“... Western European countries have to adapt their corporate governance
structures to take the shifts in shareholding structures into account. Whereas
before,  shareholding  was  concentrated  in  the  state,  firms  or  families,  an
evolution is underway whereby the market is getting a bigger role in the
financing  of  firms  ...  The  problem  in  the  Central  and  Eastern  European
transition  economies  is  to  implement  effective  corporate  governance
mechanisms. As part of the privatisation processes followed, these countries
have generally gone immediately towards an extensive level of institutional
shareholding,  with,  in  the  case  of  successful  firms,  a strong  wealth
maximizing behaviour on the part of managers. The institutional investors
often lack the expertise, or have conflicts of interest, to adequately exercise
corporate governance and to ensure profit maximization. Or they are not
properly  governed  themselves.  The  common  observation  for  Continental
Europe is thus that there is too much inside control, in Eastern Europe as
a result of privatisations whereby outside control is too weak, and insiders
exploit their position, in Western Europe as the result of economic traditions,
where stock markets and institutional investors have traditionally not played
an important role in corporate control. Acommon recommendation could thus
be to enforce ways which allow stronger outside controls, such as through the
separation  of  Chairman  and  CEO,  well-qualified  outside  directors  on  the
board,  one  share-one  vote  structures,  effective  board  control  procedures,
transparent  and  broad  reporting  ...  Since  the  statutory  change  at  EU  or
national level is difficult to achieve, the lead to set common rules on corporate
governance  should  be  taken  by  market  players  ...  As  a way  out  of  the
regulatory deadlock at European level, European industry should take the
initiative and adopt a European-wide Code of Good Practice in corporate
control ...” (Karel Lannoo, Head of EU Policies and Business Unit and
Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS),
Brussels, pp. 211-212)
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– The euro: a safe haven in a turbulent financial world? The first acid test
for an as yet unborn currency...
“... There can be no doubt that the global environment has become harsher
and more turbulent for Germany, and Europe as well, in the past weeks and
months.  A number  of  East  Asian  countries  are  beset  by  a deep-seated,
persistent  financial  crisis  ...  On  the  continent  of  Europe,  by  contrast,
conditions have so far been distinctly more favourable ... But besides the
comparatively reassuring perception that those crises are unlikely to spill over
to us (at least in the short run) through the channel of trade relations, there is
increasing concern that the crises might, instead, come right into our ‘front
room’ through  the  channel  of  financial  relations,  via  the  global  financial
markets.
... Given the crises besetting many parts of the world, the euro has passed its
first acid test. That is gratifying. The markets regard the euro as safe haven.
In that respect, it has already become a serious rival to the dollar ... That
demonstrates  two  things:  the  markets  have  accepted  the  transition  to
monetary  union  as  being  irreversible,  and  the  euro  and  the  independent
European Central Bank are enjoying a high degree of confidence in investors’
eyes...” (Hans Tietmeyer, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, pp. 5, 6, 9)
197“... The financial crisis and the forthcoming EMU will be the driving forces
for  the  future  architecture  of  the  international  capital  markets.  First,  the
introduction of the euro itself will be much more problematic if the euro area
does not prove to be resistant against the contagious effects of the current
crisis ... Second, the reintegration of the emerging market economies into the
international  financial  system  is  of  crucial  importance  for  an  efficient
allocation of capital, which is a precondition for the future growth and wealth
not only of the affected countries but of the world as a whole. Third, the
international financial system can look forward to momentous change with
the launch of monetary union. EMU will integrate the monetary sphere of an
economic area whose real economy is roughly comparable to that of the
United States ... The euro has passed its first critical test before it comes into
existence, but the experiences of the Asian tiger states have shown that every
trust must be earned ex post ...” (Ernst-Moritz Lipp, Member of the Board
of Directors of the Dresdner Bank, pp. 11, 15)
“...  One size fits all? According  to  the  Oxford Companion in Classical
Literature, Procrustes was ‘ a legendary brigand of Eleusis, who used to lay
travellers on a bed, and if they were too long for it, cut short their limbs, but
if the bed was longer, stretched them to make their length equal to it’ This
legend holds a moral for member countries of the Eurozone: whatever their
individual preferences and needs there will be only one monetary policy, only
one  interest  rate  structure,  a ‘one  size  fits  all’ monetary  policy  ...  By
measuring the homogeneity of the groupings (of 18 countries) we can obtain
some impression of where the strains and difficulties are most likely to come,
and what might be done to ease the problems of adjustment ... Participation
in the Union is a cost-benefit calculation for each country ... Some countries
will be observed to face some costs; the positive way to view this is to ask
what policy adjustments can be made to minimize those costs ...
The results (of the clustering) indicate a clear cohesive ‘core group’ around
Germany  regarded  as  the  centre  country  (France,  Netherlands,  Belgium,
Austria)  and  two  peripheral  groups  among  the  European  countries  –
a “Northern periphery” (Denmark, Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway,
Finland,  UK)  and  a ‘Southern  periphery’ Group  (Italy,  Spain,  Portugal,
Greece) while North America and Japan are clearly indicated as separate
groups ...
A distinctive  characteristic  of  the  ‘Northern  periphery’ group  is  that  its
business cycle is poorly correlated with that of Germany, while its real DM
exchange  rate  has  exhibited  a good  deal  of  volatility  ...  The  ‘Southern
198periphery’ group distances itself from the core in different respects: inflation
convergence is weak, labour markets are less flexible and the monetary policy
cycle is weakly correlated with Germany’s ...
... Consideration has to be given to the issue of substitute policies for the loss
of independent monetary policy by those countries for which it is likely to
matter most ... The most important macro-policy weapons left in national
hands after monetary union are fiscal policy (within the limits allowed by the
Growth and Stability Pact) and wages policy, though regional policy may
constitute an important third prospective entry ...” (Michael Artis, Professor
of Economics at the European University Institute, Florence, on leave from
Manchester University, pp. 19, 20, 23, 24, 26)
– Twenty-five years of European monetary unification in the light of five
evolving ambitions
“I note five major ambitions and survey how they evolved, gradually gaining
ground and overcoming the opposition, mostly from national policy makers,
but also – and sadly from my point of view – from a majority of academic
economists ...:
  reducing, then eliminating nominal exchange-rate fluctuations
  reducing, then eliminating inflation
  developing  rules  for  non-monetary  national  policies,  then  scope  for
coordinating them without undermining the rules
  developing  a potential  role  in  the  international  monetary  system,  then
adjusting it to the realities of today
  developing a European profile in financial regulation.
Truthfully, only the first three, or maybe more correctly two and a half, of
these ambitions can be said to have been fulfilled with EMU as it has started
on 1 January 1999 ...
... In his remarkable book The Road to Monetary Union in Europe Tommaso
Padoa-Schioppa (1994) notes that the utopian perspective of full currency
union was confirmed as a realistic option by the 1992-1993 crises in the EMS.
With the degree of capital mobility achieved at the end of the 1980s, fixed-
but-adjustable exchange rates might have become impossible to maintain.
Central bankers found it difficult to face this issue, and claimed in most cases
that the experience with the EMS was sufficiently promising to justify aiming
not further than a well functioning EMS. It is more surprising that many, if
not most, academic economists, also found it extremely difficult to accept this
ambition as reasonable in economic terms. I suggest that this is due to two
199important biases in much of the economic analysis of full monetary union.
The  first  is  that  the  alternative  to  EMU  is  viewed  in  too  optimistic
a perspective. The second is that the issue of asymmetric shocks affecting the
participants in EMU in a differential way has been played up too much in the
economic debate, confounding the possible with the probable...
“...  I listed  five  ambitions  which  have  gradually  evolved  as  the  project
progressed towards realization. There is a logical order in them, as we look
back over the past two decades since the start of EMS. Increasingly rigid
exchange rates – an important benefit in themselves – required convergence
of national inflation rates, hence raising the issue of who should exercise the
n-th degree of freedom in an increasingly joint monetary policy. Basically,
such a policy required an explicit stand on the principal objective of monetary
policy: to provide a stable nominal framework for the area as a whole. With
the inflationary experience of the 1970s and early 1980s still fresh in the
minds of policy makers, this issue was settled in a clear and forceful way in
the  Maastricht  Treaty  ...”  (Niels Thygesen,  Danske  Bank  Professor  of
International Economics at the University of Copenhagen, in his Marjolin
Lecture at the Colloquium, pp. 30, 31, 32, 53)
– Challenges and opportunities for the European banking system.
– The EMU as a factor provoking changes in banking structure and
performance
“There are different ways to consider these changes. First, EMU may be seen
as the extension to the European context of ... world trends by way of progress
towards frontier opening, pressures on regulatory differences, and respect of
market  principle.  Second,  EMU  may  be  viewed  as  a further  step  in  the
direction of European economic and financial integration, so that it may be
difficult to distinguish its effects from those of the Single Market and the
Second Banking Coordination directive. In particular one may argue that one
of the major gains of the single currency is that it makes the single market
real. Third ... one can consider that EMU may,in itself, have very direct and
specific  consequences  on  the  European  banking  system,  for  instance  by
exacerbating underlying trends or even having a catalytic role. Of course,
EMU  should  not  be  seen  as  the  only  driving  force  behind  current
developments  in  the  European  banking  industry  ...  The  single  monetary
policy  will  generate  new  activities,  in  particular  in  connection  with  the
emergence of larger and deeper financial markets. This will require changes
in  the  strategic  focus  of  banks  operating  in  the  euro-area.  In  addition,
competition is likely to increase significantly with the single currency, as one
of the major obstacles to financial integration will disappear, although retail
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‘local’features, in particular those due to tax differences. Market participants
are adapting their accounting and operational systems and can now define
their strategies. One realistic scenario is therefore that the final impact of
EMU will be to increase the competitiveness of banks in the Single Currency
area and to favour the emergence of some large Europe-based global banking
groups, while at the same time, smaller institutions may develop profitable
niches ...” (Olivier De Bandt, Head of Unit in the Research Department of
the Banque de France (SEMEF), pp. 92, 117)
– A new Eurobanking world
“... One can anticipate the creation of a new Eurobanking world. A major
international consolidation of the European banking industry will take place
in  the  capital  market  business,  and  further  domestic  rationalization  of
commercial banking will be needed. An important premise of the analysis has
been  that  European  size  will  dominate  domestic  size  because  it  enables
diversification benefits to be realized. The objective of the 1992 single market
programme was to reinforce the efficiency and competitiveness of European
firms. As concerns banking, it is a clear conclusion that the introduction of
a single  currency  will  not  only  make  the  creation  of  the  single  market
irreversible,  but  that  it  will,  besides  the  obvious  fall  in  revenue  from
intra-European currencies trading, alter fundamentally the nature of several
businesses. A new banking world will emerge with very different sources of
competitive advantage ...” (Jean Dermine, Professor of Banking and Finance
at INSEAD, Fontainebleau, pp. 136-137)
– Eliminating excess capacity
“...  There  are  three  ways  by  which  an  excess  capacity  problem  can  be
resolved: productivity improvements, restructuring and exit ... Public policy
should on the one hand allow market forces to operate, but on the other ensure
that the process is smooth and not disruptive. These tendencies may of course
go  in  the  same  direction,  for  example  if  delay  were  to  make  adjustment
sharper and more abrupt... The perspective of EMU, which may well lead to
a further  intensification  of  competition,  thus  heightening  the  problem  of
redundant  capacity,  could  increase  the  importance  of  orderly  removal  of
capacity,  although  it  may  reduce  concerns  regarding  the  effect  of
concentration  on  competition  ...  (E. Philip Davis and  Sinikka Salo,
respectively, Senior Economist at the Bank of England and Senior Economist
at the Bank of Finland, currently on secondment to the European Central
Bank, pp. 84, 88, 89)
201– Searching for the most efficient type of bank
“...  In  terms  of  cost  efficiency,  specialized  banks  appear  to  exhibit  no
disadvantage  relative  to  diversified  banks  or  financial  conglomerates  in
traditional  intermediation  activities,  However,  the  latter  are  more  cost
efficient  when  non-traditional  banking  activities  are  taken  into  account.
Universal banks are characterized by significantly higher average levels of
operational efficiency relative to specialized banks. They also dominate their
non-universal competitors in terms of profit efficiency. Part of the superior
profit efficiency in universal banks is probably related to the comparative
information advantage acquired through their corporate insider status. Both
for cost and profit efficiency size does seem to matter. Especially the very
large  banks  appear  to  outperform  their  smaller  competitors  in  terms  of
revenue efficiency. In general, fairly large unexploited scale economies were
found for the small banks, especially the specialized ones ... The bank sizes
for which no diseconomies were found are higher than reported in the 1980s.
As a consequence, the continued expansion of financial conglomerates and
universal banks in Europe, partly as a response to EMU, should lead to a more
efficient financial system ...” (Rudi Vander Vennet, Professor of Financial
Economics  at  the  University  of  Ghent,  in  his  Marjolin  Prize-winning
contribution, p. 162)
– Challenges to publicauthorities
– A lender of last resort (LOLR) function for the European Central Bank
(ECB)
“... The ‘narrow’ concept of a central bank that inspired the Treaty and the
Statute of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) led to the creation
of an institutional framework that may completely preclude the involvement
of the ECB, and even of the National Central Banks (NCBs) from crisis
management. If the Governing Council of the ECB decides to move in this
direction, this would represent a departure from current practices for most
EMU central banks, including the Bundesbank ...
... Another possible direction in which the framework might change is that the
ECB  might  evolve  into  an  institution  that  would  assume  a leading  and
coordinating role in crisis management. If no other institution can satisfactorily
take up LOLR responsibilities at the EMU level, then it might devolve to the
ESCB, or to the NCBs. It could evolve to the NCBs, but the ECB would, at
a minimum, need to be able to assess the systemic implications of a crisis
rapidly, especially if it involves pan-European institutions. This implies that
the  ECB  would  have  greater  access  to  supervisory  information  on  an
independent and regular basis than is currently foreseen.
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ambiguity about crisis-management mechanisms, on the principle that some
ambiguity would be ‘constructive’and would reduce moral hazard... However
it is quite a different matter, and would be risky and even counterproductive,
not to clarify in advance, and perhaps even make public, the channels of
communications and the division of responsibilities between the ECB and the
several  national  authorities  and  central  banks  ...”  (Alessandro Prati and
GarrySchinasi , respectively, Economist and Chief of the Division of the
International Capital Markets and Financial Studies Division in the Research
Department of the IMF, pp. 249, 250)
– Streamlining the balance sheets of the European Central Banks and
disposing of their excess foreign exchange reserves
“... Amonetary union and the creation of the ESCB constitute a good occasion
to simplify and streamline the balance sheets of national central banks, which
in many cases contain items that are only of historical interest. Moreover, the
ESCB should stop the tendency for central banks to hide the true state of their
balance sheets from public view. There is no reason why the ESCB should not
be completely open about the financial situation of its constituent national
central banks. As this area belongs formally to the responsibility of national
central banks, it is up to them to act and dispose of parts of their assets and
liabilities until the remainder is equal to the monetary base plus a small capital
and an appropriate revaluation reserve.
... The issue of excess foreign exchange reserves arises, however, whether or
not our proposal of reducing the balance sheet of the ESCB is adopted. The
general question that arises in this context is why central banks, which are
after all part of the public sector, should hold large amounts of low-yielding
assets  when  the  government  at  the  same  time  pays  more  on  its  debt  ...”
(Daniel Gros and  Franziska Schobert,  respectively,  Senior  Research
Fellow, Deputy Director at the Center for Economic Policy Studies (CEPS),
Brussels,  and  Ph.D.  student  in  the  Department  of  Monetary  Economics,
Goethe University, Frankfurt, pp. 222, 223)
– A Strategy for managing the euro in a tri-polar world
“... Contrary to policymakers’ ambitions for the euro, the widespread view
among economists is that the new currency is likely to be less stable (in a tri-
polar  world)  than  its  main  national  predecessors  ...  Subsuming  all  (the)
arguments is the worry that, if and when the euro develops into a global
currency, it will prove to be at least as unstable as the dollar and yen have
been, and further polarization might add to these instabilities ... Given the
203ECB’s virtually certain opposition to any strategy that would conflict with its
freedom to select and pursue its price stability objective, the focus of the
strategy should be the euro’s real exchange rate (preferably in effective terms,
but bilaterally against the dollar if transparency is at a premium). This focus
would  permit  the  ECB  to  pursue,  with  a modest  degree  of  short-term
flexibility, an internal inflation objective independently of the other major
blocks; and it would be entirely consistent with the strategy’s objectives,
namely to lean against exchange-rate misalignment rather than to provide
a (redundant) nominal anchor for the euro area ...
... The EMU authorities and especially the ECB given its influence at the
heart of the new regime, must ... also be prepared to give some weight to
minimizing  euro  instability  against  third  currencies,  principally  the  US
dollar’...  Despite  the  fairly  discouraging  omens,  global  co-operation  to
minimize fluctuations between the key currencies of the tripolar, or more
probably bipolar, post EMU world would also be worth trying to revive, if
only for the familiar reason that, in the past, DM/US dollar fluctuations have
periodically created tensions between currencies in the old ERM, and could
pose similar problems for the euro and its prospective partners in the new one
...” (John Arrowsmith, RayBarrell and Christopher Taylor, respectively,
Senior Research Fellow, Director of the World Economy team, and Visiting
Fellow, all three at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research,
London, pp. 169, 198, 199)
Issues for portfolio management and corporate finance
– The consensus on the impact of EMU on European financial markets and
portfolio management:
  ”Government bond markets will be more closely integrated and yields
closely correlated.
  Non-government  borrowers  will  increasingly  borrow  directly  from
investors by issuing debt securities rather than borrowing from banks,
leading to a US-style corporate bond market.
  The national bias in equity and fixed income investments will diminish
and funds will be increasingly managed against Euro-wide benchmarks,
possibly involving some reallocation of existing investments.
  Equity  markets  will  grow,  as  more  companies  go  public  and  more
investors seek to invest funds in equity markets.
... One feature of (the) potential flows is particularly worth noting. Typically,
when investors rebalance portfolios they concentrate new purchases on large-
cap names. This suggests that cross-border equity flows which result from re-
204balancing may be skewed towards large-cap stocks. One factor reinforcing
this  is  that  the  most  widely  used  benchmarks  for  pan-Eurozone  equity
investors are likely to be large-cap biased ...” (Martin Brooks, International
Economist and Executive Director at Goldman Sachs International, London,
pp. 310, 323)
– Non-European securities favoured by the re-balance of portfolios?
“There are many theoretical reasons for believing that the introduction of the
euro will change the optimal asset allocation of European investors. Given the
increase in the covariances between stockmarkets and between bond markets,
one may expect an increase in the share of non-European securities... There is
some  switch  towards  non-European  stocks  and  a general  increase  in  the
demand  for  non-euro  bonds  (according  to  simulations  on  the  basis  of
historical data).” (Andrea Beltratti, Associate Professor of Economics at
Bocconi University, Milan, p. 281)
– The ratings after the euro introduction
– ”The ceiling rating for the whole area will be AAA for all three major
agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch-IBCA) reflecting
the  Eurozone’s net  creditor  status,  diversified  foreign  exchange
earnings, deep markets and strong liquidity position ...
– There will be no distinction between local and foreign currency ratings.
Only one set of ratings will be published from 1 January 1999 within
the Eurozone.
– The  focus  of  sovereign  analysis  will  increasingly  be  fiscal  (budget
deficits,  financing  requirements,  public  debt  levels  and  public  debt
service  relative  to  revenue  and  GDP)  rather  than  the  balance  of
payments ...
– In  the  medium  term  sovereign  ratings  should  improve  to  AAA.
However, the short-term risks of a sovereign liquidity crisis increase
for two reasons. First, investors no longer have an incentive to hold
their government’s paper in a crisis: a flight to quality may result in
a flight out of one government’s paper and into another’s ... Second,
each government will no longer be in a position to encourage its central
bank  to  support  its  paper  in  the  market. As  a result,  an  important
liquidity support for sovereign is removed just as the liquidity risks
increase ...
– Policy on bank rescues – the LOLR function – is opaque and is likely
to remain so. However, it is clear that ultimate liability will devolve on
national fiscal authorities, and that this may make bank rescues less
likely for second-rank banks ...” (Christopher Huhne, Vice Chairman
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European Parliament, pp. 347, 348)
– A political implication of the basic shifts
“... The existence of very large and liquid capital markets may well have
profound political implications for the EU. Institutional investors – such as
pension and life insurance funds – may neither be, nor feel themselves to be,
restricted to securities offered by their own government. Instead, they will
have several competing governments and a profusion of non government
issuers, whether regional governments, traditional corporate bonds or new
securitized  issuers  that  underpin  innovative  credit  opportunities  for  the
Eurozone economy ...” (Graham Bishop, Adviser on European Financial
Affairs at Salomon Smith Barney, London, p. 308)
– The impact of portfolio shifts on currency competition
“... There is no immediate prospect for the euro’s use as an anchor currency
outside Central Europe and the Mediterranean. Still, a successful euro could
deepen Europe’s financial markets and conceivably make the evolution of
European bond prices more independent of developments in New York. Both
greater  depth  and  better  diversification  possibilities  could  attract  more
international investment to the euro. The prospect of substantial portfolio
shifts into the euro, however, does not by itself justify forecasts that the new
currency will appreciate against the dollar over an extended period. Liability
managers outside the euro area should also find the enhanced liquidity and
improved  diversification  possibilities  of  euro-denominated  debt  attractive.
Thus, in response to a shift in demand, global financial markets are capable
of producing euro-denominated assets by changes in the currency habitats of
international borrowers ...” (Robert N. McCauley, Senior Economic and
Financial Representative of the BIS’ Representative Office for Asia and the
Pacific, Hong Kong, p. 372)
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– Globalisation and Irrational Exuberance... The issue of financial stability
on the top of the international policy agenda
“... One outgrowth for us central bankers is that in addition to our concern
with price stability, our acknowledged home turf, we must increasingly also
be concerned with the stability of the financial system both regionally and
globally. Today we operate in an increasingly interdependent world, where
there is a growing divergence between the national political sphere and the
global  economic  and  financial  sphere...”  (Klaus Liebscher,  Governor,
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, p. 28)
“...  Asset  prices  have  moved  higher  and  their  volatility  have  increased
...These large asset price swings are themselves a palpable manifestation of
the increased financial instability experienced around the world since at least
the 1980s ... Just as policy makers appeared to be emerging victorious from
one exhausting battle, that against inflation, another equally challenging front
was opening up. Lower inflation, it appeared, had not by itself yielded the
peace dividend of a more stable financial environment ...
Financial  globalisation  has  transformed  geography,  with  significant
implications for the character of instability. Globalisation has heightened the
significance of ‘common factors’ in the genesis and unfolding of financial
207distress. It has done so by extending and tightening financial linkages across
institutions, markets and countries ... In addition, globalisation has heightened
the significance of size asymmetries in the world, between the main industrial
countries, on the one hand, and emerging market economies, on the other, that
is, between core and periphery ...
...  Paradoxically,  success  in  taming  inflation  can  provide  an  environment
more  vulnerable  to  those  waves  of  excessive  optimism  that  breed
unsustainable asset price dynamics ... The search for a solution to this basic
problem can be seen as a search for adequate anchors in the monetary and
financial spheres. There is little doubt that all the work already done and put
in train in order to strengthen prudential safeguards is in the right direction.
Upgraded minimum capital requirements have been the cornerstone of (the)
strategy:  the  Core  Principles  for  Effective  Banking  Supervision  provide
a consistent, broader corpus of guidelines that has served as the model for
regulatory and supervisory arrangements world-wide. Whether the current
efforts can, by themselves be sufficient to guarantee financial stability is less
clear. My analysis points to two potential weaknesses that still need to be
adequately addressed. The first relates to the limitations of market discipline
... It would be a mistake to believe that moral hazard is the only source of
incentives  for  imprudent  behaviour.  In  a highly  competitive  environment
there is no dearth of pressure to take on risks or to conform behaviour to the
prevailing  norms,  regardless  of  their  inherent  validity.  More  prudent
behaviour  requires  a heightened  recognition  that,  in  finance,  an  ultimate
source of competitive advantage is the credit standing of the institution ... The
second potential weakness relates to the raw material on which the regulatory
framework can draw. It stands to reason that the regulatory apparatus should
align its risk measures to those used by private participants ... From this
perspective the current proposals for the revision of the Capital Accord are
a major step forward. This positive step, however, still leaves unresolved the
problem posed by existing biases in the measures of risk, particularly the
shortcomings  in  assessing  the  non-diversifiable  risk  associated  with  the
financial cycle.
The bottom line is simple. If my conjectures are correct, there is a material
risk that the current anchors in the financial sphere may, by themselves, be
insufficient to deliver financial stability. In a sense, anchors are no better than
the ground in which they are planted. And that ground could, at worst, turn
out to be quicksand ...” (Andrew Crockett, General Manager of the BIS,
Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum, Basle, pp. 5, 9, 10, 12, 13)
208– Adapting the European financial landscape
– The emergent Euroland banking system
“... In wholesale and capital market activities, the signs of the emergence of
a single Euroland banking industry are rather strong, especially if we consider
that only one and a half years have elapsed since the launch of the euro. In the
case of retail activities and ownership structures, cross-border operations are
largely lacking, but we should not expect the signs thereof to materialize very
soon. After all, the two aspects – localised retail banking, which is the most
visible area of banking for the public, and the lack of cross-border mergers –
are present even in mature monetary and banking systems, such as the US
system ... Technology and infrastructure present a diversified picture and this
is the area in which – in my view – the existing obstacles are least justified.
Cost  savings  could  be  achieved  through  consolidation,  and  the
competitiveness of the euroland banking industry – vis-à-vis, say, the US
banking industry – could be enhanced. On these issues there is an important
role  for  policy  to  be  played,  including  the  competence  of  the  European
Commission in the field of competition ...” (Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa,
Member of the Executive Board, ECB, Frankfurt, p. 57)
– Financial consolidation
“...The rationale for M&As: too many large national banks, no big
European bank (in bold in the text) ... Most banks seem to favor a twofold
M&A strategy: Firstly they are keen to defend their position in the domestic
stronghold  against  potential  foreign  competitors,  which  leads  them  into
mergers with national competitors. Secondly, in a more offensive way, they
seek  to  establish  bridgeheads  in  the  pan-European  market  by  acquiring
interests in foreign institutions. The aim of such moves is to deter similar ones
by competitors and to increase market shares.
... I believe European banks will develop a multi-pronged strategy: Cross-
border acquisitions where synergies can be realized by rationalizing networks
and information systems in particular, but also where profitable markets can
be reached (for instance, retail networks in those emerging countries where
banking systems are still largely inefficient); partnerships where it is more
efficient to use existing networks in order to market specific services in which
one of the partners holds a competitive edge; internet activities ...; eventually
becoming truly global in terms of investment banking through internal and
external growth...” (Jacques de Larosière and Eric Barthalon, respectively,
Advisor and Economist, BNP Paribas, Paris, pp. 16, 19, 25)
209– Bank strategy of Spanish Banks
“... It seems that in the case of mergers and takeovers in Spain one can speak
of two types: those which have sought to expand business and those which
have opted for increases in productivity and improvements in the level of
efficiency. The ambiguity of the results obtained in terms of profitability per
unit of assets would suggest that is practically impossible to achieve both
things at the same time ... The effects of other strategies have also helped
banking institutions to confront growing competition. Strategies based on
product diversification like the development of investment and pension funds,
derivative products and securitisation take advantage of the delivery system
of banking institutions and allows them to compete in other segments while
minimising the loss of business and income. Moreover, by widening the range
of products offered, Spanish banks have rationalised the use of their branch
networks and increased their efficiency levels. Finally, these strategies, as
they reduce the size of the balance sheet, allow banking institutions to expand
their level of activity with fewer problems of capital resources ...” (Ignacio
Fuentes Egusquiza and Theresa Sastre de Miguel, Senior Economists in
the Research Department, Banco de España, Madrid, p. 182)
– Emphasizing efficiency
“... Increased competition, ongoing consolidation, continuing pressure for the
reduction  of  existing  excess  capacity  and  shrinking  profitability  in  the
European banking industry have put efficiency high on the agenda of most
banks as they monitor their performance over time and against competitors ...
The rationale of looking at the cost to income ratio and its dispersion is the
growing use of it as a proxy for bank (in)efficiency. Possible dispersion is
often  interpreted  as  an  indication  of  (in)efficiency  ...  Despite  the  recent
consolidation, on average only a small reduction of the rate is recorded ... The
findings seem to confirm that changing scale and scope has a limited impact
on the cost to income ratio. By using the available inputs efficiently in order
to generate a given (or) higher output level the direct impact on the ratio itself
is much larger ... Overlooking the efficiency literature ... this means that
banks can improve their overall cost efficiency to a greater extent if they
emulate  the  banking  industry’s best  practice,  thereby  increasing  their
managerial and technical efficiency (reducing X-inefficiencies) rather than by
size  (scale  economies)  or  diversifying  (scope  economies)  ...  Useful  and
valuable benchmark information is available when the cost to income ratio is
set  against  the  bank’s main  competitors  and  similar  banks.  Overall,  the
analysis shows that the reduction of the cost to income ratio is taking place at
a rather slow pace mainly due to the consolidation process. However the
residual analysis (i.e. the analysis of residuals of a sample of banks based on
210a fitted regression model) shows that changes in efficiency are taking place at
different pace across individual banks and across EU countries ...” (Peter Van
Dijcke,  Senior  Economist  at  Artesia  Bank  Corporation,  Brussels,  in  his
Marjolin Prize-winning contribution, pp. 295, 308, 324-325)
– The impact on payment intermediation
“... Further globalisation of the world economy will lead to growing demand
for trans-border payment services in the business-to-business transactions and
also in the business-to-consumer ones. The high proportion of global trade
taking  place  among  multinationals  requires  special  global  payment  and
transaction  services  for  these  companies.  The  emergence  of  E-commerce
which is by nature not limited to national borders, might shift the balance of
power from payment intermediaries to transaction intermediaries. The rapid
development  of  information  technologies  favours  new  competitors  for
commercial  payment  services.  In  the  area  of  financial  transactions,  the
internationalisation of exchanges calls for an internationalisation of clearing
and  settlement  systems.  Information  technologies  also  favour  new
competitors for financial transactions and payment services. The initiative of
central banks and bank supervisors will exert a continuous pressure on the
traditional  payment  intermediaries  to  reduce  the  financial  risks  in  all
payments  systems.  The  completion  of  the  European  currency  union  will
transform today’s largest market for international commercial payments into
a local  payment  market.  The  pressure  by  the  European  Union  and  the
European Central Bank will add to the demand by the customers for rapid
improvement in the European payment systems.” (Hans Geiger, Professor,
Swiss Banking Institute, University of Zurich, pp. 203, 205)
– The impact on consumer behaviour and its implications for banking
strategy
“... It is possible to construct a matrix of consumer behaviour which provides
greater insight into the interaction modes ... Each of the ideal types described
in  the  consumer  behaviour  matrix  (i.e.  repeat-passive,  rational-active,  no
purchase, relation-dependent) has implications for strategy, in that they give
rise to contingencies which demand a strategic response ... This approach has
not been widely explored or used in the financial services industry as choice
was traditionally limited and consumers had little incentive to switch between
bank providers. However, this situation no longer prevails as competitive
forces  enable  and  encourage  consumers  to  adopt  rational-active  forms  of
buying behaviour. As these changes occur the retention of customers assumes
greater importance as the costs of recruiting new customers are significant
and because existing customers should provide cross-selling opportunities ...”
211(BarryHowcroft , Professor of Retail Banking and Director, Loughborough
University Banking Centre, Loughborough, pp. 220, 225)
– Financial stability in emerging market economies
– Currency boards
“... During the Nineties, the process of economic reform has gathered pace in
Latin America, while a group of Eastern European countries has gone through
a complete transformation to become market economies. The world-wide
upsurge in the magnitude, scope and speed of financial movements has eased
the implementation of the reform processes by providing the much needed
inflows of capital, but, at the same time, it has increased their vulnerability: in
a context of financial globalization, countries which have been perceived by
markets to have weak fundamentals, particularly in terms of inflation, public
finance  and/or  current  account,  have  suffered  from  swift  reversals  in  the
inflows of capital, which have put at stake the process of reform ... The quest
for macroeconomic stability has traditionally had one of its central elements in
the choice of exchange rate regime. Many countries have based their programs
of economic stabilization on regimes of rigid or semi-rigid exchange rates. The
rationale for this strategy is the following: inflation is perceived as a structural
problem,  and  fixing  credibly  the  exchange  rate  allows  them  to  tie  down
inflation expectations; this induces a more disciplined behavior in economic
agents, facilitating overall economic reform ... Nevertheless, the empirical
evidence is at odds with this theoretical prior ... We observe that fixed exchange
regimes have only attained a limited macroeconomic stability in emerging
markets, compared to countries with flexible exchange rate regimes ... The
weakness of the fiscal system and the inability to finance them in an orthodox
way tend to fuel inflation through monetization of deficits even when they are
low, leading to the collapse of the peg in fixed regimes ...
In contrast, a special type of exchange rate arrangement, the currency board,
has  shown  its  strength  in  the  context  of  financial  turmoil. At  first  sight,
a currency board might just be considered a hardened version of a fixed
regime, in which the exchange rate is predetermined by law and the growth
in the monetary base is backed by foreign reserves. The aim of this article is
to show that currency boards are intrinsically different from standard fixed
exchange  rate  regimes  because  they  deter  monetary  authorities  from
financing  fiscal  deficits  ...  The  constraints  on  monetary  and  fiscal
management imposed by currency boards require the very wide support of
economic and social forces within the country. In this sense, currency boards
can be identified with a deep institutional change, which transforms the way
economic  policy  operates...”  (Enrique Aberola-Ila and  Luis Molina
212Sanchez, Economists in the International Affairs Division, Banco de España,
pp. 59-60, 76)
– Foreign bank participation in emerging markets
“... We conclude that in both countries (i.e. Mexico and Argentina) foreign
banks exhibited stronger loan growth than all domestically owned banks and
had  lower  associated  volatility,  contributing  to  greater  stability  in  overall
financial system credit. Additionally in both countries, foreign banks showed
notable credit growth during recent crisis periods and thereafter ... We found
that domestically owned and foreign-owned banks with low problem loans
ratios behave similarly, and we found no evidence that the foreign banks were
more  volatile  lenders  than  their  domestic  counterparts...  Overall,  these
findings suggest that bank health, and not ownership per se, has been the
critical element in the growth volatility, and cyclicality of bank credit ...”
(B. Gerard Dages, Linda Goldberg and  Daniel Kinney, Assistant Vice
President, Assistant Vice President and International Officer in the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York respectively, p. 116)
– Country Risk Analysis
“...We believe that it is at least possible to see whether a country is in a zone
of serious vulnerability – that is, whether the fundamentals are so weak that
sudden  shifts  in  expectations  will  trigger  a crisis  –  and  that  the  serious
vulnerability will also adversely impact on its ability to service its foreign
debt. If this is possible, the relative vulnerability of different countries might
predict the relative probabilities of crises happening in response to a shock ...
The C(redit)A(nstalt) country risk assessment brought different results in the
forecast of the crises in Thailand, Brazil and Russia ... Our forecasts for
Thailand when the crisis came up were reasonably accurate and, therefore, we
captured and managed the Thailand risk (as well as the whole Asian crisis)
rather satisfactorily. Besides, our forecast for the Russian economy in 1997
was quite correct, but for 1998 turned out too optimistic. In Brazil, on the
other hand, we took an overly gloomy view in our forecast. Tending towards
the pessimistic side, however, is the superior strategy for a risk assessment
process.”  (Josef Christl and  Thomas Spanel,  Chief  Economist  and
Economist respectively, Creditanstalt AG, Austria, pp. 84-85, 96-97)
– PublicPolic ies: worldwide arrangements
– Reducing G3 exchange rate volatility through more transparent monetary
policies
“... It has become established, surprisingly, that this volatility (i.e. short-term
volatility in G3 bilateral exchange rates) is not only disproportionally large
213relative to the variation in relative macroeconomic fundamentals of Germany,
Japan and the United States, but it is in fact largely unrelated to them ... The
apparent disconnect between fundamentals and dollar-yen and dollar-euro
exchange rate fluctuations has led to perennial complaints about persistent
exchange rate ‘misalignments’, and their real effects on the G3 (and other)
economies, giving rise in turn to recurring proposals for government policies
to limit this volatility ... If transparency can be increased by central banks
either through institutional developments or through being more systematic in
policy making (i.e. institutional transparency and transparency in discretion),
without altering the fundamental monetary policy capabilities or decisions,
this may give central banks an additional degree of flexibility with which to
work... The magnitude of the impact of increased monetary transparency on
G3  exchange  rate  volatility,  however,  remains  open  to  question  ...  The
problem of G3 exchange volatility would not go away, nor should it so long
as financial markets’microstructure is the source of it (see Rogoff, 1999) Yet,
assuming that part of the dislike for exchange rate volatility is generated by
its extreme magnitudes, removing 20-30 percent of it (i.e. on the basis of
‘ballpark  but  consistent  estimates  of  the  benefits  of  transparency’ by  the
authors)  would  be  significant  for  emerging  markets  and  international
businesses – especially since the means for so doing, increasing monetary
transparency, increases political legitimacy without economic cost, and adds
potentially  significant  economic  benefits  ...”  (Kenneth N. Kuttner and
Adam S. Posen, respectively, Senior Economist and Research Officer in the
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  and  Senior  Fellow,  Institute  for
International Economics, Washington D.C., pp. 229, 230, 253)
– Towards a new capital adequacy framework
“... It is not by chance that the Basel Committee talks about its proposals
in terms of a framework ... First, a capital regime that is intended to be used
in many countries and apply to banks in widely different circumstances must
be adaptable ... Second, the Accord must concentrate on the broad principles
for  how  capital  requirements  are  to  be  determined,  and  leave  the
interpretation in individual cases to the national authorities ... Third, it will
include  several  alternative  approaches  for  how  the  minimum  regulatory
capital  requirement  of  a bank  can  be  determined  ...  Fourth,  and  finally,
a framework for capital adequacy is more than a set of rules for computing
a minimum regulatory capital requirement. ‘8%’ is not the full answer ...
There should be a comprehensive way of looking at capital adequacy which
takes  into  account  the  bank’s ability  to  identify,  measure  and  control  its
various risks and the existence of an internal policy for capital allocation and
the  determination  of  an  appropriate  level  of  economic  capital  ...”  (Claes
214Norgren, Director General, The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority,
Stockholm, pp. 41, 42)
– PublicPolic ies : European monetary and financial integration
– Evolving Subsidiarity
“... It is sometimes argued that this (i.e. the present) state of affairs requires
more centralized regulatory and supervisory institutions at the international
level. Though centralization of some tasks might have its merits, I reject this
option for the time being for the following reasons. The first reason is a purely
political one. The EU has been formed on the principles of subsidiarity, where
power is shared among member states ... Taking into account both the positive
experience  with  subsidiarity  and  the  reluctance  of  national  legislators  to
transfer responsibilities to centralized authorities, we have good reason not to
rush  to  a centralization  of  regulatory  and  supervisory  duties. The  second
reason ... relates to economic and institutional aspects. Due to their local
knowledge national regulators have a comparative advantage in dealing with
idiosyncratic  national  characteristics  of  their  respective  financial
intermediaries.  The  upcoming  unification  and  convergence  of  European
financial markets will gradually remove these distinctions, but this cannot be
expected to happen in the near future.” (Klaus Liebscher, op. cit., pp. 31, 32)
“... Financial supervision in a European context needs to evolve progressively
with growing market integration, but a more centralised approach in financial
supervision can only be justified where national or local approaches are no
longer  adequate  for  performing  the  task. A coordinated  approach  is  now
necessary to handle systemic issues that will no longer be limited to national
borders, but also, and increasingly, for monitoring financial institutions with
operations in a range of European countries. There is a vital need to identify
a lead supervisor for each financial group... Akind of European Forum should
be urgently created. This forum should primarily discuss problems in the
adequate supervision of large European financial groups and, if necessary,
draft  a multilateral  and  multi-sectoral  Memorandum  of  Understanding...
Afurther institutionalisation of supervisory functions at the European level is,
as circumstances currently stand, legally and practically impossible and in
any case unlikely to be politically acceptable...” (Karel Lannoo, Centre for
European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, pp. 286-287)
– Financial crises: lessons from US financial history
“... US history shows in particular in a large and diverse monetary area with
segmented  local  banking  markets,  that  regional  crises  can  pose  a major
challenge to policy makers, while the existence of a large monetary area in
215a global sense means that there will inevitably be international transmission
of shocks generated within it. There is also a need for special care in the case
of new monetary arrangements that have not yet experienced major financial
instability ... European financial instability has traditionally been of a pattern
of bank failures following loan and trading losses, the likely securitisation of
euro area markets may pose challenges arising from the occurrence of crises
of a type more characteristic of the US, linked to price volatility in asset
markets following shifts in expectations ... or the collapse of market liquidity
and issuance, which threatens institutions needing to transact or issue in such
markets. On the other hand, the presence of both banks and securities markets
is beneficial in offering a form of diversification for the financial system ...
US experience (also) shows that issues such as too-big-to-fail can arise in
a large monetary zone in the same way as a small state with a concentrated
banking  sector  ...  Finally,  real  estate  lending  booms  and  rising  corporate
leverage are shown in the US, as in Europe, to be warning signs for financial
stability.” (E. Philip Davis, Professor of Economics and Finance, Brunel
University, UK, pp. 147, 149)
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– A lengthy ‘money-macro’ prologue in a decor of uncertainty, financial
(in)stability and EMU
The two wings of central banking: “... As regards the first wing of central
banking, monetary stability, central banks have to provide a durable anchor in
order for the price system to appropriately guide economic decisions. Astable
value of money is all the more necessary for preserving the information value
of relative prices in a changing world, where decisions have to be taken
rapidly ... Technological change and financial market developments do not
only  affect  monetary  policy  instruments  but  also  the  whole  transmission
process and consequently the strategy of monetary policy ...
About the second wing of central banking: financial market developments
and the heightened risks associated with these rapid changes led central banks
to reconsider the role they had to play to preserve financial stability. For those
central banks that where in charge of the surveillance of individual credit
217institutions,  the  implications  were  straightforward. They  had  to  adapt  the
modalities of their microprudential activities. However the need to proceed to
macroprudential monitoring was also felt by central banks, like the National
Bank of Belgium, which were not vested with the microsupervision ...
To conclude, let me stress that central banks are fully aware of the close
connection  and  the  large  convergence  existing  between  the  two  goals  of
financial stability and monetary stability. Keeping inflation under control,
which is the ultimate goal of every central bank, has proved to be the best way
to  reduce  uncertainties  on  the  market,  to  alleviate  distortions  and,  so,  to
eliminate one of the fundamental sources of financial instability.
Conversely,  central  banks  need  sound  and  efficient  banking  systems  for
ensuring rapid transmission, to the whole economy, of the impulses of their
monetary policy. This is all the more important given that the assets at the
disposal of central banks – the monetary base in our jargon – is becoming
increasingly tiny compared to the assets managed by credit institutions and,
beyond that, by financial market operators.
In this context, the monitoring of financial stability may certainly not be
considered as a by-product or a mere extension of the traditional monetary
stability objective of the central banks. The two functions are closely related
but distinct. In other words, the monetary stability and financial stability
wings belong to the same bird.” (GuyQuaden, Governor of the National
Bank of Belgium, in his opening address, pp. 13, 15, 17)
– How to cope with risk in its inter-temporal dimensions?
“... There is inevitably a conflict between the micro-level and the macro
concerns in the operation of financial regulation. At the micro-level there is
no doubt that commercial banks and other financial intermediaries will tend
to  be  more  fragile,  closer  to  insolvency,  during  recessions.  Yet  the  real
concern, the major externality, in banking lies in the possibility of contagious
(and/or correlated) failure for a significant part of the system as a whole. If
a large number of banks are constrained by regulatory pressures to reduce
their loans during a recession ... then the prospect of contagious collapse may
even be enhanced ...
One of the most common human characteristics is to lock the stable door
when the horse has already bolted. In the monetary field, the prospect of
financial  regulation  doing  the  same  could  result  in  disaster  by  further
218restricting credit and liquidity in the aftermath of (often largely unforeseeable,
and certainly unforeseen) crises.
(Gathering  some  of  the  threads  of  the  analysis):  First,  it  is  difficult  to
condition regulation on the current deviation of the economy, or key sectors
of it, from the ‘fundamental equilibrium’, since we only get to know what that
actually was after the event, and usually many years after the event. Second,
we cannot hope to predict, or model, the really big adverse shocks, since these
are  almost  by  definition  unpredictable. All  that  we  can  do  is  model  the
aftershocks.  Now  this  leads  to  a real  dilemma.  In  the  event  of  a serious
adverse crisis, financial intermediaries are individually more fragile, but in
aggregate you want them to be more expansionary. By the same token during
an expansionary boom, individual banks are stronger, but in aggregate you
would wish them to be more cautious.
How should, or can, regulators respond?... First, our view is that markets are
much  better  at  setting  relative prices,  than  being  able  to  fix  aggregate
fundamental equilibria, and much better at assessing relative volatility (and
risk) than aggregate values... What that implies, in our view, is that regulators
should place much less weight on the means of the distributions, e.g. of asset
values, or of spreads over riskless assets or of the various VAR or credit
models, especially when based on short runs of data, and much more attention
to  the  relative  position  of  the  various  banks  and  financial  intermediaries
within the distribution of such models, whether overall those measures seem
strong or weak... The second point ... means that regulators need to make
strenuous efforts to lengthen the horizon over which regulating metrics and
decisions are made... It is ... to ensure that the metrics are constructed over
a sufficient length of time to incorporate both bad/volatile periods including
some stochastic bunching of severe adverse shocks and also good/calmer
periods.  A final  consideration  is  whether  one  can  condition  regulatory
requirements on the first differences of economic outcomes e.g. output and
(real)  asset  prices,  rather  than  on  level  ...  We  can  measure,  by  simple
arithmetic past trends, and we can estimate with reasonable accuracy whether
current growth is above, or below, those trends. So collateral requirements,
loan-to-value ratios, minimum capital requirements, etc. could all be raised
when such increases, e.g. in asset prices, were above trend, and lowered when
there was a recession relative to trend...” (Charles Goodhart, Professor of
Banking and Finance, London School of Economics, in his Marjolin Lecture
at the Colloquium, pp. 19-20, 28, 30, 31)
219– The Impact of Technology: a shift of paradigm in financial institutions, on
financial markets, in the new macroeconomic landscape? A spectrum of
(sometimes diverging) views:
– The new economics of banking: “...Four central themes:
  A combination of  pressures  operating  simultaneously  is  changing  all
aspects of banking business in a fundamental way and to an extent which
represents a fundamental shift.
  One of these pressures in particular (technology) is a dominant driver of
change and a major contributor to changing the economics of the industry.
  The  pressures  inducing  structural  change  in  the  industry  are  not
incremental... but represent a paradigm shift where the total impact of the
pressures is greater than the sum of the components. A paradigm shift is
when the underlying economics of an industry and firms within it change
significantly.
  Where many of the pressures operating on the industry can be viewed as
potential  threats,  they  also  widen  (rather  than  close  down)  strategic
options  for  firms  operating  in  the  industry  ...”  (David T. Llewellyn,
Professor  of  Economics,  Loughborough  University  and  President  of
SUERF, p. 52)
– Geography does not matter any more?
“... We recognize that technology is just one of the numerous factors that
influence the geographical pattern of financial activity. From our analysis we
conclude, however, that technology by itself has not (yet) been so powerful
that  significant  changes  in  the  estimated  distributions  can  be  observed.
Alternatively  one  could  conclude  that  either  there  has  been  insufficient
change in the use of technology or all other factors combined exactly counter
the  effect  of  changed  use  of  technology  ...  These  results  indicate  that
technology has not (yet) led to a change in the spatial dispersion of financial
activity. All in all, we find no evidence for the hypothesis that technology has
eliminated  the  importance  of  geography  as  predicted  by  the  ‘Geography
Doesn’t Matter’ hypothesis ... A criticism of our analysis with some merit is
that our date pre-dates the coming of age of the Internet and that the Internet
will make completely new ways of production possible. We do not disagree,
but propose that the Internet will have an impact that is at least as strong as
the impact of the other recent innovations in communication technology.”
(Iman Van Lelyveld and  Marieke Donker,  both  Researchers  at  De
Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam, p. 156)
220– Electronic Trading in wholesale financial markets
“...  Many  recognized  effects  of  electronic  trading  –  which  include
opportunities to harness efficiency gains, better market information, handle
higher  volumes  and  lesser  physical  constraints  on  trading  practices  and
participation – have a role in contributing to the adaptability and stability of
the financial system. And while, as with the expansion of any new market, the
route will doubtless end up littered with underperforming and failed systems
– this in itself does not necessarily carry systemic threats. Indeed, if this
brings about greater strength in the remaining platforms, it should contribute
to financial stability ... While electronic trading has brought a range of policy
issues to the fore, the associated technological advances may offer routes to
solutions ... It seems likely that the direction of resolution of many of the
current questions may lie with the technology itself. And likely too that, as
with the assimilation of previous technologies, ‘electronic trading’will before
long cease to be considered as a distinct issue.” (Helen Allen, John Hawkins
and Settuya Sato,  respectively,  Adviser,  Market  Infrastructure  Division,
Bank  of  England,  Senior  Economist,  BIS,  Basel  and  Head  of  Special
Meetings, BIS, Basel, p. 227)
– The ‘New Economy’ in Europe
“... So far the ‘new economy’ in Europe is more mirage than reality. Even in
the USA there are no clear signs of spillover effects from increased ICT
(Information  and  Telecommunications  Technology)  investment  on  the
efficiency of the economic process ... While for Europe as a whole most
studies show capital deepening with respect to ICT, evidence on TFP (Total
Factor Productivity) growth is rather disappointing.... On an aggregated level,
it becomes evident that – as in the USA – growth in labour productivity is
most vigorous in the ICT-producing sectors, especially in manufacturing, and
to a somewhat less pronounced degree in services. Spillover effects are hardly
visible  ...  Having  classified  the  Internet  as  a GPT (General-Purpose
Technology) it is likely that the full-productivity-enhancing effects will be felt
only with a significant time lag ...” (Antje Stobbe, Head of e-Research, DB
Research, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt/Main, p. 332)
– More on technology in banking
– ’Something of a paradigm shift’:  “...  (Technology) is  impacting  on  the
fundamentals  of  banking  business:  information,  risk  analysis,  distribution,
monitoring and processing. In particular, it enhances management’s access to
information.  Given  that  banks  are  ultimately  in  the  ‘information  business’
(Llewellyn1999), anything that impacts on the cost, availability and management
of information must have a decisive influence on their business...
221Some banking markets (rather than necessarily the banking industry) have
become more contestable in that entry and exit barriers have been reducing in
significance  ...  Recent  new  entrants  into  banking  markets  have  certain
characteristics in common: they tend to be highly focused within a narrow
part of the value chain; they have low fixed costs; they have low or zero
legacy costs; they have a (sometimes substantial) franchise value in their
brand name; they often enter in partnership with incumbent banks; they tend
to use technology-based delivery systems; they have low exit barriers and are
focused in a narrow product range.
Scale has become less of an entry barrier to the extent that, while technology
has increased the economies of scale in processing, many processes can be
subcontracted as, with lower fixed costs through sub-contracting, economies
of scale can effectively be bought-in from specialist providers of processing
services. Scale economies tend to be in bank processes rather than in banks
per se which means that, if processes can be subcontracted, economies of
scale can be secured by firms of varying size.
Developments in technology mean that financial systems are substantially
over-supplied with infrastructure and overlapping delivery systems through
a duplication of branch networks. Delivery strategies are evolving at two
levels: branch networks are being rationalized, and banks are widening the
range of delivery options.
Technology is changing optimal organizational structures for financial firms
though  in  different  ways  for  different  firms  ...  The  deconstruction process
(whereby  financial  products  are  deconstructed  into  their  component  parts:
origination, manufacture, administration, processing etc.) focuses on what might
be termed contract banking which implies financial firms creating internal and
external markets for processes. Some processes may optimally be undertaken
internally while others are subcontracted ... Contract banking implies a bank
offering a full range of services but where the bank coordinates inputs from
a wide range of different companies. The core is a contract the bank has with its
customers to supply a set of services or products of a particular standard.
... If economies of scale relate predominantly to bank processes rather than
institutions, and external contracts can be managed efficiently, the existence
of economies of scale does not mean that only large bank can be competitive
and survive. What in practice is likely to emerge is a spectrum of different
types  of  bank. At  one  end  of  the  spectrum  will  be  the  traditional  fully
integrated bank, which, because of the economies of scale in bank processes,
222will be very large. At the other end of the spectrum will lie the virtual bank.
In practice, the majority of banks will lie within the polar boundaries of the
spectrum, with some services being provided internally and other outsourced
...” (David Llewellyn, cf. supra, pp. 53-54, 55, 56, 59, 60-61, 62, 64)
– Evidence on the penetration of IT in Spanish banking
“... Spanish commercial banks tended to increase their IT and communication
spending from 1996. In the case of savings banks and credit cooperatives the
growth  of  IT spending  began  somewhat  later  and  was  concentrated  in
a shorter time period (1998-1999).The differences in the patterns of behaviour
of these three kinds of bank seem to be related to the differences in their
product specialization and to the existence of a sectoral institution providing
services to the institutions on the basis of cooperation agreements ... In the
case  of  the  commercial  banks,  especially  the  large  ones,  which  have
significant activity in the interbank and government debt markets the advent
of the single currency (in Stage Three of EMU) required an adaptation effort
in these areas, which were those most immediately affected. This type of
activity has less weight in the savings bank sector, which is more orientated
toward retail banking and was therefore able to adapt more gradually.
... Although  the  information  presented  does  not  enable  conclusions  to  be
drawn, it does seem to indicate that, among Spanish commercial banks, there
has  been  a predominant  tendency  to  reduce  employment  and  invest  in
technology which tends to improve the technical quality of capital, while,
among the savings banks and credit cooperatives, the dominant strategy has
been  to  increase  more  labour-intensive  distribution  channels,  such  as  the
branch network.
...  The  development  of  the  alternative  distribution  networks  (based  on
Internet) is not taking place as fast as expected. Despite the advertising drives
by institutions more oriented to this business segment, the results are still not
very brilliant. The physical presence of the bank with which they operate still
dominates the preferences of Spanish bank customers ...
... The application of new systems for risk management and for processing
and transmitting data is expected to help improve the soundness of banks.
However, during the transition period, a number of uncertainties may arise
making greater control by the supervisory authorities necessary in order to
ensure the solidity of banks ...” (Ignacio Fuentes Egusquiza and Teresa
Sastre de Miguel,  Senior  Economists,  Servicio  de  Estudios,  Banco  de
España, pp. 69, 75, 83, 87)
223– Indications on the penetration of remote and direct banking in different
groups of consumers in the UK
“... This group of consumers (i.e. with a consumer behaviour of the relational-
dependent type related to lower income and low level of education) prefer
branch networks rather than remote delivery channels. This suggests that the
least profitable segment of the bank’s customer base has a predisposition to
use  the  most  expensive  delivery  channel  ...  In  the  group  associated  with
a rational-active  behaviour  direct  and  remote  delivery  channels  will
increasingly be adopted. This will lead to a situation where fairly affluent and
profitable customers are predominantly using the most cost-effective delivery
channels.  However  this  group  of  consumers  will  pose  quite  formidable
strategic challenges to banks and financial providers. A high propensity to
switch, combined with high levels of confidence and involvement, suggest
that  innovations  in  delivery  channels,  value  for  money  products,  greater
transparency  of  products,  strong  brand  image,  etc.  will  all  be  crucial  in
retaining and generating profitable business from this group of consumers.
Although quite different, both are being driven by developments in remote
delivery  channels,  increased  levels  of  competition  and  the  move  towards
greater consumer empowerment. These forces of change appear to increase
levels of confidence for some customers (i.e. the latter group) and make them
more  disposed  to  use  remote  and  direct  delivery  channels.  However,  for
others  (i.e.  the  former  group)  an  emphasis  on  technology  and  consumer
empowerment might be reducing confidence levels and making them more
disposed to emphasize personal relationships and branch networks...” (Barry
Howcroft, Professor, Director, Banking Centre, Loughborough University,
pp. 106, 107, 108)
– The impact on employment in the German financial services sector
“...  (In  our  study)  an  econometric  time  series  analysis  demonstrated  that
different skill groups have been influenced in different ways by the increasing
ICT use in the financial sector. While there is a negative impact on unskilled
workers, there are complementarities between high skilled employment and
ICT investment. Furthermore, there is a significant negative impact of rising
labour costs on the employment of low-qualified employees. For the other
skill groups this effect is smaller and insignificant. These results clearly point
to an increasing wage differentiation as a suitable measure against layoffs in
the  low-skilled  employment  segments.  The  results  of  a survey  among
financial  market  experts  confirm  this  view:  in  the  coming  five  years
employment in banks and insurance companies is predicted to decrease ... The
shift in the skill structure that was observable in the past will continue to
224prevail...”  (Ralf-Henning Peters and  Peter Westerheide,  respectively
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Otto von Guericke University
of  Magdeburg  and  Senior  Researcher,  Centre  for  European  Economic
Research, Mannheim, pp. 112-113)
– More on markets and trading
– Network economics effects in wholesale financial markets:  “Network
economics  effects  feature  strongly  in  trading  systems  and  help  explain
commonly  observed  features  of  markets  ...  In  these  markets  network
externalities arise because the value of the network to each participant rises
as other participants join ... These positive network externalities similarly
apply  to  market  liquidity.  All  other  things  being  equal,  it  is  better  to
participate in a bigger than a smaller trading network, since each trader brings
additional trading opportunities/liquidity ... In the absence of rigidities or
other barriers, the presence of these network externalities in a market would
imply a tendency to consolidation ... However, such consolidation may not
occur around an ‘optimal’ system. One reason is first mover advantage ...
Systems that come to the market later may face formidable hurdles to attract
a viable level of participation, even if they offer a better product... These
hurdles may mean users feel ‘locked in’to a dominant system, in which case
a suboptimal equilibrium can be sustained.  However,  it  is  by  no  means
inevitable that dominant market positions will be sustained. Once a critical
level of participation (by an alternative system) is achieved, the market can
tip away from the incumbent and towards the alternative. This switch can be
abrupt ...
... Liquidity is essential for trading systems. It enhances the effectiveness of
the market overall, reducing costs by narrowing spreads and giving depth
such that prices are less affected by particular trades. Electronic systems are
developing a number of ways to attract liquidity and seek it out from disparate
sources ... Despite the technological and strategic efforts, it is generally those
with existing access to order flow (particularly within an existing exchange)
that  have  experienced  viable  volumes.  Few  ‘stand-alone’ systems  have
achieved this. This, however, probably reflects the powerful network effects
of  liquidity  as  much  as  the  characteristics  of  the  electronic  systems
themselves  –  with  liquidity  attracting  (and  ‘locking  in’)  liquidity  ...
Nevertheless, in a world of electronic trading, liquidity is much more mobile
...This ‘tipping effect’was seen when Eurex, within about six months in early
1998, took all the volume in the futures on the ten-year German Bund contract
from the previously dominant LIFFE floor.
225... Looking across financial markets, it is clear that electronic trading has
penetrated  different  sectors  very  unevenly  ...  Existing  market  structures,
regulatory and competitive factors and the varied need of traders have all
affected  the  integration  of  new  technology  into  mainstream  trading.  An
important  element  is  the  asset  type,  since  standardized,  homogeneous
products have proved ‘easiest’ to migrate to electronic trading.
The contrasting development patterns of equity markets in the USAand Europe
show how electronic trading can penetrate the market for the same assets in
a very different manner. Whereas the US equity market has been characterized
by a proliferation of alternative electronic trading venues alongside relatively
few traditional exchanges, Europe has been notable for the absence of separate
systems,  with  electronic  trading  instead  incorporated  within its  many
traditional exchanges. In both markets the common features of the liquidity and
relative  homogeneity  of  the  major  equity  issues  has  made  it  relatively
straightforward and cost-effective to introduce electronic trading ...
While the structure of the foreign exchange market before the introduction of
electronic trading was (rather akin to fixed income) a fragmented bilateral
telephone market, the rapid adoption of systems in the inter-dealer sphere
reflects the liquid, homogeneous nature of the product that can be traded in
standardized units. The latter points presumably explain the earlier presence
of  electronic  trading  in  foreign  exchange  compared  to  fixed  income
markets ...”  (Helen Allen,  John Hawkins and  Setsuya Sato,  cf.  supra,
pp. 209-210, 211, 214, 223-224)
– Stock exchanges
“With the introduction of computer-based trading and settlement and payment
systems  with  remote  access,  both  benefits,  liquidity  and  low  cost  of
infrastructure do not require an on-site presence any more. Spatial proximity
is substituted by virtual proximity on the net ... In principle Electronic Trading
Systems allow traders to locate anywhere. However it is to be expected that
so-called ‘soft factors’ are keeping them from becoming footloose ... While
liquidity  and  joint  use  of  infrastructure  have  lost  in  significance,
informational spillovers are moving into the foreground and are increasingly
important. This includes informational spillovers within the financial sector
(localization effect) as well as between traders – and analysts – and traded
firms (urbanization effects). Although the local labour market argument and
access  to  intermediaries  have  not  diminished  in  importance  through
virtualization, they do not appear to have increased either. One has to be
226careful not to underestimate their relevance, although informational spillovers
appear to be more prominent ...
Yet the direction of the pull remains unclear. On the one hand there is the pull
of localization to the largest agglomeration of traders, i.e. London in Europe.
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  pull  of  urbanization  to  local  information
on traded companies. With these antipodal forces, it is difficult to project
where traders will go in the next years, now that stock exchanges have truly
become virtual...” (Vivien Lo and Michael H. Grote, respectively, Research
Assistant/Lecturer,  Institute  for  Economic  and  Social  Geography  and
Lecturer, Institute for Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt/Main, pp. 196,
199-200)
“...  With  more  than  40  independent  operators  in  Europe,  the  exchanges
industry  is  highly  fragmented.  Two  drivers  should  lead  to  a rather  rapid
consolidation: the pressing demand of the market participants and the (highly
IT-intensive) cost structure of the exchanges. Just like a network operator, an
exchange has significant infrastructure cost, trading and clearing systems,
dissemination and access to many members, but very low marginal costs. The
cost of listing one more company or connecting one more member is close to
zero. With this cost structure, consolidation creates significant synergies by
replacing full IT costs with low marginal ones.
With  this  goal  in  mind,  consolidation  requires  bringing  national  markets
together  rather  than  trying  to  move  them  to  one  particular  national
jurisdiction. Denying the role of the home equity markets is destroying value,
especially for the small and mid caps. Technology allows exchanges to serve
clients where they are offering them the dimension of a European market.
Regulation should not slow down the pace of cross-border consolidation, but
it  should  help  exchanges  to  go  in  that  direction.”  (Olivier Lefebvre,
ExecutiveVice-President,  Member  of  the  Managing  Board,  Euronext  NV,
Brussels, pp. 166, 167, 170)
– Alternative Trading Systems (ATS)
“... Two important trends can be distinguished. First, ATS are currently more
successful in the USAthan in Europe. Second, within the USAthere exists an
interesting divergence between the impact of ATS on the NASDAQ dealer
market and on the NYSE. ATS are attracting about 30 per cent of market share
in the NASDAQ market, whereas their impact on the NYSE is rather small.
Trading volume on ATS in Europe is currently still marginal compared to the
established marketplaces.
227Two forces explaining these differences should be distinguished. The first is
that  European  traditional  marketplaces  were  automated  earlier  than  their
American counterparts ... ATS are the exponent of automated systems and
should therefore be more successful in the USA. Our empirical work shows
that automation also has a significant impact on trading costs in Europe, but
still less substantial than in an international context. This observation brings
us  to  a second  explanation,  i.e.  the  agency  nature  of  trading.  European
markets are mostly organized as an auction market where traders can submit
market and limit orders. ECNs allow investors to trade with each other via
a limit order book without the intervention of a dealer. Therefore ECNs are
successful in attracting NASDAQ trading volume and are expected to be less
successful in competition with the NYSE or European exchanges. Crossing
networks are more successful in realizing trades of NYSE listed securities.
This  leads  us  to  the  projection  that  crossing  networks  may  be  a more
successful ATS business model in Europe than ECNs ...Crossing networks
rely  on  price  discovery  at  the  primary  exchange  while  ECNs  actively
contribute to the price discovery process ...” (Hans Degryse and Mark Van
Achter, Economics Department, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium)
in the concluding remarks of their Marjolin Prize-winning contribution to the
Colloquium, p. 186)
– Technology and payments networks
– Why are national payment systems different and will they remain so?
All the major developed countries have created very different retail payment
systems. These differences continue to exist, even though all countries have
had access to the same payment technologies during the past thirty years ...
I would argue that these differences are based on historical coincidences such
as the emergence of giro systems in the 1920s. The network nature of many
payment  systems  has  caused  these  differences  to  persist  and  at  times  to
increase over the past century. Looking forward, these differences are likely
to persist rather than disappear in the short or even the medium term.
Overall  these  findings  have  some  important  implications:  1.  Cooperation
between players may prevent lock-in into inferior technologies. 2. A pan-
European  payment  network  may  be  further  off  than  most  people  think.
Instead, a continuing patchwork using converters is more likely. 3. If banks or
regulators  really  want  pan-European  solutions,  they  will  need  strong
European  cooperation  platforms  to  offset  the  existing  national  payment
organizations. 4. Outside players that want to enter the European payments
arena may well be advised to take a country-by-country approach. In spite of
228a common European currency, for the time being ‘one size will not fit all’.”
(Gottfried Leibbrandt, McKinsey and Company, Amsterdam, pp. 261, 276)
– Impact of new technologies in the Norwegian banking industry
“... The results (for the period 1987-98) show that the elasticity of scale with
respect to the share of electronic payments in total non-cash payments has
increased as the share of electronic payments has increased. Average variable
costs have decreased. The move towards electronic payment systems has
affected  input  demand  asymmetric(ally),  i.e.  non-neutral(ly),  causing  the
cost-shares of both labour, physical capital and materials to increase while the
cost-share of funding decreases. The input ratios between labour and both
physical capital and materials (including energy) decrease as the share of
electronic payments increases. This is consistent with our a priori beliefs; new
electronic payment systems have particularly substituted out paper-based and
labour-intensive  methods.”  (Kjersti-Gro Lindquist,  Senior  Advisor,
Research Department, Central Bank of Norway, Oslo, p. 298)
– Prospects for e-money
“... So far, the offline electronic systems have utterly failed to penetrate the
payments market. I argue that the obstacles to the success of these systems are
due to market structures rather than technological or psychological barriers.
These  obstacles  stem  from  the  essential  characteristics  of  money  as  (a)
a network and (b) a convenience good (wanted not for its own sake but as
a way to access other goods and services ...).
The prospects for the development and deployment of e-money systems now
look increasingly favourable. The new systems and business models are more
effective than previous ones. The payment market has attracted the attention
of technology and operators from the TCE industries and some of these have
already  formed  alliances  with  the  credit  card  companies  and  the  banks.
Nevertheless there remain two formidable economic obstacles. The first is the
network  effect.  This  means  that  the  promoter  faces  a large  up-front
investment  cost.  It  also  makes  it  risky  for  providers  and  even  individual
countries to ‘go it alone’. The second obstacle is the oligopolistic nature of the
payments industry...
This paper suggests several ways in which the regulator could foster the
development of digital money. There is a clear need to ensure open markets;
minimize the effect of switching costs; and police the pricing structures of
both  new  and  old  transaction  media  ...”  (Peter D. Spencer,  Professor,
Economics Department, Birkbeck College, London, pp. 303, 311-312)
229– More on ‘New Economy: reality or mirage?’
“... To date, economists have not reached agreement about the origin of the
relatively rapid growth in productivity in the USA after 1995. One point of
discussion  is  whether  the  productivity  improvement  observed  is  largely
a cyclical phenomenon or is of a more lasting nature. According to proponents
of the ‘New Economy’ paradigm, the productivity growth trend has come to
lie  definitely  at  a higher  level  under  the  impact  of  new  information  and
communications technologies (ICT).
... However the hefty slowdown in activity in the USA since the end of 2000
has  shown  that  ICT in  reality  can  at  the  very  most  mitigate  the  cyclical
volatility surrounding the growth trend ...
Government policy must in the first instance be confined to the elimination of
institutional and legislative obstacles so that innovative economic activities
can develop to the full ... In addition, the government in the EMU must make
extra efforts as regards the support of commercially oriented R&D efforts ...
On  the  demand  side  of  the  economy  too,  the  development  of  new
technologies and their impact on economic growth can have a hefty impact.
Modern ICT applications are ‘knowledge products’par excellence... Apolicy
implication  of  this  is  that  the  government  may  not  focus  exclusively  on
promoting innovation in firms, but must also pay attention to strengthening
the ICT knowledge and skills among the population ...” (Johan Van Gompel,
Head of Economic Research, KBC Asset Management, Brussels, pp. 356,
365, 366)
“The availability of the new technologies and inexpensive access for a broad
section of the population are not sufficient in themselves to ensure that their
enormous economic potential will be developed to the full. The new economy
has its own laws and requires more flexibility from market participants. It can
therefore only flourish if general national and international conditions allow
these requirements to be fulfilled. For this reason, the new economy is more
than  the  reflection  of  a technological  revolution.  It  highlights  the
responsibility of economic policymakers to create a framework within which
market forces may freely interact and develop. Policies based on the concept
of ‘Ordnungspolitik’... are likely, under these circumstances, to come back in
their own.
Resistance to such reforms is considerable, especially in Europe... The new
economy means more opportunities, but more risks too...
230Nevertheless, there is no reason to be excessively pessimistic. In Europe, the
radical changes that may lead us beyond the dot.coms are already underway
in many areas ...” (Siegfried Utzig, Director Economics, Capital Markets,
Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, Berlin, pp. 348)
Quid if technology leads to a Cashless Society: a theoretical exploration in
monetary economics: “...Innovations  in  information  technologies  have
improved  the  prospects  for  the  advent  of  a cashless  society. Although  it
remains unclear whether the new information technologies will drive out cash
completely from the payments system in the foreseeable future, the prospects
for such an outcome cannot be excluded either ...
We  have  analysed  how  monetary  policies  will  be  affected  in  a cashless
society. Our main conclusions are that the central bank will lose its traditional
instruments  of  monetary  policy.  Standing  facilities  and  open  market
operations will become ineffective as instruments to control the interest rate
and the money stock. This is problematic because in a cashless society where
all the money is privately supplied, there is no clear and reliable mechanism
that ties down the price level ...
...This leads to two possible avenues for the future role of the central bank. In
the first one the central bank becomes very dependent on the Treasury, both
as  a means  of  obtaining  revenues  and  as  a way  of  maintaining  some
effectiveness for its traditional instruments of monetary policies. This road is
not without danger because it would imply a return to a system of political
dependence of the central banks.
Another  avenue  consists  in  redefining  the  role  of  the  central  bank.  This
consists in strengthening the supervisory role of the monetary authority. This
strengthening  would  include  the  use  of  macroeconomic  indicators  in  the
control of the quality of the loan portfolios of the money-issuing institutions.
It  would  lead  the  central  bank  (supervisor)  to  design  its  supervision  in
a counter-cyclical  way.  It  also  implies  that  the  supervision  should  be
expanded to the issuers of e-money...” (Conclusions of Claudia Costa Storti
and Paul De Grauwe, Economist, Banco de Portugal, Lisbon, and Professor
Centrum  voor  Economische  Studiën,  Katholieke  Universiteit  Leuven,
Belgium respectively, pp. 241, 257)
231Colloquium 24: Stability and Efficiency of Financial
Markets in Central and Eastern Europe
Tallinn, Estonia, June 2003
In co-operation with the Bank of Estonia
President of SUERF and Chairman of the Colloquium: David T. Llewellyn
Colloquium Book
Editors: Morten Balling, Frank Lierman and Andy Mullineux
Authors: Morten  Balling,  Dirk  Effenberger,  Gerhard  Fink, Alicia  García-
Herrero, Christopher J. Green, Peter Haiss, Zsigmond Járai, Vahur
Kraft,  Tuuli  Koivu,  Lelo  Liive,  Hans  Christian  Mantler,  Victor
Murinde, Totka Naneva, Nikolay Nenovsky, Ivaylo Nikolov, Luigi
Passamonti, Pedro del Rio, Franz Schardax, Mart Sörg, Mariana
Tomova,  Michel  Tison,  Janek  Uiboupin,  Urmas  Varblane,  Vello
Vensel, C Maxwell Watson, Peter Zajc.
Publishers: Routledge, London and New York, forthcoming.
Tallinn 2003: the right topic, the right time, the right place
The road map: transition    convergence    accession    EU membership
  EMU membership
“...The efficiency of financial systems is particularly important for Central
and Eastern European countries where modern financial systems have been
built up almost from scratch over the last ten years. In line with the EU
accession process, full integration of Central and Eastern European countries’
financial  systems  to  the  EMU  has  increasingly  become  a priority.  The
integration  and  flexibility  of  financial  systems  plays  an  essential  role  in
promoting  full  convergence  and  supporting  economic  stability  within  the
monetary policy framework of the EMU.
... Directly or indirectly, the primary goal of most central banks is price stability...
(But) monetary transmission cannot be efficient if a weak financial system
distorts interest signals by increasing margins, or if financial markets have ceased
to  function  for  the  reason  that  some  of  the  participants  do  not  trust  other
players...” (Q under C24, Vahur Kraft, Governor of Bank of Estonia, mimeo)
233“Without  successful  financial  sector  reform,  a fundamental  criteria  for
accession, an economy functioning based on market principles, would not
have been met. This has been a major accomplishment. To establish a proper
legal and regulatory framework for financial intermediation activities and,
within this framework, to have had several hundreds of independent financial
institutions mobilize and allocate the nation’s savings in a profitable and
sustainable  way  has  been  a very  significant  accomplishment-given  initial
conditions.
...  There  are  intrinsic  limits  to  how  much  capital  domestic  banks  can
effectively recycle in the local economy given the deposits they can mobilize,
the returns available, the intermediation costs to be incurred, the risk profile
of potential borrowers, the loan portfolio concentration risk and the equity
base that shareholders are prepared to allocate to that particular business in
the country...
In the new member countries, much more than in any other EU-15 country,
the solution for credit and financial deepening could be found at the level of
the EU single financial market- and not within the boundaries of their small
financial markets...
It  is  quite  possible  that  the  new  member  states  may  become  the  main
beneficiaries  of  the  EU  Financial  Sector  Plan  ...  EU  membership  is  the
platform for a potential leapfrog in financial sector development.
... This is a major exercise. National authorities and the EU will lead it. But it
requires the involvement of many players – also, and in particular, of market
participants. According to the old City of London adage: Markets are not
created by rules and regulations; they are created by market participants – in
italics in the text...” (Luigi Passamonti, The World Bank, mimeo)
“... Little more than a decade after transition began, the progress that has been
made in strengthening the efficiency of the financial sector is impressive – but
it gives no grounds for complacency in terms of the path ahead.
Private  sector  credit,  even  in  economies  such  as  Hungary,  Poland  and
Slovenia, is still only some two-thirds the level typical of banking systems in
the  EU.  With  the  exception  of  Hungary  and  Poland,  money  markets
throughout the region are still relatively narrow. Capital markets remain fairly
illiquid- with active equity trading confined to a handful of stocks; private
bond markets narrow; and money markets embryonic in most cases. And
234although banks have been branching out into fee and commission earning
activities  directly  and  through  their  subsidiaries-they  remain  heavily
dependent at this stage on interest income. By EU standards, financial depth
typically remains fairly modest-leaving a considerable way to go to ensure
that the financial sector functions efficiently and is competitive in the setting
of the EU market in financial services...
... In the period ahead, macroeconomic and financial sector policies will face
challenges, as the CEE region remains a magnet for international capital.
These flows can accelerate the catch-up in living standard towards those of
present  EU  members,  but  only  if  resources  are  allocated  efficiently,  and
growth is not punctuated by crisis. In these regards, the financial sector has
a pivotal role to play...
The focus must thus remain on initiatives-from non bank supervision to sound
fiscal policy-that will allow the sector to contribute fully as policy-makers
chart the road to full EU integration...” (Maxwell Watson, Wolfson College
Oxford, mimeo)
Small Estonia as a success country on the road map
“... Estonia ..., by the late 1990s achieved success through a strictly rule-based
macropolicy framework (currency board, balanced budget), a major banking
clean-up in the late 1990s-triggered by the Asian and Russian crises; and
absolute openness to foreign capital. It is notable that all three (i.e. Estonia,
Hungary and Poland) found their different ways to a four-point program that
comprised  of  sound  macroeconomics;  prudent  but  comprehensive
liberalization; hard budget constraints on firms; and sound basic elements of
banking regulation and supervision.The quality and complementarity of these
policies, over time ,accounts for their success...” (Maxwell Watson, op.cit)
“Estonia has made strong progress to date in developing a privately-owned
and market-oriented banking sector and is achieving fairly rapid expansion of
the financial sector in general including non-bank financial institutions such
as  leasing,  insurance,  investment  firms  and  private  pension  funds.  With
substantial influence in recent years from strong Nordic strategic investors,
productivity  and  efficiency  of  the  financial  sector  is  rapidly  approaching
Western European standards...
The banking sector has been strengthened through the further consolidation
behind foreign investors. At the end of 2002, 7 banks were operating in the
235market (down from 42 banks in 1992 and 11 banks in 1997). Foreign owners
own more than 90% of the banking sector capital and 98% of assets...
What else is there to do for Estonia in enhancing the financial markets? There
has definitely been a success-story in building up the financial sector and
establishing the regulations ... Shall Estonia now only have to maintain its
reputation as a country with open and competitive economy and just proceed
with integrating the new standards set out by the (European) Commission and
international organisations?
It is for sure not the main prospective for us. Capital and financial services
activity is, in the global economic market, highly mobile. Abalance has to be
struck between making an economy friendly and supportive of the financial
services  sector,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  danger  of  making  a state
overindulgent and apparently negligent on the other. In order to attain this we
do have a plan to say our word in working out the international standards and
in integrating them in Estonian laws.
The regulations must work for the gain of the market place. The new market
place for the accession countries is the single market of the whole Europe.
That is the perspective to keep in mind. It is time to avoid using regulations
to protect national markets and make choices which promote competition and
diversify to the benefit of the future European financial markets” (Lelo Liive,
Deputy Director, Ministry of Finance of Estonia, mimeo)
“The  banking  sector  in  Estonia  has  been  among  the  frontrunners  in
understanding the opportunities and risks of the internationalisation process.
The internationalisation ... has been twofold. At one side foreign banks have
intensively  entered  into  the  Estonian  banking  market... At  the  same  time
some Estonian banks have tried to enlarge their activities on neighbouring
foreign markets..., particularly towards Latvia and Lithuania.Th main reason
was  the  market-seeking  argument-  the  domestic  market  was  very  limited
by size  and  competition  was  heavy.  An  additional  important  aspect  for
entering  the  Latvian  and  Lithuanian  markets  was  also  the  need  to  serve
domestic (Estonian) firms, which moved intensively into these markets since
early 1995 ...” (Mart Sörg, Janek Uiboupin, Urmas Varblane, all from
the University  of  Tartu,  and  Vello Vensel,  Tallinn  Technical  University,
mimeo)
236Assessing the role and the performance of the financial sector in transition
economies
An ambiguous link between financial sector development and economic
growth?
“...Impressive evidence from broad empirical studies indicates that financial
sector  size  and  financial  sector  industry  efficiency  have  an  economically
important impact on economic growth. Recent work suggests that the degree
to which a country’s financial architecture is bank-based or securities-based
is not necessarily associated with economic growth, whereas the degree to
which  a country’s legal  system  protects  creditor  and  shareholder  rights,
enforces law and promotes information disclosure by accounting standards
contributes to the development of the financial sector. Looking exclusively at
OECD countries, empirical evidence indicates that the correlation of financial
indicators and growth is considerably weaker or vanishing. Historical studies
for  OECD  countries  detected  a strong  relation  between  financial  size
indicators  and  economic  growth,  indicating  that  especially  in  early
development stages the financial sector has growth-enhancing potential. First
evidence for transition countries indicates that growth-enhancing potential
lies  not  so  much  in  financial  sector  size but  more  in  financial  sector
efficiency...” (Gerhard Fink, Peter Haiss, and Hans Christian Mantler,
University of Vienna, on the basis on a systematic literature screening of
11,512 articles between 1997 to 2002, mimeo)
“...We  used  two  variables  to  measure  the  level  of  the  banking  sector
development in 25 transition countries for the period 1993-2001: interest rate
margin and the amount of credit allocated to the private sector...The margin
between deposit and lending rates describes the efficiency in the banking
sector and is closely linked to theoretical models which find that a more
efficient banking sector accelerates economic growth by increasing the share
of savings allocated to the investments. Our results support the view that an
efficient banking sector, where interest rate margins are low accelerates GDP
growth.
Our second variable, the amount of bank credit allocated to the private sector
production seems to have a more ambiguous effect on economic growth. The
higher  amount  of  credit  has  accelerated  simultaneous  GDP growth  in
transition economies but when the amount of credit is lagged with one year
the credit seems to have been harmful to economic development. In other
words, the loan growth has not been sustainable. This result is different from
the results of earlier studies and, according to our view, is related to the
237special characteristics of transition countries... This result implicates that the
development of the financial sector cannot be measured solely by its size, at
least  in  the  transition  countries.  In  addition,  the  countries  should  not  be
encouraged to increase the size of the banking sector without first having
properly  functioning  institutions  and  market  structures  in  place...”  (Tuuli
Koivu, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition, mimeo)
“...We analysed technical efficiency of banks in CEE (Central and Eastern
Europe – i.e. nine transition economies) and EU (France and Portugal) during
the  period  1993-2001,  using  data  development  analysis  DEA)  ...  and
according  to  two  different  scenarios:  the  first  is  based  on  the  profit-
maximizing behavior of banks, while the second is based on the economic
growth-generating objectives of the regulatory authorities. On average, banks
in transition economies tend to have higher efficiency scores on the first set
of objectives and lower performance on the second one.
No matter what measures of performance are used, the technical efficiency of
banks in CEE countries in obtaining both sets of objectives was converging
to that in the evaluated EU member states in terms of decreasing variability.
The greatest decrease in the heterogeneity of banking efficiency in transition
countries and between CEE and EU member states could be observed in the
year 2000, following the launch of the European Monetary Union.
Despite  the  trend  of  decreasing  dispersion  of  performance  measures,
differences in efficiency levels are still great... (However) banks in the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic are on average indistinguishable from that
in the EU (member states) in terms of ability to obtain commercial banks
objectives...” (Mariana Tomova, NikolayNenovsky and Totka Naneva,
University for National and World Economy, Bulgarian National Bank and
World Bank respectively, mimeo)
Foreign Banks: Friends or Foes?
“... One of the developments characteristic of many CEEC countries is the
entrance of foreign banks. Foreign capital has had a positive impact on the
financial  sector,  increasing  competition  and  making  it  possible  to  import
management culture and professional skills. It is noticeable that no proof of
significant negative effects related to the foreign banks entry has been found.
It seems that the foreign banks credit policies have been less sensitive to local
economic downturns and the entrance of foreign banks has not imported
instability in any form...” (Vahur Kraft, op.cit.)
238“...Results of the authors’ inquiry by questionnaire in Estonia, Lithuania,
Poland and Romania:
– The  most  important  motive  for  foreign  banks  are  new  business
opportunities.  The  expansion  strategy  was  evaluated  as  the  second
most important reason...
– Foreign banks have quite different advantages over domestic banks in
different  countries.  In  general,  reputation  of  foreign  banks  was
evaluated as the most important advantage, followed by the range and
quality of banking innovations. The main advantage of domestic banks
is  a better  knowledge  of  customers  and  closer  bank-customer
relations...
– There are no very significant differences between foreign and domestic
banks in the main fields of activities. Corporate financing is the most
important field for both domestic and foreign banks...
– Foreign banks’ strategies foresee a long-term stay in the Estonian and
Romanian banking markets...
– The transfer of various kinds of know-how from foreign banks has
been important, especially for risk management...
– Foreign banks’ entry increased significantly the overall competition in
the banking markets and reduced the profitability and efficiency of
operating domestic banks in the host country...
– Long term loans to first class business clients dominated the segments
of competitive pressure from foreign banks...
– Foreign banks’ entry has improved service quality and innovation in
the host country’s banking.” (Mart Sörg et al., op. cit.)
The dynamics of foreign bank ownership:
“Results (for six CEE countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia in the 1995-2000 period) show that foreign bank entry,
measured both as the number of foreign banks and as the foreign banks’share
in total assets, reduces net interest margin, income and profits, and increases
costs of domestic banks. A reduction of the net interest margin and of profits
suggests that foreign bank entry enhances competition in the banking sector.
Arise in costs may indicate that domestic banks react to new competitors and
invest  in  refocusing  their  businesses  and  in  introducing  new  products...”
(Peter Zajc, Faculty  of  Economics,  University  of  Ljubljana,  Slovenia,
mimeo)
“A dissenting view on the basis of an investigation of economies of scale and
scope on 273 foreign and domestic banks located in nine different countries:
239Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland and Romania, for the period 1995-1999:
The paper contests the widespread belief that foreign banks are more efficient
than their counterparts... Banks in Central and Eastern Europe are both scale
and scope efficient, for the sample period 1995-1999... Foreign banks are not
more efficient than the average bank in each of the nine European transition
economies. In general the results reject the hypothesis that foreign banks are
more  efficient  than  domestic  banks  in  these  economies.  In  addition,  the
regression  results  of  the  system  of  equations  suggest  that  foreign  bank
ownership (rather than domestic bank ownership) is not a significant factor in
reducing the banks’ total costs...” (Christopher J. Green, Department of
Economics,  Loughborough  University,  Victor Murinde, Birmingham
Business School, University of Birmingham and Institute for Development
Policy  and  Management,  University  of  Manchester  and  Ivaylo Nikolov,
Center for Economic Development, Sofia, Bulgaria, mimeo)
The quest for financial stability
What is the central bank’s role in supporting financial stability? – Overview
and Estonian practice:
“...Over  the  past  decade  we  have,  once  and  again,  in  many  countries,
witnessed a weak financial system causing a currency crisis that results in
capital  flight,  devaluation  and  deep  recession.  This  particular  threat  is
especially relevant to fixed exchange rates systems where financial sector
assets and liabilities usually tend to have a currency mismatch. Central banks
are (also) interested in financial stability as they often have the leading role in
crisis resolution by providing emergency assistance and (by) working out
restructuring plans.
Acentral bank’s direct responsibilities in maintaining financial stability, apart
from its direct supervisory functions, can be divided into three large areas:
– monitoring and analysis of financial system developments,
– designing and building up financial system safety nets,
– often, responsibility for the banking system regulation
The successful fulfilment of the central bank’s financial stability supporting
functions  highly  depends  on  the  quality  of  information  and  analysis
available...The key to vulnerability analysis is successful implementation of,
ideally,  several  analytical  tools,  including  early  warning  systems  and
macroprudential analysis. It should ...be noted that creating early warning
systems in small countries like Estonia with a highly concentrated banking
240sector  is  probably  very  different  from  large  countries.  If  you  only  have
7 individual banks to supervise, close individual monitoring of each bank
might be more cost effective than building up a sufficiently sophisticated
aggregated system.
...Having in mind the rapidly developing economy and (our) currency board
arrangement, we believe that our banking system should have robust liquidity
buffers  and  sufficient  capital  to  withstand  the  fluctuation  of  asset  prices.
Therefore, we have set a relatively high reserve requirement (13 per cent of
the banks’liabilities, half of which the banks can hold in high-quality foreign
assets)... (As far as regulation is concerned) I would just like to point out that
one advantage of being a transition economy has been the possibility to draw
the legislation from scratch. This has very much facilitated the compliance
with good practices and the de facto full adoption of the EU acquis. It is
important  to  note,  however,  that  adoption  of  the  acquis means  not  only
issuing new legislation but also ensuring compliance with the regulations...
What is a real regulatory challenge for the central bank in our case is the
question to what extent should regulatory measures be taken into account in
a broader financial policy context. There are arguments for designing the
regulations with a view to business cycles, especially as it seems that in the
modern world financial systems have become more pro-cyclical than before.
In that case, anticipatory measures may pre-empt the possibly devastating
effects of asset price volatility and loan losses once the economy starts to cool
down. This approach has a particular appeal under the currency board as the
active use of monetary measures is excluded and reserve requirements are
essentially the only monetary tool. In these circumstances, sound prudential
measures  have  had  an  important  role.  Eesti  Pank  (the  Bank  of  Estonia)
increased  the  capital  adequacy  ratio  with  a view  to  promoting  resilience
against cyclical risks in 1997 at the onset of Asian contagion, before the peak
of the cycle...” (Vahur Kraft, op.cit.)
Early warning models
“...The so-called first-generation crisis models, pioneered by Krugman (1979)
strongly emphasize economic fundamentals in their explanation of balance of
payments/currency  crisis...The  difficulties  of  first-generation  models  in
explaining contagion effects and the occurrence of balance of payments crisis
in countries with relatively sound fundamentals led to the development of
second-generation models .In this approach features of speculative attacks are
explicitly incorporated...More recent theoretical work- often referred to as
241‘generation two and a half’ places (again) more weight on the importance of
economic fundamentals.
...The results of this study lend support to ‘first generation’ and ‘generation
two  and  a half’ crisis  models  which  place  a big  weight  on  economic
fundamentals in explaining currency crises...
An early warning model was developed using all available quarterly data
from twelve transition countries from the beginning of 1989 up to the third
quarter 2002. It was shown that a number of indicators (the deviation of the
real exchange rate from a trend; the current account; the growth of reserves;
the growth of exports; the ratio of M2/reserves; the growth of this ratio; the
ratio  budget  balance/GDP)  contain  useful  information  for  early  warning
purposes when evaluated according to a modified signal approach. In this
approach, an indicator is understood to issue a signal, if the level of the
indicator exceeds a certain threshold. Using a cut-off level for the probability
of crisis of 25%, the model proves to perform significantly better than random
guesses  as  well  as  some  comparable  early  warning  models.  Overall,  the
model  appears  to  track  developments  in  individual  countries  rather  well,
although the importance of some variables seems to change over time...”
(Franz Schardax, Capital Invest, Vienna, Austria)
“A third generation of crisis models was developed in the wake of the Asian
crisis. These models stress the importance of microeconomic weaknesses and
seek to explain the coexistence of bank and currency crises (twin crises).
Here,  for  the  first  time,  institutions  are  explicitly  considered  as  major
determinants of a currency’s vulnerability to crises...
...The study aimed at shed light on the influence of the type and the quality of
institutions on the vulnerability of currencies. It was found that above all, the
type of exchange rate regime, the quality of the regulatory and supervisory
setting and the degree of liberalisation significantly influence the probability
of a currency crisis. If all other indicators remain constant, the vulnerability
of the CEECs to currency crises is reduced significantly with a currency
board or a flexible regime (despite the Bulgarian crisis). The existence of
a conventional fixed rate regime or a crawling peg raises the vulnerability.
The EBRD indicators of the quality of banking supervision (convergence
with BIS or IOSCO standards) prove also to have a significant influence on
the probability of currency crises. Finally, the index of economic freedom,
published by the Heritage Foundation, proves also to be significant but in
a negative  sense.  This  result  becomes  understandable  if  the  ‘degree  of
242liberalisation’ is applied to international capital flows. Economies that are
closed  in  this  respect  are  obviously  less  vulnerable  to  an  outflow  of
international capital and hence to currency crises.
An early warning system that included these factors provided much better
forecast  quality  than  a purely  economic  benchmark  model...”  (Dirk
Effenberger, Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt am Main and University of
Münster, Germany)
Price stability and financial stability: synergy or trade-off?
“...We look into the role that the design of monetary policy may have in
fostering  financial  stability,  in  particular  the  choice  of  the  central  bank
objectives and the monetary policy strategy. More specifically, we assess
empirically whether countries whose central banks focus narrowly on price
stability are less prone to financial instability, when accounting for other
factors. In the same vein, we test which monetary policy strategy (exchange
rate based, money or inflation targeting), if any best contributes to financial
stability...We concentrate on banking crises, banks being the major player in
most countries’ financial system and influence most directly by the central
bank... We apply abinary (logit) model to apanel of yearly data for 79countries
(27 industrialised, 32 developing and 20 transition) over the years 1970-1999
(1492  observations)  ... We  conduct  one  set  of  regressions,  which  can  be
considered the baseline and three more sets of regressions, as robustness tests.
The  study  yields  evidence  that  the  choice  of  the  central  bank  objectives
significantly influences the probability that a banking crisis may occur. In
particular focusing the central bank objectives on price stability reduces the
likelihood of a banking crisis, other things given. This result is robust to the
definition of banking crisis (only systemic) and to different country groups,
except for transition economies.The results for this latter group, however,
should be taken with care due to the relatively small number of observations
on which they are drawn.
As for the monetary policy strategy, exchange rate targeting appears to be the
preferred option in terms of financial stability when all types of banking crises
are considered (systemic or not) and for the group of transition countries, but
not for industrial and emerging countries. This finding would support the
choice of relatively fixed exchange regimes in countries in transition as far as
financial stability is concerned while not necessarily for other country groups
(i.e. a partly different conclusion from that of Effenberger for currency crises).
... Finally locating regulatory and supervisory responsibilities at the central
243bank reduces the likelihood of a banking crisis in all the model specifications
where this variable has been included...” (Alicia García Herrero and Pedro
del Rio, Banco  de  España,  Madrid,  in  their  Marjolin  Prize-winning
contribution to the Colloquium, mimeo)
A legal note: should the prudential supervisor be (regulatorily) immune?
“In  a EU  perspective  the  issue  of  supervisory  liability  still  is  ‘under
construction’and different orientations have been identified: on the one hand,
individual  member  states  increasingly  tend  to  limit  supervisory  liability
through  statutory  immunity  regimes,  thereby  supported  by  the  Basle
Committee’s Core Principles. On the other hand, depositors more and more
put pressure on national courts by relying on EU law as legal foundation for
supervisory liability in order to circumvent limitations originating in member
states’law. We have argued that allowing Francovich
4-liability in the field of
prudential supervision allows to strike a fair balance between the legitimate
expectations from depositors in the quality of supervision and the risk of
systematically shifting the cost of banking failures to government
With the problem of accession in 2004 the discussions about supervisory
liability will increasingly influence most of the CEECs as well. As CEECs
have incorporated the acquis communautaire into their national laws, or are
in the process to do so, most of them already at present operate under similar
prudential standards as the EU member states. However, building a stable and
sound banking system requires more than simply ‘transplanting’ the legal
rules. It also requires the setting up of well staffed supervisory agencies which
can effectively ensure high quality supervision...” (Michel Tison, Financial
Law Institute, Ghent University, Belgium)
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4 In its judgment in the Francovich and Bonifaci cases (19.11.1991) the European Court of
Justice held that a member state could be held liable for non fulfilment of its obligations under EU
law and that this liability could be legally based on EU law, not on the law of individual member
states. Since the obligation to exercise prudential supervision and the minimum requirements
attach  to  it  are  determined  by  the  various  EU  banking  directives,  it  could  be  argued  that
shortcomings in the exercise of prudential supervision constitute a breach of the member states’
obligations under the EU directives and therefore could form the legal foundation for a liability
claim directed against the member state for the acts or omissions of its supervisory authority.
However, according to the Court’s case a number of conditions must be satisfied in order to
establish Francovich-liability.245
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